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## POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE NEW STATES

### I

#### THE WILL TO BE MODERN

There are very few states today which do not aspire to modernity. The day of rulers who were indifferent to the archaism of the society which they governed has almost disappeared. The leaders of nearly every state—both the old established states as well as the new states of Asia and Africa—feel a pressing necessity of espousing policies which will bring them well within the circle of modernity. Much of the opposition which they encounter among their politically interested countrymen contends that they are not modern enough. Many traditionalists are constrained to assert that only by cleaving to the essence of older traditions can a genuine and stable modernity be attained.

Among the elites of the new states, "modern" means dynamic, concerned with the people, democratic and equalitarian, scientific, economically advanced, sovereign and influential.

Modern states must be "dynamic", above all else. To be modern, an elite, as the elites of the new states see it, must not fear change; on the contrary, it must strive to bring it about. It does not wish to remain as it is. It is against the *ancien regime*; even where it affirms the past of the country, it stresses its adaptability to the needs of the present. "Dynamic" is one of the favorite adjectives of the elites of the new states. The elites pride themselves on their dynamism and they claim that the mass of the population demands it of them. Almost everything else which they esteem presupposes this praise of change.

According to the elites of the new states, the "interests of the people" are the engines of the dynamic society. Dynamic, "modern" states must therefore be "welfare states". Accordingly, the elites proclaim the welfare of all the people, and especially the lower classes, as their deepest urge. "Modern" states are meant necessarily to be democratic states in which the "people" are not merely objects of the care and solicitude of their rulers, but they are, as the "nation", also alleged to be the source of inspiration of these rulers. Revolutions are made by officers to fulfill or protect the aspirations of "the people;" great programs of industrial development are undertaken on the grounds that "the people" demand them; actions to enhance the international prestige of the new states are initiated, at least in part, because "the people" will welcome that enhancement. Even actions of the most undemocratic sort are justified by reference to

the alleged desires and interests of "the people". The "will of the people" becomes the exclusive ground of the legitimacy of the regime.

Modernity entails democracy, and democracy in the new states must above all be equalitarian. Modernity, in the eyes of the elites of the new states, therefore entails the dethronement of the rich and the traditionally privileged from their positions of pre-eminent influence. It involves land reform, i.e., the breaking up of large private estates, especially those which are owned by absentee landlords. It involves steeply progressive income taxation. It involves universal suffrage, even if the suffrage is exercised primarily as acclamation. It involves breaking the power of the traditional interests, of chiefs, sultans and priesthoods. It involves the replacement of monarchies by republics. Modernity demands universal public education and equality of access to opportunities to enter into the more influential and better rewarded positions with which even an egalitarian regime cannot dispense. To be a "modern" democracy implies according to the prevailing conception in the new states, that the rulers should be answerable to the people for what they do. Where they are not in fact answerable to them through a legislature which is popularly and periodically elected, then they allege that they exercise a stewardship on behalf of the people, and that they are answerable to the collective will, the "higher will" which is more real than the empirical will of their people. They are, they allege, answerable to them in a better sense and in the longer run. Their stewardship, which is in fact often irresponsible, is said to be transitional to a period in which the people will rule.

To be modern is to be scientific. A dynamic modern elite aspires to direct change through the use of science. This means that, in principle, it alleges to set its face against the guidance of policy by superstitious procedures (e.g., by divination, magical practices, and astrology). The elites usually claim to believe that the progress of their country towards modernity rests on rational technology, and ultimately on scientific knowledge. Hence, it involves the promotion of scientific research and the utilization of the results of that research for common good. Education is commonly regarded as one way of diffusing the scientific spirit among the new generation, and of breaking the hold of traditional beliefs, and the traditional privileges associated with those beliefs.

The proponents of modernity assert that no country can claim to be modern without being economically advanced or progressive. This is the very center of dynamism. To be advanced economically means to have an economy based on modern technology, to be industrialized and to have a high standard of living. No country can aspire to be modern and not purport to pay attention to its economic improvement. All this requires planning, employing economists and statisticians, conducting surveys, controlling the rates of saving and investment, controlling imports and foreign exchange, constructing new factories, building roads and harbors, developing of railways, irrigation schemes, fertilizer production, agricultural research, forestry research, etc., etc.

Modernity requires national sovereignty. And this, in the minds of its protag-

onists, presupposes the existence of a nation, which rules itself through indigenous organs and persons. With or without representative institutions, the modern sovereign state is put forward as the embodiment of the essence of its society. National sovereignty means to the elites of the new states not only internal autonomy from foreign rule or influence, it also means playing a part in the larger arena of world politics. It means exercising influence among the nations. To be sovereign is to have an influential and respected place as a modern nation on the world stage.

"Modern" means being Western without the onus of dependence on the West. The model of modernity is a picture of the West detached in some way from its geographical origins and locus; it permits the affirmation of Soviet Russian and Chinese idelas which ostensibly have what is worthwhile in the West, while being themselves anti-Western.

Now, what are the "new states", the *aspirations* of which to modernity we speak of here? They are states which are not yet "modern." Already modern states—the states of Western Europe and of North America (and the English-speaking dominions of the British Commonwealth)—need not *aspire* to modernity. They *are* modern. It has become part of their nature to be modern and indeed what they are is definitive of modernity. The image of the Western countries and the partial incorporation and transformation of that image in the Soviet Union provide the standards or models in the light of which the elites of the unmodern new states of Asia and Africa seek to reshape their countries.

The new states are "non-Western," both geographically and in the imagery of their elites. They are Asian and African states. Not all the states of Asia and Africa are new. Japan is not a new state, nor is China nor are Liberia, Iran, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Thailand. These are all states which have enjoyed sovereignty for a long time. The South American states are not new states. They have had their sovereignty for a long time although except for a few spurts and spots here and there, they have not become modern. They exist in an intermediate zone between the modern, longer established states and the unmodern new states.

Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, India, Ceylan, Pakistan, Iraq, the United Arab Republic, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Viet-Nam, Israel, Ghana, Guinea, the Philippines, the recently formed states of French West Africa and, Nigeria, are all new states; their acquisition of sovereignty is relatively recent or is just now taking place. Their societies are old and they live in traditions which maintain the past in the present. The states which rule these societies are, however, recent creations, even where independent sovereign states once existed in the territories which, to a greater or lesser extent, correspond with their present boundaries. They are the results of the recession of Western imperialism.

The new states of Asia and Africa have the following properties in common:

- 1) They have recently acquired independent sovereignty following a substant-

ial period of foreign—Western—rule; their indigenous machinery of government is of quite recent origin; 2) their social structure and culture are, on the whole, highly traditional; 3) significant sections of their elite are concerned to modernize their social structure, their culture and their political life and outlook. It must be stressed that the elites of the new states are not equally and fully oriented towards modernity. In some of the states, certain of the constituent elements of modernity are pursued with more vigor than others; in some of the states the elites are more unqualifiedly and more zealously directed towards modernity than in others where the elite is less sympathetic with modern aspirations. Within almost every state, there are variations among the different sectors of the elites. The differences are often indicative of important cleavage within the elite. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to assert that, in practically every new state, the drive towards modernity is a major factor in the country's public life.<sup>1</sup>

## II

## THE DETERMINANTS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

This promethean urge towards modernity places a strain on every resource and aspiration which the elites of the new states bring to their self-imposed task. The available resources—the inherited body of traditional beliefs, the existing social structure, the available human personalities and the moral and intellectual qualities of the elites themselves—all stand in the path of the ideal sought. The struggle to close that gap between the dusty present and the attainment of modernity arouses recalcitrances in the resources as well as discloses new potentialities; it also deforms the ideal itself. The struggle will take its revenge on the political system which is the instrument chosen to bring about this movement into modernity. The institutions of government, major and auxiliary, with which the new states have begun their sovereign careers are increasingly subject to the drag of the old societies which must be governed and the counter-pull of the ideal of modernity. Both of these will change, but they will not cease their tearing strain on the form of government. The result will

<sup>1</sup>. The confluence of these three properties: the recent acquisition of sovereignty and the attendant creation of the machinery of the modern state; the massively traditional character of the social structure and culture, and the urge towards modernity define the new states as a significant category.

New states are not alone in most of their problems. For example, long established states such as Ethiopia or Thailand are characterized by the traditionality of their social structure, and many states with a long history of continuous sovereignty are the scene of conflict between attachments to tradition and the drive towards modernity. Almost all countries outside Western Europe and possibly the United States experience the cultural tension between metropolis and province. Numerous problems in the new states are instances of more general classes of problems which are shared by many states, Western and non-Western, new and old, advanced and underdeveloped, sovereign and colonial. The new states present however a unique *constellation* of problems.

probably be something which no one wished for or foresaw in the order of society, in the level of modernity attained and in the political system which will be the outcome of this violent encounter between the past and the future.

It is the resultant political order which interests us primarily. In order to estimate the outcome we shall survey the stock of available resources in social structure, cultural tradition and human qualities and skills with which this journey towards modernity is being undertaken, and seek to assess the influence which each of them exerts on the political regime which commences the journey, and on the form which the regime might assume as the journey advances, hesitates, or stops.

*A. Social Structure: Kinship, territory and community:*

Among the societies of the new states, although to very unequal degrees, the status of a human being is very much a function of his kinship connections—and in certain of the societies —of his caste membership and his linguistic group affiliations. This stands in the way of his becoming a citizen in a political society. The rural kinship system (and where it exists, the caste system which works in the same direction) obstructs the entry of the rural mass into the modern nation. The extended kinship system (and caste) both confine the loyalties, and the capacities for loyalty, to a narrow, locally circumscribed range. They inhibit the flow of loyalty to the larger territory, and to the population which inhabits it and potentially constitutes the nation. While, on the one hand, these traditional structures of kinship and locality stabilize the social structure of the new states and thus give their elites a breathing spell in which to find their direction and to get under way, the particularistic spirit which is thus maintained and reinforced, spreads throughout the society and hinders the formation of the vague, intermittent and genuine unity of spirit which is necessary for a modern political society.

The preponderance of parochial loyalties renders difficult the working of the rule of law. Strong attachments to kinship, caste and local territorial groups mean that in administration and adjudication, it is more difficult to obtain justice, since there will be a tendency for judge and administrator to favor his kinsmen, his caste-fellows, and co-believers. It will also be reflected in favoritism in appointments to administrative office.

In poor peasant countries, litigation is a major topic of passion and entertainment. Inequities in the application of the law will echo widely and will cause the lower classes to feel that the new government is corrupt and in some ways less good than the foreign government which it replaced, or than some alternative regime which seeks to displace it. In poor countries, furthermore, government employment is very highly prized; communal and other favoritism is interpreted as evidence that the rulers look only to their own personal and communal interest. As a result, the "political gap" between rulers and ruled,

which is a major fact of life in the new states and a challenge to every modern type of polity, will remain undiminished.

When a government is considered to represent particular kinship, caste, or local interests, the citizenry look upon it as neither just nor representative of the national interest. It makes each section of the society fearful of exploitation and suppression by others, and thereby weakens the effectiveness of government, and heightens reluctance to participate in schemes for which the government needs the assent and the will of the ordinary man.

Yet to accredit themselves, the governments of the new states must be effective. More than that, they must be strong enough to satisfy some of the demands which the politically interested sections of the population make of them. If they fumble and stumble, they alienate the politically sensitive section of the society and thus maintain the "gap" between government and governed, which if it is not closed by consent can be given the appearance of closure by coercion. The aggravation of the dissensuality of a society split by particularism is a standing invitation to an anxious government to establish an enforced consensus.

The parochialism of kinship, caste and locality makes it more difficult to create stable and coherent nation-wide parties. Parties tend rather, to be cliques or aggregations of bosses and their clients, overlaid upon a regional or tribal base. Thus, insofar as the regime operates within a more or less democratic constitution, and it is not dominated by the massive party of national independence, the government is like to rest on an uneasy coalition of segmental and rivalrous interests.

The growth of an effective opposition party which could form an alternative government is stunted both by this fragmentation and by the condition in which the state remains under the overwhelming dominance of one single party, usually the party directly identified in the public mind with emancipation from foreign rule. Where the large nationalist (Congress-like) party breaks up, the immediate alternative is an unstable coalition of fragmentary parties. Another alternative is an ideological party which zealously turns against traditional and primordial obligations.

2. *Class structure:* The economic and social "underdevelopment" of the new states of Asia and Africa, shows itself in the size and structure of their urban middle classes. These differ markedly from the middle classes of the advanced countries. Although they have numerous small retail traders, these are largely illiterate and have assimilated little modern culture or few modern economic skills. In a number of new states, the larger enterprisers in commerce and finance are ethnically distinct from the rest of the population, e.g., the Chinese in South East Asia, the Indians in East Africa, the Syrians and Lebanese in West Africa, the Scotsmen, Englishmen and Americans in India and Pakistan, etc., and within the Indian population the special communities such as Marwaris and Parsees in industry, commerce and finance in Calcutta and Bombay. The



new states are absolutely and proportionately underrepresented in the whole range of modern middle class professional occupations, i.e., university teachers, school teachers, physicians, scientists, engineers, nurses, agronomists, chemists, etc. This is partly a function of the structure of the economy of the new states and partly a function of the long pre-emption of such posts by Europeans. Lower level civil servants, clerks in commercial firms and lawyers make up a disproportionately large share of the more or less educated urban middle classes of the new states.

As primarily peasant societies, the new states lack also a stratum of highly skilled industrial workers used to the exercise of initiative and responsibility, and of a lower level of supervisory workers.

This wide spread and the relative feebleness of the intervening strata between the most powerful and the most wealthy—foreign businessmen, plutocrats of very particularistic indigenous provenience and quasi-feudal landowners — on the one side, and the least powerful and the poorest on the other, makes the feeling of remoteness from the center of things more pronounced among the poor; it also heightens the sense of separateness between the modern section of the population and the more traditional, less educated or utterly uneducated strata. This attenuates the sense of affinity necessary for the development of a modern political society and hampers its further growth. It makes for mutual alienation and a failure of mutual identification.

It is true that in a Western society, so split between a class of poor peasants and workmen, on the one hand, and wealthy merchants, highly educated civil servants and lawyers, on the other, there would be a far more overt antagonism between classes than seems to exist in the new states. Occupation and wealth although significant criteria of status in the societies of the new states, are by no means as prominent as they are in Western societies. Kinship, caste, religious attachment provide other criteria and offset the weight of wealth and occupation as criteria of status. Nonetheless, these latter criteria are growing in importance in the "modern" sectors of the population. Insofar as they do, they will generate and intensify a sense of remoteness between the poor, powerless and uneducated and the wealthy, powerful and educated. They will supplant caste, linguistic and ethnic group and kinship — or rather they will supplement them — as obstacles to the formation of the consensus necessary for a political society, equally required by democracy and by a stable modernizing oligarchy.

At present, class antagonism is not terribly strong in the new states. It certainly exists but it has relatively less conscious and explicit expression than it has in Western countries. For one thing, it lacks the organized infra-structure necessary for its effective expression. Secondly, there is such a tradition of hierarchy in those societies that the expression of hostility towards the more powerful and the otherwise more advantaged is inhibited. This is bound to grow as the new states become more urbanized, which they will certainly

become in the course of economic development and administrative expansion.

The "gap" in the class structure makes for greater alienation between the extremes. This alienation will be transformed into hostility through the "politicization" engendered by universal suffrage, and by the propaganda of modern oligarchical regimes. The extreme economic inequality of the societies of the new states can have seriously eruptive consequences once class consciousness becomes more pronounced. The fact that there are as yet few traditions of *disciplined* class conflict in the new states and the "infra-structural" institutions through which disciplined class conflict can be carried on are very poorly developed (i.e., the trade union movement, collective bargaining machinery, etc.) means that, in the proximate future, the class conflict in the new states might well be wilder and more violent in nature than in the older better established political societies of the West. Class conflicts would then take the form of "Jacqueries" and organized insurrections, rather than of negotiation and bargaining.

Furthermore, the occupational distribution which accentuates the traditional "gap" is further distorted by the disproportionate concentration of the educated middle class in the larger towns. Hence, such middle class as does exist, does not exercise the modernizing and integrating influence in the smaller towns and villages which might be one of its more important functions. Thus, the effects of the "gap" are aggravated.

3. *Educational Structure:* (a) *The uneducated:* This "gap" in the structure of territorial loyalty and in the class structure is paralleled by the wide divergence in the styles of life and the associated outlooks of those with a modern ("Western") education and those without it. There is nothing quite comparable in Western countries where the least and the most educated are educated in the same language and share to some extent certain important common symbols. Even in Great Britain where the most educated are still unlikely to have passed through the same educational system as the less educated, they have at least been educated in the same language and for the years in which both classes were at school, there were certain common elements in their courses of study and in the culture of childhood. This is not so in the new countries where the mass of the population has not been to school at all.

It is not so much what education teaches, as it is the fact that the experience of having been to school, especially in countries with a steeply graded system of social stratification and a tradition of the superiority of the religiously educated, gives to those who have been to school an enhanced feeling of their own value. It makes them feel that they have acquired some extremely valuable qualities which entitle them to the respect of others. It makes them feel themselves to be in some sense, at the center of the larger society. Where education is highly valued, on traditional religious grounds, on practical vocational grounds and because of the *mystique* of modernity, those who do not have it tend to feel inferior to those who do, and to feel cut off from them.



The continuation of the inherited modes of education leaves the ordinary person apathetic to what goes on outside his kinship group and locality. Education does not always, in all situations, arouse human beings from their torpor and widen their interests; it does have that effect on the more intelligent. The well-endowed and undeveloped intelligences of children and youths in the lower classes do not receive this stimulus in the poor societies of the new states. Thus, links which would open the mind to symbols of the wider world and unite local and kinship groups with the national society are prevented from forming.

The inability to read greatly restricts the range of knowledge of the world, not only of the world beyond national boundaries, but even beyond narrow local boundaries. Ignorance of one's fellow countrymen, a feeling that they are remote and distant, ignorance even of the names of important national leaders, maintain estrangement and impede the growth of the sense of membership in the national community, which is essential to the alert and intermittent response to the policies of parties and governments. Illiteracy restricts the capacity for rendering thoughtful judgment regarding national issues. It fortifies the belief that the government at the center is alien to the ordinary man, and, is correspondingly, interested only in maintaining and enriching itself.

Nonetheless, it should be added that illiteracy is not necessarily a total barrier against all sensible political judgment. The illiterate peasant or trader is often extremely shrewd about local issues and about his and his community's immediate interests; he is often quite sharpwitted in scrutinizing the performance of his representatives and of the aspirants for his suffrage, with respect to these interests. His capacities fall off markedly as issues become more nation-wide or international in scope.

(b) *The Intellectuals*: The possession of a higher education enhances the demand for respect. It also has other very important significances.

The educated have received their education in modern schools, in which they have been taught by Westerners or by the pupils of Westerners. Many of them have been educated in the West, and these represent the standard by which the other educated persons measure themselves. In dress, in recreations, in tastes in food and drink, and much more importantly, in their attitude towards what is valuable in life, they diverge considerably from the ordinary members of their societies. Even though they wear their traditional garments on ceremonial and festive occasions, they wear modern clothing in the daily working life. They understand, play and like modern games and spectacles. They believe in the truth of science and in salvation through its application; they believe not in the wisdom of the tribal elders but in the value of rational administration and written laws and orders. They believe in planning and in large-scale schemes. Their minds are often on what is happening abroad, on what foreigners, especially in London, and Paris, Oxford and Cambridge, and to a lesser extent in a few American universities, are thinking and doing. *The*

*New Statesman*, *The Economist* and *l'Express* are more important for most of them than their inherited sacred texts and myths, and they are often more concerned that their representatives in the United Nations should make an impression on the world than they are about the people in village and bush. Being somewhat detribalized, albeit less completely than they themselves often think, they think in terms of their nation more than they do in terms of lineage groups (although when they are loyal to their own lineage group, like traditional people, they often do not care about other lineage groups.) This makes the distance between the educated and uneducated, if anything, even greater than in the Western countries.

The problem is a universal one. In the Western countries, too, the cleavage between a large section of the intellectual classes and the rest of the population is often more tense or more distant than is good for the intellectuals or for society as a whole. The differences between the West and the under-developed countries are matters of degree. The greater influence of intellectuals in the political life in the new states renders these differences—which help to form the “gap”—more significant there than in the modern societies.

The university and college-educated in the new states bear responsibilities which are almost unprecedented in world history. Their fulfillment of these responsibilities is rendered difficult by the structure of the societies in which they live, the general cultural traditions of the learned and the spiritually endowed in their own societies, and their own traditions as modern intellectuals.

The intellectuals in the new countries have received their education at a time and in countries with growing sensitivity to poverty, inequality and injustice. Coming for the most part from countries where the learned and the spiritual have had an aversion from the pursuit of wealth, the modern intellectuals of the new countries have been greatly attracted by the socialistic solutions of social and economic problems proffered by the intellectuals of the metropolis, (notably the United Kingdom and France.)

The intellectuals of the new states have, in varying degrees, a deep concern with the poverty of their own countries and a lively awareness of the industrial wealth and high living standards of the advanced countries. They are, insofar as they are not apathetic or cynical, strenuously insistent on rapid economic progress so that their own peoples will be able to approximate the level of the peoples of the advanced countries. They are inclined, therefore, to espouse large-scale actions designed for quick results. Given the availability of the Marxist dogma about economic progress under dictatorial conditions, this imposes a heavy strain on the still feeble framework of democratic political institutions.

At the same time that the intellectuals are insistent on large-scale state action, they are rather anti-political. They are extremely critical of practically all politicians and they are contemptuous of party leaders. A large part of the intelligentsia inclines towards opposition—as if by their very nature. They do not give a lead to an affirmatively critical public opinion. On the contrary,

their views constitute public opinion (given the narrow radius of the educated classes) and the public opinion which they represent is seldom constructive, and when it is, it is seldom heeded. This drives them further into opposition, rather than into a relationship of positive criticism and discriminating guidance. There is among them, therefore, a disproportionately high readiness to associate themselves with alienated movements aspiring to extremist solutions of the problems of their societies.

This disposition is supported by another feature of the intellectual's position, namely, his complex relations with the traditions of the people amidst whom he grew up. He is often impatient with old traditions and with those who espouse and live by them. This impatience is accompanied by disregard and disrespect for the preferences and views of the uneducated, and by the readiness to order them about "for their own good." It prompts a willingness to flatter traditional beliefs demagogically, for political purposes, while at the same time really viewing them as "prejudices" and "superstitions". Nonetheless, the modern intellectual in the new states often does yearn for a deeper contact with the indigenous culture in which he was brought up and of which he is, not unfrequently, only fragmentarily informed. These two dispositions produce a form of "populism" which, alleging to speak on behalf of the "people", deals with political opponents as alien to the essence of the traditional culture, as enemies of "the people" and as hostile to the interests of the nation. It results too, in the generation of a "nativist" ideology, half-sincere and half-insincere, which praises the wisdom of the simple and the humble while being fundamentally distrustful of them.

The traditions of oppositional politics, of an ambivalent relationship to his indigenous culture and of preoccupation with "abroad", all make for political alienation. In the actual situation, the fact that there are many intellectuals who find no opportunity to use their qualifications in ways which appear to them to be appropriate has a similar consequence.

Those new states which inherited an elaborate network of institutions of higher study produce in addition to talented, well-qualified persons who take a responsible part in the public life of their countries, many who do not fit in, either because there is no demand for their services or because they are not regarded as sufficiently or appropriately qualified. The civility of their successful seniors and coevals finds little sympathy with them. They feel neglected and contemned by their society and especially by those who rule it. They believe politicians and businessmen are hostile to them, have no use for them. Insofar as they do not withdraw into an apolitical state of mind and inaction, they are ready to support those movements which promise to make a "clean sweep" of the ineffectual regimes which are charged with impeding progress.

Political passivity is contrary to the tradition of preoccupation with politics which the intellectuals inherit from the days of the struggle for independence. The conditions of the struggle and the particular role which the educated played

in it, the leftist inclinations of many of the intellectuals of the new states and indigenous traditions which require that the learned should be the ultimate force in the polity all give further impulse to this "politicization."

This has diverse ramifications. It results in the demand, among intellectuals as well as among politicians, that intellectuals must participate actively and immediately in party politics. If they do not, they are alleged to be shirking their responsibilities; those who do not, sometimes feel guilty because, whatever their actual role, they often share this conviction. The assertion of the obligation to be political tends, under the conditions of the early years of the new states, to breed distrust between those politicians who are actually ruling the country and the politicized intellectuals who do not share this responsibility. The demand, so common among intellectuals, for heroic politics and the tarnish which the exercise of political authority almost always carries with it result in the development of a disillusioned anti-political attitude.

This development is accentuated by another change in the relationship between intellectuals and politicians which comes with freedom. During the early years of the nationalist movement, before the acquisition of sovereignty, nationalist politics tended to be in the hands of quite sophisticated, well-educated men, mainly lawyers with a marked intellectual countenance, and a few business men of similar inclinations. The greatest prosperity of the nationalist movement occurred however only when it came into the hands of populist leaders, who, whatever their educational qualifications, put themselves forward as representatives of the traditional culture, or as rough sons of the people. These sought to distinguish themselves from their forerunners whom they derogated as "out of touch with the people." Many of the younger intellectuals went along with this belittlement of their elders. Then with the coming of independence, when the second generation of nationalist leaders had to take over the burdensome privilege of power, the intellectuals' loyalty to their own traditions of admiration for the heroic reasserted itself against the drabness and philistinism of the ruling politicians. The latter responded with the same hostility towards their quondam allies as they had earlier shown towards their predecessors. The tension was renewed. In consequence, the intellectuals, while still feeling that rightfully they should be among the rulers, also feel that they are spurned and disesteemed in the new state, for the coming of which they had worked and dreamed. This has strengthened the "anti-political politics", the politics of withdrawal, which have been growing among the intellectuals of the new states.

This is not however a universal phenomenon. In every new state and particularly in those who live in the tradition of British rule,<sup>2</sup> there is a group of civic-spirited, realistic and responsible intellectuals, devoted to the public good, critical and yet sympathetic, interested in the political growth of their society

<sup>2</sup> It is too early yet to speak of withdrawal in the new states being formed in French Africa. Such developments do however seem to be in prospect.

and yet detached enough from immediate partisanship to constitute a corps of custodians of the public good in the present and the future. In each country, they form only a small proportion of the intellectual class.

Alongside of these, there is a new sector of the intellectual class beginning to grow up. This is the technical and executive intelligentsia — chemists, engineers, accountants, statisticians — who do not share in the older political traditions of their country's intellectuals, and who resemble the "new intellectual class" of the more advanced countries. They are generally more specialized and professional, more philistine and less widely interested in cultural and political matters than their immediate predecessors. It is on the growth and influence of these latter two groups that the emergence of a stable and progressive civil society depends. The first of these two groups is especially important for the prosperity of a regime of civilian rule, representative government and public liberties; the second is equally congenial to any sort of modernizing regime regardless of whether it is democratic and liberal or oligarchical.<sup>3</sup>

4. *Town and Countryside:* The "gap" in the social structure of the new states appears again in the wide disparity between the degree of modernization of the countryside and the large towns. (In Asian countries, a disproportionately large share of the urban population lives in very large cities. It is true that a considerable proportion of this urban population remain bound by visits and remittances to their families in the villages, but in the large town they live without their families and free from their controlling influence.)

Because of defective transportation and communication and the narrow radius of markets, modernization is concentrated in the population of a few large urban centers and within those centers, to a small proportion of the whole. The rest of the society remains bound within the traditional form of life. Even the great national leaders who succeeded in transforming the movement of national liberation from a movement of the modern elite into a "mass movement", did not greatly change the balance. The mass of the population in the villages are the "objects" of modernization and the political activities which seek to bring it about, rather than initiators in this process. Their preferences and responses are of much concern to the political elite but they do not participate in the dialogue of rulers and ruled.

<sup>3</sup>. Problematic though the modern intelligentsia might be, the situation of countries, like those of the Middle East where the Ottoman rulers established no modern educational institutions or like Indonesia where the Dutch did very little more, and where the modern intelligentsia is, therefore, far less numerous, is probably worse. In such countries, the modern intellectual class is extremely small and has not yet been able to establish itself as the proponent and embodiment of modernity. Furthermore, so few intellectuals are trained in modern scientific and technological subjects the army officers have become the chief representatives of modernity in these countries. They, through their engineering training, have become the sole bearers of the modern outlook in administration and in national development. When the state flounders and politicians "make a mess", energetic officers come forward to establish a military oligarchy, claiming that they do so in order to set the country firmly on the path of modernization.

The villages become politically interested largely around election time. Even then their political interest remains immediate and local rather than national.

The big cities are the centers of innovation, not just technological but political as well. As a result, the undercurrents of thought and sentiment which are regarded as significant public opinion circulate primarily in the cities. The best journalists, the more forceful lawyers, the politically alert business men and technologists, the most eminent professors, the urban mob, the "verandah boys" spoiling for a fight, the students ready to protest and demonstrate are concentrated in the cities. Except at elections, when candidates are often very seriously questioned about what they would do about some local grievance, the countryside leads a slumbering political existence. Politicians at times act as if it does not exist politically. This does not go entirely unnoticed by the villagers who, in consequence, reinforce their distrust of the urbanized politicians and the educated who are charged with having turned against the traditions of their people.

5. *Economic Development:* The new states are all rather far down on the list which ranks countries according to their *per capita* income. They are primarily agricultural, and although there are exceptions, as in West Africa and Malaya, their procedures tend to be very traditional.

At the same time, the elites of the new states, practically without exception are committed to economic development. They are concerned with the discovery of more and better resources, the increased efficiency of the processing of resources, the accumulation of capital by saving, heavy taxation, capital levies and foreign investments, loans and gifts. Their motives are multiple. Many wish to raise the standard of living of their people and they also think that a modern country to be worth anything at all in the eyes of mankind, must be industrialized, rationalized and "economically advanced". Some are interested in self-aggrandizement, materially and politically, and they regard economic development as a useful instrument. Some allege that they are compelled to develop because their people demand it. There is however, little evidence that there is an intense and persistent demand for economic progress from the mass of the peasantry. The industrial working class is too negligible in most of the new states for their views to constitute a major factor although their trade union leaders — who tend to be middle class intellectuals — are very strongly for economic development, as long as it causes no additional hardship to their constituents.

The modern intellectuals of the new states, who overlap very notably with the political elite, are almost universally and intensely for economic progress. They vary concerning the rate and especially concerning the efficacy of policies promulgated and implemented by the political elite but they have no doubts about its urgent desirability.

The entrepreneurial classes in the new states tend to be mercantile and financial and these are not the fields in which economic progress is sought by the



political elite. The industrial entrepreneurial class is very small—apart from large foreign firms. There might be a few middle-sized, indigenously owned firms and a large number of very small handicraft enterprises. No substantial contribution to economic progress is expected from these. The larger enterprises fall under the prejudice which the intellectuals and the intellectual-politicians have against private business enterprise.

For a variety of reasons, therefore, economic development is conceived as a major task of government. This necessitates a large increase in the size of the civil service, a large increase in its powers and particularly in the powers of the politicians and higher civil servants responsible for economic development. There are serious political ramifications.

The extension of the size of the Civil Service is, in one aspect, a force for social stability, since it reduces the susceptibility of the unemployed or the malemployed intellectual to the wiles of demagogic and extremist agitators. On the other hand, the great increase in the size of the Civil Service necessarily makes contact with it more frustrating for members of the public which must deal with it. Delays are increased, rebuffs more frequent and the populace forms a distrustful image of the government. Murmuring and complaint become widespread, tales of irresponsibility, inefficiency and corruption increase.

Meanwhile, at the upper levels of the political and administrative elite, the vast sums of money which must be expended on objects and in modes alien to traditions of the higher civil service increase the chances of corruption and it certainly increases the likelihood of accusations of corruption. The more puritanical sections of the society are sensitive to these rumors (especially the Army, often trained in traditions of the Germanic and British military ethos); the reputation of the politicians and other classes closely identified with the "politicians'" regime sinks.

A third political consequence of policies of governmentally controlled economic development arises from the success or failure of those policies, and the ratio of the actual success to the promised success.

Despite frequent corruption in the management of economic development and the most exasperating bits of evidence of bureaucratic incompetence, it is very likely that the economies of the new states are being considerably, though variously, strengthened by the development policies. The standard of living of certain classes improves, more economical uses are made of certain resources, etc. Nonetheless, the process of economic development through governmental action is probably injurious to the stability of any political regime—not least, democratic regimes. We have already mentioned the rumors and realities of corruption as signs of an enfeeblement of the reputation of politicians and their regime. In addition to this, it seems inherent in economic development through governmental policy for plans and expectations to exceed achievements, even when achievements are substantial. The new governments are ambitious for

dramatic accomplishments and therefore they aim high; their inexperience causes them to overplan and to fall short of their planned objectives. This creates stress within the elite.

The elite is under pressure, partly from within its own ruling circle, partly from its competitors in other sections of the political elite, partly from "public opinion" i.e., intellectuals and students, and partly from the image of itself which the elite wishes to have accepted in the larger world. It feels it must press on with great haste towards great goals. This calls for the imposition of uncongenial reforms on the peasantry and small business. Resentment is increased thereby. More importantly it makes the elite impatient of obstacles and fearful of criticism; it makes it reluctant to see its plans and achievements subjected to detached criticism. It makes it impatient of parliamentary scrutiny, which is in any case placed at a disadvantage *vis-à-vis* the political leadership of the executive and the Civil Service by the large powers which economic planning confers on them.

Thus, we may conclude that the large scale programs of economic development being undertaken in the new states do weaken the already weak foundations of political democracy and push in a more oligarchical direction, towards either tutelary democracy or beyond. Yet it must be recognized that without considerable economic progress, the new states could never become genuinely democratic. Extremely poor, traditional people with a primitive technology could not develop the social differentiation and personal individuality necessary for democracy.

Whether considerable or even equal or greater economic progress could not be made with less governmental intervention and enterprise is another and very controversial matter. Given the prevailing doctrines and prejudices in the new states, the alternative of less governmental activity is unlikely to be tried on a large enough scale to modify present trends of policy. And even if comparable economic progress were made by other methods, the results would still be disturbing to the traditional order of society and towards political stability as well.

6. *The Structure of Authority:* With considerable variations, the predominant tendency in the societies of the new states is for authority to be hierarchical and sacral. The highly traditional nature of these societies removes much from the sphere of current decision, and much of what requires decision lies in the hands of persons who accede to the decisive positions largely through the qualifications of kinship, age and sex, (although not solely through these). Whole sections of the population have no share in the exercise of public authority.

Outside the state, the major institutions through which authority is exercised are the kinship and lineage groups and the religious and caste communities. None of these are voluntary; in many of them there is no publicly acknowledged mode of contending for positions of influence. The "infra-structures" for



collaboration in the pursuit of private interests and for the exercise of influence in the wider society are largely lacking.

The sacral properties of authority were somewhat diminished by the exercise of authority by foreigners. This latter fact, however, accentuated and reinforced the hierarchical structure of authority.

The chief effect of the hierarchical structure of authority in both the traditional and the modern sectors of society is to generate either excessive submissiveness among the ordinary people or an extremist egalitarianism, by way of reaction against it. Insofar as the people are used to living in a hierarchical traditional society they have little conception of their rights as citizens. Although they can be brought to vote in elections, they do not feel that their preferences will be considered in the decisions of their rulers, and above all they are little inclined, unless there has been a great break in tradition, to speak out their own views and preferences on the largest questions of policy.

The underdeveloped state of the infra-structure of voluntary associations on a local level and outside the cities, deepens the silence of the countryside in matters of day-to-day political concern. It increases the disregard for the interests of the poor in the villages, from whom the politicians and administrators are separated by class and caste and by education and culture.

7. *The Gap in the Social Structure:* In almost every aspect of their social structures, the societies on which the new states must be based are characterized by a "gap". It is the gap between the few, very rich and the mass of the poor, between the educated and the uneducated, between the townsman and the villager, between the cosmopolitan or national and the local, between the modern and the traditional, between the rulers and the ruled. It is the "gap" between a small group of active, aspiring, relatively well-off, educated and influential persons in the big towns and an inert or indifferent, impoverished, uneducated and relatively powerless peasantry.

Almost every feature of the social structure of the new states conspires to separate the ordinary people from their government. Naturally, even the most advanced states which have achieved a relatively effective democratic system, e.g., the Scandinavian countries, do not disclose a full participation of the mass of the population or a full sense of identity between rulers and ruled. These states, too, manifest bureaucratic tendencies and some measure of anti-political alienation in the mass among intellectuals. All that is asserted here is that the phenomenon of the "gap" is far more pronounced in the new states.

This is a fundamental fact of life of the new states. It is a hindrance to the realization of political democracy—indeed it renders certain elements of "tutelar democracy" or oligarchy almost inevitable. The gap however is not a phenomenon to be closed by oligarchy—it can only obscure it, suppress it, exploit it and maintain it. Only political democracy has a chance of overcoming it and can only do so by arousing and liberating the capacities of the ordinary people in the villages. Only a devoted political elite which is wedded to demo-

cratic ideals can stir up and guide the population—if it is to be stirred up at all—to disciplined political judgement and initiative.

The “gap” might be described as a high concentration of initiative and interest in the ruling circle. The overcoming of the gap requires the dispersion of initiative and interest more widely throughout the society. A regime which seeks to work through a very high concentration of initiative can probably accomplish a great deal in many important respects. It will not however be able to create a *political society*.

## B. Culture

1. *Traditionality*: The societies in which the new states have come into existence are traditional societies, that is, they are attached to beliefs and rules which guided past practices, and which are regarded as guides to right practice in the present. The attachment to these beliefs is firmer or more intense than it is in modern societies, and it is more widely shared throughout the society. Some of these traditional beliefs incline towards liberality in government, others towards initiative in enterprise, but even where the substance of the belief is congruent with greater democracy and progress, the general disposition to accept what has been accepted in the past directs the course against modernity.

The substance of the traditional beliefs is also uncongenial to modernity. The prevalent beliefs of man's traditional societies are almost exclusively characterized by the absence of elements of civil politics. Citizenship is not among the virtues which they prize. Fealty to rulers, respect for the aged, obligations to one's kin, responsiveness to the ultimate transcendent powers which make and destroy men's lives, bravery in war, are the virtues which they rank highly. A concern for the well-being, in peaceful pursuits, of the whole population, over a larger territory, indifferently to their particular ethnic and kinship bonds is not so widely diffused.

Individuality, creativity, the empirical attitude, the criterion of efficiency, an indifference to or disbelief in the efficacy of supernatural forces, the freedom of the individual, economic progress, a concern for national unity and dignity and an interest in the larger world, have little place in the outlook of the ordinary peasant or recently recruited factory worker, handicraftsman, small-scale trader, or old-style money lender.

Traditionality offers a by no means insuperable obstacle to the development of a modern polity. Traditions often possess sufficient ambiguity and hence flexibility to allow innovations to enter without severely disruptive consequences. Then, too, patterns of traditional beliefs (and their accompanying practices) do not form such a rigorously unitary whole; some parts are more affirmative towards modernity, or at least less resistant towards innovation. Many traditional beliefs are not so much objects of zealous devotion to symbols of the past as they are the resultants of a situation without alternatives. Once alter-

natives become visible and available, what appeared to be an immobile tradition might well yield to a new practice.

Nonetheless, even after these qualifications have been made, traditional beliefs do have the capacity for self-reproduction and mutual support. The intertwinement of the institutions of kinship, government and landownership and cultivation within a locality sustains traditional beliefs and practices, and resist assimilation into a more modern culture and a larger national polity.

2. *Parochialism, Nationality and Nationalism*: The parochialism of the constituent segments of the societies of the new states has been commonly observed. The sense of membership in the nation, which is more or less coterminous with the population residing within the boundaries of the new states, is still very rudimentary and very frail.

The sense of nationality which embraces the larger territory (which is often not less a "natural unit" than an accident of the administrative requirement of colonial rule) flourishes primarily among those who have lost their intimate connections with the institutions and conditions in which the mass of the population live. In them, it is not so much a civil phenomenon—which it has become in the better established states—as a conversion phenomenon. It has not yet settled into a civil attitude.

In many in whom it exists, it exists very intensely in the form of nationalism. Nationalism, which is anti-traditional or a-traditional in its essence, even though it draws deeply from indigenous traditions, tends still to be heroic rather than routine, ideological rather than civil. Nationalistic sentiment does, it is true, widen the scope of affinity of those human beings who share it but it is more concerned with the place of the nation *vis-à-vis* other nations than it is with the life internal to the national collectivity. Extreme nationalism often widens the gap within the new state.

Parochialism or particularism, afflicting societies which inherit a powerful kinship system, caste and communal loyalties, linguistic diversities, religious heterogeneity, or ethnic dissimilarities, resists national unity. It can be rendered more or less compatible with a modern political regime only by a well-contrived federalism. Yet, even there, federalism might be recalcitrant to the idea of a strong state such as is thought necessary for an energetic program of modernization. Nor does extremist nationalism take easily to federalism.

Nonetheless, an elite which is unwilling to permit a measure of federalism will often find itself forced to resort to coercion. Coercion in turn, although it might well impose the order of obedience, cannot really close the horizontal gap produced by particularism.

Nationalism will not overcome parochialism except transiently, at moments of crises. Extremist nationalism in heterogeneous and particularistic societies will produce tendencies toward separatism.

Nationalism can create oligarchies but it alone cannot sustain them. It cannot even achieve widespread popular support for them. It is even less con-

genial to democracy. Democracy in the new states must cope with the additional handicap that it is an importation from the culture of the former foreign rulers. As such, quite apart from the appreciation of its intrinsic value, it is accorded deference. Nonetheless, since it is Western in origin, it also suffers the hostility of those who, while they aspire to emulate the West, also resent the West for its power and the humiliations it inflicted on them and are restive with the Western democratic institutions because they implicitly deny the indigenous traditions of government.

3. *The Oppositional Mentality:* In the period of their birth and growth, nationalistic politics were oppositional politics. Even in the British Raj in India and in the African states today where there have been dyarchical arrangements (prior to the transfer of power to indigenous governments), the main weight of nationalist agitation has run contrarily to the acceptance of the proffered limited opportunities for civil responsibility. In India where civil politics have been best developed, most of the political effort prior to independence was concentrated on the struggle against the foreign government on behalf of national freedom and not on the exercise of the very qualified and restricted sovereignty which the later constitutions allowed. Political action has been impelled into an oppositional direction in which dramatic symbolic deeds rather than responsible detailed work on practical legislation have been most honored. This tradition of "demonstrative" and "remonstrative" politics persists in the new states. The hard work of studying the subject matter of bills, contributing in committee to their amendment, and scrutinizing their implementation often has little appeal to many legislators and journalists. If they cannot oppose dramatically, they subside into passivity and indifference.

The spirit of opposition is especially strong among university, college and high school students, in whom adolescent resistance to the older generation often takes on a political form. It is also common among politicians who participated in the movements for national independence and who find the work of legislation and administration in an independent state too routine and dull by contrast with the exciting experiences of their youth, when they were "fighting" against the foreign ruler. It is of course strong among intellectuals. It enters into whatever public opinion exists in these countries.

There is a tendency in these highly politicized circles, to be distrustful of politicians in all countries where opinion is relatively free. The low esteem in which politicians are held is a striking feature of the outlook of the people in the new states. Politicians are frequently thought to be timid, compromising, indecisive, dishonest, wasteful selfish, etc. One reason for this attitude is the persistence of the traditions of the struggle for national independence, when heroic and noble opposition was the most approved form of political activity.

Another and deeper reason is the traditional intertwinement of sacral and political authority. Even in the most secular, modern states, these two types of authority are not completely dissociated. The sacral element is however held

in a condition of latency. In the more traditional societies, however, the intertwinement is more continuous and more intense—at least in the expectations of the mass of the population. Politicians who have grown up in the modern sector of their societies, who have a modern education and who, more than the mass of their fellow-citizens, have a secular outlook on the world—do not call forth the awe and affection of those over whom they rule, unless they are very rich in personal charisma.

The details of the management of a modern state are secular affairs. They are not ritual actions but actions of expediency and they are markedly discontinuous from the rituals of authority in religion and rule in traditional societies and in the traditional sectors of the new states. Politics becomes a “profession”, not a “cause” and as such it repels those who still, despite everything, expect authority to have something of the sacred, of immediate consecration to the ultimate powers of existence. This strengthens the oppositional mentality.

The “gap” in the social structure is accompanied by a parallel “gap” in the cultural system with which the new states have to contend. There is a “gap” between those relatively free from the hold of tradition and those who live under its dominion, between those whose attachments remain parochial and those who are committed to the conduct of a modern state with an elaborate administrative organization and a continuous and heavy program of governmental action, and those who feel that all authority must be immersed in the sacred and the heroic. The oppositional mentality draws sustenance from the “gap”.

The oppositional mentality, impatient with the talkative and roundabout methods of representative government, inclines towards oligarchical solutions to the problems confronted and envisaged in the new states. It is not, however, very likely to be overcome in any oligarchical regime. It might be coercively driven into silence but it cannot be dissolved into a unitary national will any more than the traditionality of the mass can be dissolved into that will. It can be cured only by the practice of responsibility and the development of traditions of disciplined opposition.

The combination of a tradition of oppositional politics with the great tasks required of the modernizing elites in the new states is a disequilibrating force. A regime which depends on intelligent and discriminating support and criticism is handicapped when it confronts the oppositional mentality.

The problems of politics are very intractable in all countries, and most politicians are not up to their undertakings. In the more advanced countries, however, a somewhat larger nucleus of more responsible politicians, a more experienced civil service, greater wealth, and less utopian expectations which make errors more bearable, usually manage to keep the strain within the limits of democratic procedures. In the newly emerging countries, however, where respect for civil order is less deeply engrained, and the tradition of conspiratorial politics “on behalf of the nation” is still strong, and where the reservoir of qualified

personnel for politics, journalism, administration, etc. is shallow, the oppositional disposition is costly.

In the democratic regimes of the new states, it is an obvious burden. In the oligarchical regimes which can give the semblance of transcending it, it remains a perpetual source of instability, inclining towards conspiracy and subversion.<sup>4</sup>

### C. *Personality*

1. *Individuality*: At the very bottom of all the factors which are likely to determine prospective development in the political systems of the new states is the rudimentary state of individuality and of the consequently feeble feelings of individual dignity and worth within the polity. From this comes the insensitivity towards the rights of individuals, among both rulers and ruled. It is this deeplying factor which makes for the frailty of public opinion, its reluctance to criticize authority, its unbridled abuse of authority, and the un-empirical, unfactual nature of its political criticism.

Beneath the phenomenon of an "underdeveloped" individuality, we may discern some of the following causes: (a) The high level of religious sensitivity and the relatively intense and frequent orientation to sacred entities. The religious orientation in general involves a renunciation of individuality and the absorption of the self into the transcendent; it involves, in other words, the annihilation of the concrete self. (b) The poverty of most of the new states. Harsh poverty deadens creative capacity and individual potentiality. It makes people accept their predestined fate and the actions of rulers. (Among those who do begin to feel that they have rights to something better, it leads to extreme and embittered reaction against the inherited order and makes them sympathetic to revolutionary, oligarchical ideas. It makes them distrustful of gradual progress within a constitutional order thought insufficient for the satisfaction of the newly-felt needs and rights.) (c) Illiteracy. A major function of education is the stirring up of the human being from the encrustation of unthinking acceptance of what has been accepted hitherto by his elders. It gives him some detachment from himself, it enables him to see himself as a distinctive entity, it permits him to see new possibilities in his environment and himself, it awakens his self-consciousness. (d) Traditionality and hierarchy.

<sup>4</sup> There is a closely related phenomenon which plays a great part in the new states—it occurs both in the new democratic states as well as in those which have become oligarchies of all but the totalitarian sort. This is the phenomenon of the "urban mob", which consists partly of menials, servants and workmen away from their families, of refugees and displaced persons and partly of restive students and discontented high school and university graduates. These tumultuous crowds at the centers of concentrated population are the equivalent of public opinion in some of the new states. The common civil indifference and the general apathy towards public affairs does not constitute a governor on the turbulence of such bearers of public opinion. Even oligarchies, to survive, must ride on the crest of the waves of such public opinion—unless they can resort to force on a totalitarian scale. If they do not, the oppositional current penetrates into the bodies required for the maintenance of order, and democratic regimes and oligarchies as well, cannot resist their disintegrative influence.



These deprive the human being of opportunities to exercise his capacities for individual choice.

The poverty and indifference which prevents the education of the children and the youth of the new states thus inhibits the growth of their individuality. As long as elementary education is much less than universal, as long as the new states remain poor, so long will the widespread emergence of individuality be obstructed. The persistence of the extended family system will probably have similar consequences.

#### D. *Political Structure*

The resources which any new state brings to the effort of self-transformation and the obstacles which it encounters include political as well as pre-political things. Thus far we have dealt predominantly with the pre-political. Political life however is not merely an epiphenomenon. The present state of political life has its own consequences for its further persistence or transformation. It would be appropriate therefore to touch briefly on certain features of the political life of the new states which bear on the prospects of development.

1. *Universal suffrage:* The granting of universal suffrage without property or literacy qualifications is perhaps the greatest single factor leading to the formation of a political society. The mere existence of the suffrage might in the course of a short time disintegrate the nascent political society, if it is not accompanied by other changes as well. Nonetheless, the drawing of the whole adult population periodically into contact with the symbols of the center of national political life must in the course of time have immeasurable consequences for stirring people up, giving them a sense of their own potential significance and for attaching their sentiments to symbols which comprehend the entire nation.

This does not mean that an oligarchy could not suspend or deform the periodic elections. What it does mean is that the first step towards the formation of the political society, with a more or less universal adult membership, has been taken.

2. *Parliament and politicians:* The existence of universal suffrage, and the competition of parties where that is allowed, creates expectations that grievances can be satisfied. It also helps to create the expectation that the government is the appropriate agency for such satisfaction—and in societies where there are traditional beliefs in the sacral character of authority, such expectations receive additional force.

This means that any government, living in an economy of misery which speaks through universal suffrage (however much that voice is attenuated and distorted by "bossism," party machinations, etc.) commits itself to a heavy program of action. This commitment works in the same direction as the beliefs of the intellectuals whose views constitute day-to-day public opinion and the politicians who come from the same school. The government is forced to be highly interventionist, if not outrightly socialistic.

This creates a heavy budget of work for the Parliament and the Executive in a democratic regime (and for the Executive in an oligarchy). In the regime of political democracy, the parliamentarians must for the most part have a very hard time, given their background and the nature of the tasks, to remain abreast of what the leadership of the government and the expert civil service put before them for their decision. The alternatives are either uncritical submission or undisciplined opposition. (This is one of the ineluctable facts of democracy in the new states.)

The new states are fortunate when their first years are spent under the leadership of one of the great personalities who led in the struggle for national independence. These charismatic personalities are invaluable in binding together such conglomerations of particularistic attachments as form the societies of the new states. These dominating figures also serve as surrogates for deficiencies in party organization and in traditions of parliamentary work. Nonetheless, they leave behind them a heritage which is difficult to assimilate. Their disappearance leaves a gap which what they have created might not be able to fill. Charismatic personalities do not ordinarily build the institutions which are indispensable for carrying on the life of a political society.

Meanwhile, parliamentary life in the new states is not succeeding in attracting the best talents of the nation in the way in which the struggle for independence succeeded in doing. Many of the second rank of politicians are no more than place-holders who gained their nominations through service in the national struggle, (with imprisonment as a major qualification). Their subservience to the party leadership in the new regime arouses the antipathy of the more vigorous among the oppositionally-minded younger generation who see in their characterlessness a typical instance of the drab and unheroic nature of party politics. The parliamentarians, too, are aware of their embarrassing situation and decline in self-esteem.

The large budget of work undertaken by governments in the new states creates a problem which did not exist before independence, namely, the corruption of politicians. Indigenous politicians had no governmental authority to speak of before independence and thus their probity was neither trained nor tested. Now, when so much is at their disposition in the awarding of contracts and in appointments to office, new opportunities and temptations are open to them. Thus having no firm tradition of probity in the exercise of governmental power, and having indeed, on the contrary been brought up in an atmosphere of kinship, caste and ethnic particularism and of "traditional gift-giving," it is all too easy for some politicians to yield to the attractions which office brings before them. The inadequacy of the press as a standing enquiry into the probity of elected (and appointed) officials, which, in the more advanced states, is an intermittent safeguard against corruption, also serves to diminish inhibitions.

What is impressive, in view of these factors, is the generally high standard of integrity among many leading politicians in certain of the new states. Here



once more, India stands out, and with it the importance of the deeply inculcated British tradition and the long schooling provided by great Indian personalities such as Gokhale and Gandhi. Other new states which do not share this combination of traditions have been less fortunate and accordingly, the democratic regimes in those countries have declined in legitimacy and affectiveness, or have given way to oligarchies.

3. *Party system:* Either the new state as in India (Burma, Israel, Tunisia, or Ghana) has been ruled by an overwhelmingly preponderant party which won national independence or it has been ruled, however feebly, by a coalition of clique-like and sectional parties (e.g., Indonesia, Pakistan, before the accession of General Ayyub, and Sudan before General Abboud). The former provides stability and helps to give the country unity; the latter is unstable and keeps the country from settling down or becoming unified under a democratic regime.

Nonetheless, the former has its dangers. While the Congress-like party is in the saddle, it impedes the emergence of an opposition responsive to the possibility of succeeding to power through constitutional means and made responsible by that idea. Opposition is either discouraged by the odds against which it must contend or it is overwhelmed by coercion. Thus, the leadership of opposition either withdraws from politics or gravitates towards the extremist party. Meanwhile, the dominant party, through long tenure in office grows "soft" and perhaps "corrupt". In any case, it is natural that people should get "fed up" with it because equally naturally, the party and its government cannot do all that public opinion requires of it. So, in the course of time the party falls from power, and with its fall comes disintegration of the party. There-with the unity of the nation is endangered and the oppositional mentality comes once more into active influence.

In addition to the constellation of parties in the early years of independence, the stability of the regime of representative institutions with which most of the new states have commenced, is menaced by factors of a different origin. Politics everywhere tends to attract persons who are sensitive to the responses of others, and the exercise of authority seems to increase vanity and sensitivity to criticism rather than to diminish it. In well established democracies, politicians accept the distasteful harvest of criticism which their public activities bring them because they have no alternative. To war against the opposition and the press because they are critical would make them only more critical. In the new states, where the tradition and the institutional vigor of a free press and parliamentary opposition are less firmly grounded, and where the leading politicians—as the liberators of the nation—are less used to being criticized by their fellow-countrymen, there is a greater tendency towards impatience with criticism and opposition.

The ruling political elite, having carried the banner of the nation for so many years, under conditions of stress, continue to think of themselves as identical with the nation and after their accession to power, with the State. Those who

disagree with them are thus viewed not merely as political opponents but as enemies of the state and nation.

This phenomenon, which is a product of an occupational hazard common to all regimes and countries, and of the novelty of self-government, is made more likely by the feeling, not entirely ill-founded, that the intellectuals (who constitute so much of public opinion) are on the other side. The opposition in the new states has in general not yet learned to conduct its criticism of the governing politicians in a matter-of-fact and moderate way. Deficiencies are pointed out without cease, achievements are passed over or denied; small points are magnified into major issues, the sensibilities which are disturbed when former friends part make both sides acrimonious and abusive towards each other. Where the ruling party has the very large majority, the opposition, seeing so little chance of coming to power, is made more irresponsible. Where a number of parties form a governing coalition, the political situation is rendered more tense and criticism and suspicion are aggravated.

The newly established regime of political democracy suffers in two ways from these features of the public life of the new states. First, the government, harried and assailed by the opposition is excessively ready to discern subversion where there is only dissatisfaction and to take the measures appropriate to the repression of subversion. Second, the spectacle of politicians, both governmental and opposition, abusing and demeaning each other causes the "public" to wish a plague on both their houses. The serious accomplishment of parliamentary bodies is overshadowed by the fulminatory rhetoric; representative institutions are given a bad name, politicians come to be viewed as self-seeking "windbags". As a result, actions which promise to clear away the empty agitation and replace it by hard-headed and businesslike deeds are accepted with relief and alacrity.

4. *Civil Service:* Certain of the new states (India above all, Sudan, Ghana) have had the good fortune of inheriting from their foreign rulers a superior body of indigenous civil servants. The years have taken a toll of death, retirement and strain, and the politicians have not spared them, but these countries have nonetheless maintained their administrative integrity through the devoted work of the "steel framework." These countries and others less fortunate in this respect have, however, been both faced with the pressing task of increasing greatly through very rapid recruitment their corps of civil servants. As a result of the interventionist and socialistic policies of modernization they have had to recruit at a dizzying rate without always being able to maintain a high standard partly because they have not had available to them a reservoir of very high-grade persons and partly because communal and parochial considerations have been allowed to intrude into the process of selection.

In consequence of this it is generally believed that the efficiency and probity of the Civil Service have gone down in most new states. This in turn has aggravated the feeling of alienation of the people from the government and es-

pecially from the politicians whom they hold responsible for this decline in standard of probity.

When this tendency is juxtaposed against the "politicization" which is forwarded by universal suffrage, the maintenance of the "gap" and a higher level of tension across the gap result.

5. *The Army*: Certain of the new states have inherited well organized armies from their former rulers; others have been faced with the task of creating an army from very elementary materials inherited from the lower ranks of the previously foreign army. We need concern ourselves here only with the political implications of a more or less modern army in a new state.

The officer corps usually contains a considerable body of intelligent young men who have been trained to value discipline and orderliness. They usually have a quite high degree of internal solidarity. Many of them have received a technical education in engineering colleges or at some foreign military institution. Although no army in any new state is really modern in the sense that the American or Soviet armies are modern, they are usually trained in the theory and practice of the most recent weapons appropriate to their size and tasks. Even if they are not, they have assimilated some of the outlook of the professional military technician.

Where there is a relatively large body of modern technical intellectuals (engineers, scientists, etc.) the officer corps is unlikely to nourish the idea that it alone carries the spirit of modernity and the capacity to realize it. Where the civilian political elite shows self-confidence, and the ability to carry through some of its programs and to maintain public order without immediate dependence on the army, the officer corps is not likely to decide that it must take over the government as the only alternative to chaos or stagnation. Another important factor is the strength of the army tradition inherited from the previous ruler. In all these respects, India has been in the most favorable situation of any of the new states. It has the largest technical intelligentsia of any of the new states, its political elite has the best record of effectiveness of any elite of the new states and its army has been living in the British army tradition of abstention from politics for a century.

Where these conditions are lacking, the results have been visible for all to see.

There is another aspect of the existence of the army which is relevant to our consideration of political development in the new states. This is the civic-training function of the army, i.e., the role of the army in forming young men and women of heterogeneous ethnic and cultural backgrounds from traditional societies, into citizens of a modern political society. (The Israeli experience is exemplary and its applicability to West Africa is now being canvassed.) Such a function is indispensable for any regime in the new states, be they democratic or oligarchic. The potential achievements of the army in this sphere must however be weighed against the consequence of giving the army such prestige as would result from its successful fulfillment of this function.

6. *The Institutions of Public Opinion:* To what extent do the institutions of public opinion in the new states contribute to the emergence or maintenance of democracy, political or tutelary? To what extent do they contribute to the emergence of one form or another of oligarchy?

The journalistic profession is a part of the intellectual classes and as such it partakes of those attitudes which we have already examined. There is a widespread tendency to be critical of all politicians as such, where the newspaper is independent or to be unqualifiedly critical of opponents and unqualifiedly approving, where the publisher or owner has strong ties with one of the parties. Comment tends to be strongly expressed except where the papers have been intimidated into neutrality or supine admiration.

Because of an almost universal paucity of reportorial curiosity and skill, the press does not serve as the eye of the public, on which, according to Bentham, depends the virtue of the statesman. Seldom does the press enquire independently into any matter of public interest and provide information which is of benefit to politicians, to civic-minded citizens and even to government officials. The poverty of the newspapers, the slightness of the tradition of news-gathering journalism, a fear of governmental displeasure, the low status of the newspaper correspondent in comparison with those into whose public conduct he would enquire, all tend to hamper the press in its performance of this important function. For this reason public opinion languishes, and when it does express itself, it cannot easily do so in an informed and responsible manner.

The other institutions which contribute to the formation of public opinion are likewise of feeble vitality. University teachers are either overworked or too few in number to produce a continuous flow of pertinent investigation into the fundamental trends and problems of economy, society and polity. There are very few independent institutions for research into the problems about which a citizenry should be informed and which would, indirectly, through popularization in daily and periodical press reach politicians and civil servants. The apolitical tradition of the college teacher as a government employee and the fact that in certain of the new states the staff of colleges consist largely of "expatriates" also deprive the country of important sources of political judgment.

There are lighter tints in this dark picture: In India a few journalists through their reporting, their leaders and their "columns" keep a sharp informed and discriminating eye on the government; in Nigeria, the Extra Mural Studies Department of the University College does wonders to form an intelligent public opinion among the middle class, etc. On the whole, however, the "fourth estate" is more of an expression of the state of political sentiments than an independent factor in the formation of informed and judicious opinion.

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## BUDDHISM AND SOCIALISM IN JAPAN AND BURMA\*

At the First Asian Socialist Conference, held in Rangoon in January 1953, members of the two wings of the then split Japanese Socialist Party viewed the Burmese Socialists and their successful movement in Burma with interest and amazement<sup>1</sup>. The Japanese right-wing Socialists were pleased with the Burmese emphasis on "democratic socialism" and denunciation of "Soviet imperialism," though a somewhat patronizing air could be detected in their attitudes toward the younger Burmese who were relative new-comers to the ranks of the international socialist movement. The Japanese left-wing Socialist delegation wanted very much to identify themselves with the rising socialist elements in Asia but were surprised to find out how watered-down Burmese socialism was, from their point of view.<sup>2</sup> Class analysis had not been given much attention and the stipulated goal of *Pyidawtha* (the "Happy Land") appeared to be little more than the kind of mixed economy usually associated with Scandinavian welfare states.

Both groups of Japanese Socialists coming from a land of some fifty million nominal Mahayana Buddhists were astonished at the great role Theravada Buddhism was playing in the nationalist movement of Burma which the Socialists had largely captured and which had taken the political form of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL). This formed the overwhelming

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<sup>1</sup> For a report of the First Asian Socialist Conference, see Saul Rose, *Socialism in Southern Asia*, New York, 1959, pp. 4-13.

<sup>2</sup> An outline of the Burmese socialist program and a brief description of its philosophy may be found in Julius Braunthal, ed., *Yearbook of the International Socialist Labour Movement: 1956-1957*, London, 1956, pp. 165-170. The Japanese Socialist Program is translated in entirety in *ibid.*, pp. 338-348. For the Japanese text see, Nihon Shakaitō, ed., *Yobō ni Kotaete: Nihon Shakaitō Taikai Kettei Shū*, Tokyo, 1955. The latter two citations refer to the reunified program of 1955 which is a compromise of the Right and Left Japanese Socialist points of view. For a comparison of the previous Right and Left Socialist positions, see *Comparative Platforms of Japan's Major Parties*, translated and arranged by Cecil H. Uyebara, Michio and Shimako Royama, and Shijuro Ogata, with an introduction by Allan B. Cole, Medford, Massachusetts: The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1955 (mimeographed).

majority in Parliament. Although the Burmese Socialists refrained from raising religious issues in the main discussions of the Conference, the Japanese and other Socialists were aware that U Kyaw Nyein, U Ba Swe, and other Socialist leaders, as well as the Premier and AFPFL leader, U Nu, were devout Buddhists, who reconciled their religious beliefs with Marxism. During their stay in Rangoon, the Japanese and other Socialist delegates visited as sight-seers the great Kaba Aye or World Peace Pagoda just outside Rangoon that the Burmese Socialist-led Parliament had recently encouraged and also near it saw some \$2,000,000 worth of buildings under construction for the government-sponsored Sixth World Buddhist Council that was to convene in Burma in the following year.

How did it happen that Buddhism had become so important to the socially oriented nationalist movement in Burma, while neither Buddhism nor Shintoism, nor even Christianity, are matters of concern to the contemporary Socialist movement in Japan?

Aspects of the answer to this question can be sought on various levels and in diverse directions. With limited space it is probably best to begin with the more obvious generalities which may be modified as further elements are introduced into the picture. In the first place, it will probably be generally agreed that Burma's Socialists are products of the nationalism that sprouted under latter-day British colonial rule.<sup>3</sup> They discovered in Marxism what they considered the most relentless unmasking of the economic exploitation of foreign monopoly capitalism in Burma, and in Lenin's theory of imperialism they took possession of a sharp ideological weapon for rallying resistance to the British Raj. At the same time, the young socialistically oriented nationalists found themselves heir to the nationalist activities of the Buddhist monks, and working with the people for the first time, they came to realize how tightly Buddhism was woven into the culture of the *ludu* or common people.

Since achieving independence the Burmese Socialists have not been unaware of the significance in terms of popular acceptance that the building of the Kaba Aye Pagoda had. In the past Burmese kings have traditionally inaugurated their reigns with the erection of a Buddhist temple or statuary to bring blessings on the land. It was also clear that the three major religious acts passed by the Parliament in 1949-50 were aimed at rallying the numerous, respected, and nationalistically conscious "monks" to the new republic. More specifically, with the outbreak of open rebellion on the part of dissident Communist elements from the nationalist movement compounded with uprisings of the Karens and other minority peoples, the encouragement of the popularly and almost universally accepted faith could, on the one hand, tip the scale in favor of the Socialist-led government which had essentially the same program of reform as the Communists and talked in equally Marxist terminology and, on the other

<sup>3</sup> This is the thesis in the chapter "Marxism in Burma," by John Seabury Thomson, in Frank N. Trager, ed., *Marxism in Southeast Asia* (Stanford, 1959), pp. 14-57.



hand, help reconcile the minority groups which by and large shared with the dominant Burman ethnic majority the common faith in Theravada Buddhism. Although religious Burmese Socialists do not admit to "using" Buddhism, it nevertheless cannot be denied that its encouragement had made the government seem more nationalist, as a respecter of the national culture, than the Communists, and also more of a transcendent symbol of unity than any secular Burmanization that was also going on.<sup>4</sup>

If these are the more obvious answers as to why the Burmese Socialists have been interested in Buddhism, why have the Japanese Socialists made no attempt to mobilize what might be a vast potential feeling that is every day expressed in obeisance to *Butsudan* and *Kamidana* altars in millions of homes throughout Japan as well as visits and pilgrimages to thousands of temples and shrines? It may at first seem strange to look for an explanation for something that did not happen rather than an actual historical event but I believe this approach can be helpful in understanding the role of the socialist movement in recent Japanese history.

We can start with the proposition that if the Burmese leaders were nationalists first and socialists second (both in time and conviction), the Japanese Socialists have been socialists first and nationalists second. When they first came on the scene in the 1890's the problems of national unity and independence had long since been settled, while those attendant on the industrial revolution were just beginning to appear in the Japanese context. These incipient socialists were soon looked upon by the authorities as bearers of "dangerous thought" and indeed their intellectual stimulation derived almost entirely from abroad.<sup>5</sup> While among their humanitarian motives was surely to be found the patriotic motive of wanting to improve Japan, the fact that they were searching abroad for answers to the social problems they saw around them added to their disdainful attitude toward the "feudalistic" character of Japanese traditions.

While the Burmese socialists in the late 1930's and early 1940's were held together under foreign British and Japanese masters by the common bond of nationalism despite widely differing interpretations of Marxism, the Japanese Socialists, seeking for ideological solutions, have been continuously fragmented throughout the last fifty years by schisms. Indeed they came upon their social consciousness along various paths. They sought unity in order to achieve some strength in numbers, only to be split again and again by internal and external pressures. Their present unity, based on the Program of 1955, was a tortuously achieved compromise among a number of concepts but particularly between the concept of a "class oriented party" versus that of a "nation oriented party."<sup>5a</sup>

<sup>4</sup> For a fuller exposition of this position, see Frank N. Trager, *Burma and the United States* (New York, 1959).

<sup>5</sup> For the best short resumé in English of the early socialist movement, see Chitoshi Yanaga, *Japan Since Perry*, New York, 1949, pp. 228-242.

<sup>5a</sup> A right-wing faction led by Suehiro Nishio split off from the party in September 1959, in order to found a new "Democratic Socialist Party" in early 1960.

Among the leaders of the party there are even today unreconstructed Marxists, anti-Marxists, revisionist Marxists, Christians noted because they are rarities, nominal Buddhists and Shintoists, agnostics, atheists, and others with such a variety of *Weltanschauungen* that they defy classification other than in metamorphosing cliques and factions. While many of these factions are based on personal or patronage (*oyabun - kobun*) relations, each one exerts as much effort to state its position in ideological terms as if it were standing on principle. Among the Burmese Socialists, on the other hand, internal ideological conflict after the expulsion of the Communists had not been a major problem. In fact, even as late as January 1958 Premier U Nu was able to read a speech on ideology for the AFPFL in which all the Socialist factions concurred, albeit with some reservations here and there. The subsequent AFPFL split has roots that go back years but when it occurred in the summer of 1958 it resulted from policy and personality conflicts rather than ideological differences.<sup>6</sup>

Since ideology has been secondary for young Burmese nationalists, it has been relatively easy for them to reconcile socialism with Buddhism. Almost all were Buddhists by upbringing. In the now famous student strike at the University of Rangoon in 1936, it was natural for Thakins Nu, Aung San, and the other students to meet at the Swedagon Pagoda to plan their next steps.<sup>7</sup> The student movement of this time provides some enlightening parallels with and differences from the Japanese student movement of a decade or so earlier. The Burmese students, like the Japanese students at Tokyo Imperial, Kyoto Imperial, Waseda, and other Universities, were stimulated by their contact with Marxism to go out and organize and radicalize the incipient labor and peasant movements.<sup>8</sup> In Burma, Ba Swe and other Thakins got involved in the oil field workers' strike of 1938-9. Since the industry was British owned, the strike soon took on a nationalist hue and, with the addition of peasants rallied by other Thakins, turned into a march on the government in Rangoon. Japanese labor union disputes, such as that led by young Katō Kanjū at the Besshi Copper Mines in 1925, had no such nationalistic aspect, since the capitalists they opposed were Japanese and the police mobilized to "control" the strike regarded the union's tactics and slogans as products of foreign subversive thought. The parallels of Marxist influence impelling the students into labor and peasant organization and then into politics are sharp, and surprisingly so on closer inspection, but the differences with respect to nationalism are decisive. The young Burmese were the nationalists *par excellence*; the young Japanese

<sup>6</sup> This opinion is convincingly argued in Frank N. Trager, "The Political Split in Burma," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. xxvii, No. 10 (October 1959), pp. 145 ff.

<sup>7</sup> This strike was recounted recently in a new light in a series of articles appearing in the first ten issues of the *New Burma Weekly*, a journal which was founded in mid 1958 but unfortunately folded early in 1959.

<sup>8</sup> For mention of the important student organizations at these universities, see the author's "Problems of Japanese Socialist Leadership," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. xxviii, No. 2 (June 1955), pp. 163 and 165; the process of student radicalization of the labor and peasant movements is described in the author's forthcoming book. *The Socialist Movement in Prewar Japan*.



organizers were often roughed up by thugs from ultra-nationalist associations which had shady connections with big political bosses. For the Burmese resisters of exploitation, colonialism provided targets of a different color and a different culture.

This is not to say that the Burmese student nationalists had become racists in their opposition to the British and Indian overlords. Marxist influence militated against that and marked off the student movement from earlier nationalistic uprisings in Burma such as the 1931 violence which was anti-Muslim and thus anti-Indian. In contrast the students organized the Indian and Burmese workers together into what became the All-Burma Trade Union Congress in 1940; and among the Thakins were found Indians such as Rashid who have remained socialist and nationalist leaders to this day.

The Japanese socialist movement was incomparably more sophisticated from a much earlier date than the Burmese Marxist movement has ever been. For instance, Hatabatake Motoyuki translated *Das Kapital* just after the first World War, whereas *Capital* in English along with books by Lenin and others first came into the hands of Burmese students after 1931 through U Tun Pe's purchases from a list of readings suggested by Nehru in his book about Soviet Russia. In Burma not only were the writings of the German revisionist Marxists unknown, but even the distinction between Marxist and non-Marxist socialists unclear. Harold Laski, for instance, was considered a Marxist pure and simple. In the late 1930's four Burmese Socialists were elected to the legislature. One of these styled himself a Fabian; the other three were young members of the Dohbama Asiayone ("We Burmans" Association) who had been reading English translations of Lenin and even Stalin but campaigned under the nationalistic slogan of "one's own king, one's own kind."<sup>9</sup> In Japan a clandestine Communist Party was formed in 1922 (almost as early as in China), whereas the Burmese Communists did not get organized until 1943!

The Japanese movement also seems to have been born out of a greater soul-searching or mental anguish (*hammon*). One of the most interesting phenomena in this regard lies in the fact that a number of the early, and some of the most important, socialist leaders became socialist only after their conversion to Christianity.<sup>10</sup> Of the six founders of the first Social Democratic Party of Japan in 1901 — which was immediately disbanded by the authorities — all but one were Christians. They had come to socialism through the interest in social problems shown by certain Christian circles — such as those engaged in settlement work in New York, and in Japan the Unitarians with their liberal views (whom Fukuzawa Yūkichi had invited to Japan). Like Katayama Sen, some Christian Socialists moved on into Communism and presumably gave up their Christianity, but others, such as Abe Isoo, remained Christians while being

<sup>9</sup> This information on Burmese Marxists is from Thomson's chapter in Trager, ed., *Marxism in Southeast Asia*, op. cit., pp. 20-1.

<sup>10</sup> See Morito Tatsuo, *Nihon ni okeru Kirisutokiyō to Shakaishugi Undō*, Tokyo, 1950

active socialists the rest of their lives. Christianity was accepted as part of the Westernism of which the socialist movement was a product; an ardent Buddhist would tend to be looked on askance as fundamentally a traditionalist.

Christian influence can be detected in three subsequent incidents of crucial importance to the development of the Japanese socialist movement: (1) in the anti-war movement prior to and during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 when Abe Isoo symbolized the common front of socialists and Christian pacifists and when the still Christian Katayama Sen clasped the hand of the Russian Social Democrat Plekhanov at the Amsterdam meeting of the Socialist International symbolizing its as yet unbroken solidarity; (2) in the formation of the Friendly Society (Yūaikai) in the Unitarian Society's Hall in Tokyo in 1912 under the leadership of the Protestant Suzuki Bunji and foreign and Japanese Christian advisors — this Society being later transformed into the nucleus of the trade union movement in Japan;<sup>11</sup> and (3) in the formation of the organized agrarian movement in 1922, when Kagawa Toyohiko, Sugiyama Motojirō, and another Christian minister, plus one more Christian, made up the majority of the seven founders of the Japan Farmers' Union. In fact the Christian influence was so great during this last instance that certain landlords propagandized against the Farmers' Union by telling the peasants that if they joined it they would become Christians and thereby betray their ancestors.<sup>12</sup> (In the next few years, however, the agrarian movement grew so rapidly that it soon lost the predominant Christian influence of its founding, and the original Christian-humanitarian platitudes of its program changed to radical Marxist doctrine.) Since the war the few Christian political leaders are found mainly in the socialist right wing, but it can be contended that a pervasive, though indirect, Christian influence may lie behind the democratic humanitarianism that can be detected in the new concern for the liberties of the opposition which the Socialists have pledged to defend if they come to power.

In contrast to the energetic socially-conscious Christians, the Buddhist clergy was by and large more interested in charity than reform. For instance, in 1926 the Federation of Christian Churches in Japan formulated a program calling for equality of opportunity, a minimum wage law, and other social legislation.<sup>13</sup> The Buddhists tended to avoid taking stands on social questions, preaching social harmony, which meant the *status quo*. Consequently those Buddhist university students of Buddhist clergy background who were attracted to the socialist movement usually left their Buddhism behind, such as the Akamatsus and Takamatsu Seidō.<sup>14</sup> Due to its principle of accommodation (*hōben*),

<sup>11</sup> This was the "Sōdōmei" or Nihon Rōdō Sōdōmei (Japan General Federation of Labor).

<sup>12</sup> Morito, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

<sup>13</sup> Miura Sangendō, *Sayoku Sensen to Bukkyō*, Tokyo, 1933, p. 22. This book, written by a Buddhist priest influenced by Marxism and Christianity, urges the Buddhists to take an interest in social questions.

<sup>14</sup> The Akamatsus refer to Katsumaro and Iomaro, two brothers, and their sister, Tsuneko, who were active participants in the socialist movement, particularly in prewar days. Tsuneko

Buddhism was easily rallied to support Japan's military actions, and during the Pacific war was used to forge ties with other Buddhist countries, such as Burma.<sup>15</sup>

The responses of Burmese monks to Japanese co-religionist overtures were widespread and spontaneous. They had long stood at the forefront of anti-British agitation. The Japanese occupiers had to their advantage the alleged British disrespect for Buddhism, and they encouraged through the Head of State *Adipati* Ba Maw the organization of monks both politically and ecclesiastically. In return the Maha Sangha Athin or Great Council of Monks proclaimed in 1943 that Burma with the Japanese was engaged in a "religious war." Nevertheless, the Japanese could never quite trust the Burmese *pongyis*, for unlike the Japanese clergy they had long been more politically active and were deeply nationalistic.<sup>16</sup>

How did it happen that in Burma Buddhism lay at the core of nationalism and constituted a force that the progressive-minded Burmese nationalists had to work with and integrate in order to achieve success, whereas in Japan Buddhism, though subservient to nationalist ends and reactionary, stood on the sidelines of the march of nationalism? Perhaps one clue can be found in ancient history. Long before the beginning of the Burmese Era in the seventh century A.D. Buddhism had entered Burma and had begun to absorb the indigenous worship of spirits which the Burmese call *Nats* (as well as astrology and alchemy). When Anawratha (1044-1077), the first important king of Burma, made Theravada Buddhism the national religion, he first broke the organized nature of the pre-Buddhist cults and then built a temple in Pagan in which he placed the thirty-six most important *Nats* as worshippers of the Buddha. In this way the indigenous cult was brought entirely under the wing of Buddhism and no real contradictions were felt. Buddhism became the main prop for legitimate kingship.

When Buddhism arrived in Japan in the sixth century A.D., it also found an indigenous cult of *Kami* worship (which only later came to be called Shintō). The *Kami*, like the *Nats*, were both nature sprites and spirits of the dead, but an important difference lay in the fact that the Yamato Imperial House and other nobles traced their ancestry to the pantheon of Shintō gods. Thus, Shintō served as a legitimizer of the Imperial line. Buddhism almost overwhelmed Shintōism by its vast cultural and philosophical riches, but Shintō survived,

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is a prominent member of the Japanese Socialist Party at present. Their father and uncle were Buddhist priests and their older brother taught Buddhism at Ryūkoku University in Kyoto. Takasu Seidō (Masamichi), also a prominent Socialist leader, came from a Buddhist background but in the late 1920's and early 1930's wrote a good deal of criticism of Buddhism from a leftist point of view. See his *Musan Kaikyū to Shūkyō*, Tokyo, 1929.

<sup>15</sup> This contention forms much of the theme of Daniel C. Holtom's books, *National Faith of Japan: A study in Modern Shinto* (London, 1938), and *Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism: A Study of Present-Day Trends in Japanese Religions* (Chicago, 1943).

<sup>16</sup> See Cecil Hobbs, "The Political Importance of the Buddhist Priesthood in Burma," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 21 (November 8, 1956), pp. 586-590; also John F. Cady, *A History of Modern Burma* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1958), p. 455 ff.

albeit in a very syncretized form. With the Imperial Restoration in 1868, one of the first acts of the new government was to attempt to free Shintō from the clasp of Buddhism (*shimbutsu bunri*) both because the Imperial supporters were acutely conscious of the legitimizing function of Shintō and because they were seeking for national identity in the most autochthonous cultural elements they could find, knowing they would have to take so much from the West. The attendant attack on Buddhism (*haibutsu kishaku*) left it just on the side of the deepest current of nationalism rather than in its mainstream as in Burma. The Meiji leaders placed the Imperial House at the center of their heightened national identification. It remained a bastion that only the anarchists and Communists have attempted to storm. Turn-coat Communists and ultra-nationalists have called for an "Emperor-centered socialism." The social democrats, however, have paid a distant respect to the Imperial institution — a few, such as Abe Isoo, even trying to utilize it for socialist ends by calling on the zaibatsu to surrender their wealth to the throne as the *daimyō* feudal lords had returned their fiefs (*hanseki hōkan*) at the time of the Restoration.<sup>17</sup> In the postwar period the Emperor has been made merely a symbol in the new constitution with the whole-hearted support of the Socialists, but the nationalist potential in popular respect for the "democratized" Emperor since the surrender has yet to be tested.

In Burma no movement for restoration of the royal line arose, partly because the last King, Thibaw, had all his rivals tied in velvet sacks and trampled to death by royal elephants (this remains a little difficult for the modern Burmese to stomach), and partly because the postwar tide in Europe and elsewhere was washing kings away. With the kingship tradition gone, Buddhism became all the more important for promoting national identification and giving Burma a mission in the world. Buddhism has been recognized as having a "special position" by the Constitution and among other agencies a Sasana (Religious) Council has been created by the government as a lay organization to promote the faith and undertake mission work at home and abroad.

While Buddhism has thus been given a preferred status in the state, without outright establishment and without detracting from freedom of religion for all groups, the Socialists have attempted to depoliticize monks by debarring them from political activities, even from the exercise of the franchise. While there appears to be a close, though unofficial, alliance between the Socialists and a strong group of the younger members of the order, monks are frequently seen in demonstrations organized by pro-Communist or even Communist groups.

This brings us to the interesting point of the compatibility between Buddhism and Marxism, socialist or Communist. The classic explanation was made by U Ba Swe in his *The Burmese Revolution* issued by the Ministry of Information

<sup>17</sup> For an English translation by the present author of a document in which Abe takes this position, see "The Second Restoration," in Ryusaku Tsunoda, Wm. Theodore de Bary, and Donald Keene, *Sources of the Japanese Tradition* (New York, 1958), pp. 816-820.

in 1952. In it he says, "In the beginning, I was a Buddhist only by tradition. The more I study Marxism, however, the more I feel convinced in Buddhism... for any man who has deeply studied Buddhism, and correctly perceived its tenets there should be no obstacle to becoming a Marxist." He reasons that Marxism does not reject religion but only the theory of creation, as does Buddhism. "Marxist theory deals with mundane affairs and seeks to satisfy material needs in life... Buddhist philosophy, however, deals with the solution of spiritual matters with a view to seeking spiritual satisfaction in life and liberation from this mundane world."

It is interesting parenthetically to note that no positive amalgamation of Buddhism and socialism developed in Burma at all comparable with the social gospel in Britain or the Christian socialism of Europe. In contrast to Islam or Christianity, Theravada Buddhism lacks in large part a social message. In the first place people are not faced with the dire single choice between heaven or hell that impels the more sensitive to go out and save the souls of others either through direct evangelism or through improving people's environment so that they have a better chance to be good. Buddhists believe there will always be another choice in another life, though the next life is determined by this one. Secondly, Burmese mores indicate that it is effrontery to help someone unless he has asked for aid. Religion in Burma then tends to channelize merit-gaining into shrine building and alms giving rather than into the more general injunction of "do unto others..." What the devoutly Buddhist Burmese socialists evidently get out of religious meditation and exercises (such as breathing) is a strength and equilibrium that helps them as individuals better to meet the problems even of this world. No doubt tradition and common acceptance help to make Buddhism a more enduring phenomenon in Burma than the imported ideology of socialism.

An increasing awareness that Marxism as such is not essential to a general socialist orientation has gradually grown up. The issue came to a head in January, 1958, in the speech already referred to in which U Nu had received prior and almost complete acceptance from the main AFPFL leaders (including those with whom he was soon to break). U Nu took several hours to dissect Marxism showing how modern science had invalidated dialectical and historical materialism; but at the crucial point he referred to Theravada Buddhism's doctrine of *Thinkhata Dhat* (the inherent property of the principle of change) to refute the idea that matter in the form of atoms exists as something unchanging and indestructible. (The atom was not smashed until after Marx had long since passed away.) Thus, the materialism of Marxism is incompatible with Buddhism. He goes on to say that there are many people who accept certain aspects of Marxism but they are not Marxists; only Communists are Marxists, since only they believe in Marxism as infallible and utterly correct. U Nu then reminisces: "When we were younger, we had not yet studied Marxism in detail and in all its aspects... At that time, more or less on hearsay

and cursory readings, we impetuously and loudly claimed that Marxism was the same as Buddhism. We are very remorseful for having made... such ill-considered and unfounded claims." Finally, U Nu declared that as a result "the AFPFL approves only some parts of the Economic Doctrine of Marxism," namely, that "commodities should not be produced for profit making but for the consumption and use of the people," an idea that is certainly not incompatible with Buddhism in Burma. But Marxism in its narrow sense was rejected as a "guiding political philosophy."<sup>18</sup> This, of course, did not entirely dispose of the problem. U Ba Swe, at the time, was reported critical of going so far. The Communists remain and in fact are coming more into the open. With U Nu retired from the Premiership since October 28, 1958, and with the university students critical of the regime and of Buddhism, the tide may again run in favor of Marxism but with military rule continuing throughout 1959 and into 1960, even "democratic socialism" has become distinctly unpopular.

In Japan with its much older socialist movement, the questions of Marxist-Buddhist compatibility and mutual influence present a much more complex picture. The first leading Socialist to espouse atheism systematically in his writings under Marxist influence was Kōtoku Denjirō (whose penname was Shūsui), but he was executed as an anarchist in 1911. In the early 1920's when the socialist movement was splitting into the communist, social democratic, and for a time, anarchist segments, the secret Communist theoretician Sano Manabu (Gaku) argued that the social democrats were compromising with capitalist society by holding that religion was a private affair; the true Marxist must help remove all blinders from the people so that they could see the world of exploitation in its true colors. (Sano who recanted in 1933 became a student of Buddhism before his death in 1953, warning Buddhists against communism and to reform their own social outlook.)<sup>19</sup> But in 1922 his first advice to the "special community people" (the euphemous name for the social outcasts formerly known as the Eta) was to forsake the charity of the Higashi Honganji Buddhists and to start working for their own emancipation together with the proletariat.<sup>20</sup> In the early 1930's a spate of anti-religious and anti-Buddhist writings came from the pens of the Marxists (both Communist and left-wing Socialist). To meet this attack Buddhist defenders undertook an extensive Study of Marxism-Leninism. As a result some Buddhists began to study Buddhism in the light of economic history. Others, not many, sought to revitalize Buddhism by making it a part of the socialist proletarian movement. The leading writer of this trend was Miki Kiyoshi, a member of the group who wrote for the *Shinkō Kagaku no Hata no Moto ni* (Under the Flag of the New

<sup>18</sup> Speech of January 29, 1958, given before the Third All-Burma Congress of the AFPFL, after which it was widely published in full in the English language press in Burma.

<sup>19</sup> This is the position he takes in *Kyōsanshugi to Bukkyō*, Koya Kyokku, Wakayama Ken, 1953.

<sup>20</sup> Sano Manabu (Gaku), "Tokushu Buraku Kaihō Ron," *Kaihō* (July 1921), pp. 31-41.



Science). In fact, the Youth League for Revitalizing Buddhism (Shinkō Bukkyō Seinen Dōmei), which was formed and led by Seo Girō, took an active part in labor and anti-war demonstrations and, as a consequence, was disbanded by the authorities at the time of the China Incident in 1937.

Although much study has yet to be done to verify any such proposition as the following, it may be worth mentioning. With its emphasis on the Bodhisattvas who have refrained from entering Nirvana until all other people have attained it, Mahayana Buddhism may have an element that more closely resembles the Christian call to action for the sake of others than Theravada Buddhism. Certainly this concern for helping others motivated Miura Sangendō and the other Buddhists mentioned above who were interested in the pre-war proletarian movement.

Since the war various Buddhist groups, along with Christians and others, have been involved in the large and active peace movement in which Communists and Socialists have vied for leadership. This in turn has produced a spate of writings attempting to clarify where basic Buddhist philosophy differs from dialectical materialism, while at the same time supporting the peace movement. Notable in this endeavor have been Nakano Kyōtoku and Nibu Shōjun of the Tendai Sect, as well as Ichikawa Hakugen, a Zenist.<sup>21</sup> The Social Democratic Party of Japan has always taken the position that religion is a private affair and thus it has never been intruded into programs or policies as an ideological issue. Given the wide variety of philosophies found within the party and the convictions with which they are held, it is unlikely the party could ever reach the kind of statement on basic views that the Burmese did, and although the majority of active Buddhist and new sect Shintō political leaders are found in the conservative party, the Socialists, on coming to power, would in no way be embarrassed by any obstruction of the part of Buddhism in Japan.

Thus, despite great differences in approach, Buddhism in both Burma and Japan has proved that it can be reconciled with socialism, if not with materialistic Marxism. Also despite differences in complexity and sophistication, the Socialist movements in both countries find themselves in essential agreement on a program, as the Asian Socialist Conferences have shown. Is not then the fundamental reason for the success of socialism until recently in Burma, as contrasted so far with Japan, to be found in the nature of the nationalist movement in each country?

In Japan socialist ideas were originally adopted by men who sought answers to the injustices of remnant feudalism and incipient capitalism, whereas in Burma socialist ideas were grasped by already nationalistic students who saw the injustices of capitalism as brought to Burma by foreigners — Indians, Chinese, and British. In the highly stratified class society of Japan the social-

<sup>21</sup> See Nibu Shōjun, ed., *Bukkyō Fukyō Taikai, Dai Ku Kan, Dai Jū Ban: Gendai Shichō to Bukkyō, jō, ge*, Tokyo, 1951; Ishihara Ken, et al, comp., *Gendai Shūkyō Kōza*, Tokyo, 1955; and *Gendai Bukkyō Kōza*, Tokyo, 1957.

ists came into conflict with a sovereign regime which had already saved the country from foreign domination and which was slowly promising the people a rich overseas empire. Now that that regime has suffered a defeat and been shorn of its empire, nationalism has had to take the form of securing and safeguarding the political, social, and economic independence of Japan in a dangerously divided world.

Japanese nationalism in this, as in other ways, has come to resemble that of Burma. This postwar situation has greatly strengthened the Socialists' chance of gaining power in Japan but in no way foreshadows any bond between socialism and Buddhism except in an accommodation of the latter to a future socialist regime. In Burma, now that independence is secure and rebellion almost entirely quelled, military rule has appeared in order to forestall political disunity. If the Burmese socialists can return to power, their future will probably depend more on their ability to make parliamentary government work towards building a welfare state than on any further promotion of international Buddhist pomp and circumstance.

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## THE RECRUITMENT OF AN INDUSTRIAL LABOR FORCE IN INDIA, WITH BRITISH AND AMERICAN COMPARISONS\*

### I

There has been an overriding if not always explicit tendency to see Britain as the prototype of industrial revolutions wherever they have appeared. In one sense this tradition is not incorrect. An industrial revolution does require, generally speaking, a common set of basic preconditions and, as it proceeds, does generate a rather common set of general consequences. Nevertheless, the variety of possibilities are, within limits, substantial. As Professor Gerschenkron has reminded us, the very timing of the process of industrialization in one country as related to others is in itself very likely to produce different paths by which industrialization is achieved. This is partly the result of exposure to previous industrializations, the consequence of a "demonstration effect", and partly the consequence of the changed international economic environment that succeeding economies face as a result of the industrialization that has gone before. Moreover, preexisting social institutions will to some extent modify the path and character of each nation's industrial development.<sup>1</sup>

Once these facts are recognized, the scope of the comparative history of industrial revolutions is widened beyond what it has tended to be in the past, merely a study of deviations from a normal type. It becomes a more exciting venture. One can seek to distinguish the elements of industrialization that are "inevitable" because of the character of the technology involved from the factors that persist historically and give to a society that individual tone that distinguishes it from every other society possessing similar techniques.

One characteristic of every newly industrializing society, a characteristic determined by technology, is the appearance of a system of factory production. The factory system depends for its success partly on the social ability to generate a labor force divorced from traditional occupations and committed to the

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<sup>1</sup> Alexander Gerschenkron, "Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective", in the *Progress of Under-developed Areas*, edited by Bert F. Hoselitz (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 3-29.

disciplinary requirements of the new technology. But historians of this process have been concerned fundamentally only with the growth of trade unions and labor movements, with the social response of the work-force to the new industrial environment. Moreover, this single-minded preoccupation with one range of problems has led many scholars to overstress the grimness of the early stages of an industrial revolution. In this they have been encouraged by economists who have often argued, more or less erroneously, that a reduction in living standards is necessary to provide that capital accumulation out of which an industrial revolution is financed.<sup>2</sup> Even those historians who have minimized the grimness of the Industrial Revolution in Britain have been involved in an excessive absorption with the issue of the standard of life.<sup>3</sup>

The economic historian is concerned with the changing patterns of economic and social institutions as techniques that evolve for dealing with wants that are themselves changing. So viewed, the early phase of an industrial revolution introduces a new technology that sets new problems and demands new solutions. Factors of production have to be mobilized in different ways and institutions have to be changed to accomplish the task. Seen in this way, many more dimensions are added to the historical analysis of early industrialization as it involves the labor force. The social response of the working class becomes only one question. A new range of problems appears. We now want to know how the labor force for industry was recruited and disciplined to the new productive requirements: we must know about the creation of new labor markets and new patterns of labor deployment, about the enhancement of new skills and occupational mobilities, the habituation of the work-force to new obligations and routines, the development of new wage structures. In short, we must investigate how the early entrepreneurs solved the problems of recruiting, organizing and administering the labor force. The focus shifts from social protest to social administration, from a stress on the horrors of industrialization to an investigation of the clumsy grapplings with new problems and the efforts first to handle them with traditional devices and then gradually with painfully formulated new techniques.<sup>3a</sup> When we view the issue in these terms, with labor as a factor of production that has to be mobilized for productive activities under

<sup>2</sup> For example, see the classic statement by G. D. H. Cole, "Industrialism", *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. VIII, particularly p. 20. See also, S. Pollard, "Investment, Consumption and the Industrial Revolution", *The Economic History Review*, Second Series, Vol. XI, No. 2, 1958, pp. 220-222.

<sup>3</sup> For example, T. S. Ashton, "The Standard of Life of the Workers in England, 1790-1850", *Journal of Economic History*, Supplement, Vol. IX, 1949, pp. 19-38. For a discussion of the doctrinal implications of the debate on the standard of life, see W. Woodruff, "Capitalism and the Historians: A Contribution to the Discussion on the Industrial Revolution in England", *Journal of Economic History*, Vol. XVI, No. 1, March 1956, pp. 1-17.

<sup>3a</sup> The lack of research on this range of topics has been commented on by T. S. Ashton, *An Economic History of England: The 18th Century* (London: Methune and Co., 1955), p. 122, and H. L. Beales, *The Industrial Revolution 1750-1850* (Revised edition, London: Frank Cass and Co., 1958), pp. 16-20.

new circumstances, even trade unions can be studied with fresh insight, as instruments of social discipline and administrative coordination. Moreover, an investigation in these terms will permit another look to be taken at the process of industrialization in newly developing economies where so much has been said, erroneously, I believe, about the difficulties of recruiting and transforming a portion of the rural population into a disciplined industrial labor force.

It is this economic history of labor force recruitment and administration, viewed comparatively, that I have been studying. But such comparative analysis of the process of industrial labor mobilization is a broad topic that requires heroic reduction in scale in order to be capable of discussion within the limits of a brief essay. Moreover, the incompleteness of my research prevents a systematic statement cast in the analytic framework I have suggested. Instead, I propose to concern myself only with certain aspects of labor mobilization during the early stages of cotton mill development in Bombay, India (c. 1855-1914), Great Britain (c. 1770-1830) and New England (c. 1792-1840). In some ways the cotton textile industry is the most significant, being in each of these societies the first to develop the main characteristics of modern factory production. With this apology, let me note the propositions I wish to develop about the labor force during the early phase of industrialization.

(1) The recruitment of labor was not a problem that significantly inhibited the progress of industrial expansion.

(2) Social structure affected the kind of labor that flowed into the factories.

(3) The cultural homogeneity or diversity of the labor force recruited affected the character of labor administration.

(4) The sources of original skill on which the factories depended also affected the character of labor administration.

(5) There was no violent resistance by the new industrial workforce to the disciplinary requirements of the factory system.

These propositions suggest useful comparisons that will throw light on the extent of variations in the pattern of industrial evolution.

## II

During the first half of the 19th century Bombay became a major entrepôt through which flowed exports of cotton and opium and imports of sugar, metals, silk and cotton products. Population grew from 180,000 to over half a million.<sup>4</sup> On the basis of the increasing trade with East Asia and the West an elaborate commercial apparatus developed in which Indian merchants played an extremely important role.<sup>5</sup> The fact that raw cotton was being exported to Europe

<sup>4</sup> S. M. Edwardes, *The Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island*, etc., Vol. I (Bombay: The Times Press, 1909), pp. 158-163.

<sup>5</sup> The fact that Indian merchants played an extremely important role in the economic growth of Bombay raises an interesting problem of comparative analysis that is outside the scope of this essay. Why is it that while indigenous enterprise was so crucial in 19th century Bombay it became so insignificant in Calcutta during the same period?

and cotton products were being imported through Bombay made the establishment of cotton textile mills an inevitable next step. The Indian merchants who played an important role in the commercial activities associated with this foreign trade projected in the 1850's the first cotton mills to be established in India. It is interesting to note that it was not until two decades had passed and seventeen mills had gone into operation that a mill sponsored by Englishmen came into existence in 1874.<sup>6</sup> It is equally interesting that unlike the majority of the Indian-owned mills, the English-sponsored enterprise operated at a loss until after 1893.<sup>7</sup>

Unlike the British or early New England mills, the Bombay units tended to be composite enterprises embracing both spinning and weaving activities. The first few mills recruited their labor directly from the Bombay population.<sup>8</sup> As the industry grew, generating employment directly as well as in complementary services, labor migrated as swiftly as was needed to Bombay city from the rural parts of Bombay Presidency.<sup>9</sup>

It is frequently argued that the work-force necessary for early Bombay industry was forced into existence and made available as a result of the disintegration of handicrafts, the transformation of agriculture associated with the introduction of Anglo-Saxon concepts of property and the consequent shift from subsistence to cash-cropping with its enhanced and adverse dependence on the vagaries of the world market.<sup>10</sup> We really know virtually nothing about the economic history of 19th century India, but an investigation of the evidence suggests that the decay of specialized handicrafts affected an infinitesimally small proportion of the total Indian population.<sup>11</sup> This was certainly the case in the Bombay Deccan and Konkan, the areas from which Bombay city drew the main bulk of its labor.

British land and revenue policy, while not conducive to any systematic enhancement of peasant well-being, did permit a fairly extensive growth of land under cultivation during the last two-thirds of the 19th century.<sup>12</sup> British administrative innovations did not, however, result in any labor-saving reor-

<sup>6</sup> S. M. Rutnagar, *Bombay Industries: The Cotton Mills* (Bombay: Indian Textile Journal, 1927), pp. 9-37. "Report on Bombay Mills by Mr. John Robertson of Glasgow", *Bombay Millowners Association Report for 1875 and 1875-76*, p. 74.

<sup>7</sup> Rutnagar, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

<sup>8</sup> S. D. Mehta, *The Cotton Mills of India 1854-1954* (Bombay: The Textile Association, 1954), p. 116.

<sup>9</sup> Morris David Morris, "Some Comments on the Supply of Labour to the Bombay Cotton Textile Industry, 1854-1951", *The Indian Economic Journal*, Vol. I, No. 2, October 1953, pp. 138-152.

<sup>10</sup> For example, S. J. Patel, *Agricultural Labourers in Modern India and Pakistan* (Bombay: Current Book House, 1952), Chapter IV.

<sup>11</sup> D. R. Gadgil, *The Industrial Evolution of India in Recent Times* (4th ed., London: Oxford University Press, 1942), Chapter III.

<sup>12</sup> N. V. Sovani, "British Impact on India Before 1850-57", *Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale*, Vol. I, No. 4, April 1954, p. 868; Sovani, "British Impact on India After 1850-57", *CHM*, Vol. II, No. 1, July 1954, pp. 87-88.



ganization of Indian agricultural practices. The extension of cultivation seems to have been a function of the rapid growth of population, most likely a consequence of the 19th century suppression of the Malthusian checks.<sup>13</sup> But population growth outpaced the extension of cultivable land. In the absence of any substantial differentiation of the rural economic structure, landholdings were increasingly subdivided to the point where the marginal physical product of labor fell probably to zero. This steady increase of population pressure on the land provided a labor force that was adequate for all expansion of Bombay's industry without any consequent necessity of agricultural reorganization or special administrative devices on the part of the entrepreneurs.<sup>14</sup>

The British pattern was somewhat different. The economic transformation of both agriculture and handicraft had been underway long before the appearance of the factory system. Certainly from the late sixteenth century the British economy was characterized by an increasing efficiency in the distribution and use of its labor force. The purported immobilities of labor associated with the Elizabethan poor laws have been grossly exaggerated. Labor mobility had been a significant feature of British life even in Elizabethan times<sup>15</sup> and "the growth of the industrial districts through migration in the eighteenth century is sufficient evidence of the failure of the Settlement Acts to check the natural movement of population, however much they may have hampered and oppressed individuals."<sup>16</sup> While part of the labor supply for the new cotton mills that began to appear in the 1770's came from the natural increase in population that occurred after 1750, an equally important source of supply during the early period came from shifts out of declining occupations and from the extensive use of women and children, a source not widely utilized in the more traditional occupations.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>13</sup> *Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency*, Vol. X: "Ratnagiri and Savantwadi" (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1880), pp. 105-106; R. D. Choksey, *Economic Life in the Bombay Deccan (1818-1939)* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1955), pp. 18, 20-21, 28-29.

<sup>14</sup> As has been suggested, the economic history of nineteenth century India has been grossly neglected and monographic literature of quality is completely lacking. The voluminous literature that is available is overwhelmingly polemic in tone and desperately weak in statistical adequacy. It is therefore virtually impossible to come to firm conclusions at this time. Much of the traditional analysis depends for its accuracy upon the assumption of a pre-British rural harmony and population stability that is entirely out of accord with the evidence. For example, Choksey, *op. cit.*, p. 24, contains an excellent example of the "paradise lost" theme: "In such a paradise of contentment, as only those who know no ambition can enjoy, there crept in forces, from an inconceivable distance, brought to his simple home by his new masters—the upheaval wrought by the Industrial Revolution." However, for a detailed analysis of the problems of labor recruitment to the Bombay cotton textile industry, cf., Morris David Morris, "A History of the Creation of a Disciplined Labor Force in the Cotton Textile Industry of Bombay City, 1851-1951", (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Berkeley: University of California, 1954).

<sup>15</sup> E. E. Rich, "The Population of Elizabethan England", *Economic History Review*, 2nd S., Vol. II, No. 3, 1950, pp. 252 ff.

<sup>16</sup> A. P. Wadsworth and J. de L. Mann, *The Cotton Trade and Industrial Lancashire, 1600-1780* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1931), p. 68.

<sup>17</sup> Ashton, *An Economic History of England*, pp. 129, 203 and 234.

Despite the oft repeated and widely accepted statement that the early cotton factories were established in rural areas where water power was available but where labor was scarce or unwilling, it seems that a substantial proportion of the mills were located in relatively densely settled districts, in villages and towns where there was no problem of obtaining raw, unskilled labor.<sup>18</sup> And when steam power began to be widely harnessed to cotton production, new mills tended to be increasingly concentrated in the towns where raw labor supply was no issue at all. Bowden refers not incorrectly to the "well-nigh inexhaustible numbers of the population whence came the industrial workers...."<sup>19</sup>

But because the new technology depended on adequate supplies of water-power, particularly in the period before 1800, many mills were established in isolated upland valleys where water supply would be uninterrupted but where population was often very thinly settled.<sup>20</sup> Obviously, in these areas there would be some initial difficulties in the recruitment of labor. Even in a perfectly organized labor market where all labor is wage labor, there would be some

<sup>18</sup> For the traditional stress on the rural location of the early cotton mills, L. C. A. Knowles, *The Industrial and Commercial Revolutions in Great Britain during the Nineteenth Century* (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1921), p. 92, and Paul Mantoux, *The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1928), p. 253.

There has never been, to my knowledge, a complete analysis of the locations of eighteenth and early 19th century mills. However, a survey of the evidence suggests that a surprising number were placed in the economically more vigorous, and thus more densely populated, districts. Sources of water power had not been so completely preempted as to make this impossible. Moreover, certain marketing considerations tended to encourage this phenomenon. Apart from the matter of raw material supply, the yarn produced by the mills had to be sold to the handicraft weavers.

<sup>19</sup> Witt Bowden, *Industrial Society in England Towards the End of the Eighteenth Century* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1925), p. 263. Arthur Redford, *Labour Migration in England, 1800-50* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1926), p. 18, recognizes that "in considerable towns, such as Stockport and Manchester, the nucleus of a labor supply was, no doubt, already available...."

It is important to note that this essay is concerned with the mobilization of raw, unskilled labor. The problem of obtaining and stabilizing skilled labor was a much more difficult task, partly because it had to be trained to the new requirements and partly because of the tendency of new entrepreneurs to pirate skilled employees from one another. Cf., Gilbert J. French, *The Life and Times of Samuel Crompton* (London, 1859), p. 105, and Richard Guest, *A Compendious History of the Cotton Manufacture* (Manchester, 1823), p. 23.

A careful reading of the literature suggests that it was the problem of skill rather than of raw labor supply that was crucial. The confusion of these two different problems largely accounts, it seems, for the exaggeration of the problem of raw labor supply in the early stages.

<sup>20</sup> One should not err in assuming that all rural areas where waterpower was available were lacking in available labor. For example, a Manchester paper of 1787 carried an advertisement "To cotton and other manufacturers: To be let for not more than 21 years, a large and commodious building formerly a water corn mill... 200 yards from Ruthin in Denbigh. The millstream is supplied out of the principal river. Situation ...will admit of erecting works.... The manufacturer may be supplied with plenty of hands at low wages as there are a great number of grown women boys and girls in the town of Ruthin that are out of employ, no manufactory whatever being carried on there at present, and the wages paid to women at hay-harvest does not exceed eightpence a day upon their own meat." Quoted in George Unwin, *Samuel Oldknow and the Arkwrights* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1924), p. 118.

interval before institutional arrangements could readjust to the demands from new geographical areas. Yet even for such rural enterprises, despite the general impression left by scholars, it can be said that, almost without exception, once a labor force started to flow no difficulties in sustaining the flow manifested themselves.

Arkwright's experimental first mill was established at Nottingham in 1768. In such a center labor supply was no problem. But his second effort (1771) was located at Cromford. "There was no preexisting village of any size and, one would suppose, no labor force ready to hand...."<sup>21</sup> An advertisement was placed in the *Derby Mercury* in December 1771, seeking artisans and "There is Employment at the above Place, for Women, Children & c. and good Wages."<sup>22</sup> While the evidence is slim, it seems that a "great number of poor people" were attracted and a shortage of labor was not one of the initial difficulties at Cromford.<sup>23</sup> In May 1774, Jedediah Strutt told a House of Commons committee that "already upwards of 600 Persons of all Ages [are] employed" at Cromford.<sup>24</sup>

The Arkwright-Strutt mill at Belper (established 1776) was employing 600 workers by 1786, a year when a second mill was under construction, and by 1816, some 1500 were at work.<sup>25</sup> Again, there seems to have been no difficulty in recruiting raw labor. <sup>26</sup> Nor did Samuel Greg at Styal (1784) or Oldknow at Mellor (1793) seem to have difficulty mobilizing a staff of operatives.<sup>27</sup>

Even a mill as isolated as New Lanark, often cited as a classic example of a factory that faced a difficult problem of labor supply, in fact very quickly solved its problem. In 1785, when David Dale started construction in the Clyde Valley, the location was, apart from its supply of power, "a mere morass". Obviously, a mill established in such an isolated and thinly populated area had to seek out new sources of labor. Nevertheless, by 1792 New Lanark boasted a population of two thousand and Dale had four mills in operation in the village. In 1816 New Lanark was the largest undertaking in Britain, giving employment to "1600 or 1700" operatives.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>21</sup> R. S. Fitton and A. P. Wadsworth, *The Strutts and the Arkwrights, 1758-1830* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958), p. 65.

<sup>22</sup> Quoted *ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> J. H. Crabtree, *Richard Arkwright* (London, 1923), p. 37.

<sup>24</sup> Fitton and Wadsworth, *op. cit.* p. 71. That labor supply was not one of Arkwright's difficulties seems also to be suggested in a letter from him. *Ibid.*, 66-67.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 224-225.

<sup>26</sup> J. D. Chambers, "The Vale of Trent 1670-1800", *Economic History Review Supplements*, No. 3, p. 37.

<sup>27</sup> Unwin, *op. cit.*, Ch. XI; Frances Collier, "An Early Factory Community", *Economic History* (A Supplement of *The Economic Journal*), Vol. II, No. 5, January 1930, pp. 117-124.

<sup>28</sup> For a statement of the difficulty of recruiting labor, cf., Mantoux, *op. cit.*, p. 478. Mantoux, *loc. cit.*, also gives the population of New Lanark for 1792. Speaking generally of the very rapid growth of the Scottish cotton textile industry, David Bremner, *The Industries of Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1869), pp. 282-283, wrote: "The rapid extension of the cotton trade in Scotland was owing, among other things, to the facility with which workpeople could be obtained." He points out (*Ibid.*, p. 279) that between 1778 and 1787 nineteen waterpower mills were established. On the 1816 employment, Fitton and Wadsworth, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

Arthur Redford refers to "a fairly general prejudice against factory work, which aggravated the difficulty of labor recruiting." He cites the case of the Deanston cotton mills in Perthshire, established in 1795, quoting the factory inspectors' reports for 1838 to the effect that "The more respectable part of the surrounding inhabitants were at first averse to seek employment in the works, as they considered it disreputable to be employed in what they called 'a public work.'"<sup>29</sup> To the extent that objections of this sort existed among the rural population, they seem quickly to have been overcome. In a few years the mills had six or eight hundred workers employed. In fact, "Owing to the Improvements in Machinery, fewer Workers were found necessary and about the year 1800 not above 500 Workers remained."<sup>30</sup>

A more significant factor contributing to the recruiting difficulties that did exist in the thinly settled rural areas immediately proximate to the new mills was the stimulation to weaving activity given by the development of spinning mills. The enhanced supply of mill yarn made possible fuller employment and higher incomes for handicraft weavers. This, it seems clear, explains the fact which Redford misinterprets, that "very few of Samuel Oldknow's weavers, either at Stockport or elsewhere, sent their children into his spinning mills."<sup>31</sup>

It is widely stated that handloom weavers refused to go into the mills, even at the cost of great suffering. On the other hand, it seems quite clear that as the handloom weavers began to suffer from the competition of the powerlooms after 1800 they eagerly sought employment in the factories but with little success. However, their children were employed in the mills from the earliest period.<sup>32</sup>

It is interesting that Robert Owen in his autobiography, describing his activities at Mr. Drinkwater's mill in Manchester, at Northwich, at his own mills at Chorlton and New Lanark, at no point ever indicates that labor supply was a critical issue. The problem was solely a matter of discipline. However, Mantoux, *op. cit.*, p. 478, quotes another of Owen's essays to the effect that the original recruitment of labor "was no light task, for all the regularly trained Scotch peasantry disdained the idea of working early and late, day after day, within cotton mills. Two modes then only remained of obtaining these laborers, the one, to procure children from the various charities of the country, and the other, to induce families to settle around the works."

For the moment it is sufficient to indicate that the effort to recruit labor was successful. For the moment it is sufficient to indicate that the effort to recruit labor was successful. Moreover, Owen also reports that in Sutherland George Macintosh had "induced Mr. Dale, . . . to join him . . . in this cotton mill in Scotland — called the "Spring Dale Cotton Mill", with a view of introducing this new machinery into the North Highlands, and to give employment to the people." Robert Owen, *The Life of Robert Owen by Himself* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1920), pp. 101. 103.

<sup>29</sup> Redford, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

<sup>30</sup> From House of Commons investigation of cotton mill apprentices, 1819, quoted by Fitton and Wadsworth, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

<sup>31</sup> Redford, *op. cit.*, p. 20, On the impact of cotton yarn supply, cf., S. J. Chapman, *The Lancashire Cotton Industry* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1904), pp. 37-39; P. Gaskell, *Artisans and Machinery* (London, 1836), pp. 33-34; Wm. Radcliffe's description quoted in Bowden, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-112.

<sup>32</sup> For a standard statement on the refusal of handloom weavers to enter the mills, cf., J. L. and Barbara Hammond, *The Town Labourer* (New ed., London: Longmans, Green and Co.,

Redford leaves another erroneous impression when he tells us:

For most of their adult workers the early factories had to rely on tramp labor. This may account for the markedly casual character of mill-work, as reflected in early mill records. Between 1791 and 1794 over six hundred names appear on the wage lists of Oldknow's mill at Mellor; yet not more than three hundred were employed at one time.<sup>33</sup>

Redford clearly misinterpreted the Oldknow evidence. The Mellor mill did not go into production until 1793. The labor to which Redford refers was occupied in mill construction and in the road-making, bridge-building and other similar tasks which require casual labor. The records cited show no evidence of an unstable labor force once the mill got under way.<sup>34</sup> In fact, the one case for which we have some detailed data, Strutt's operations at Belper for the years 1805-1812, shows that the labor turnover for all causes averaged about 16 per cent annually, a not unreasonably high figure.<sup>35</sup>

It is often argued that the use of children generally reflected a desperate shortage of adult labor in the early cotton mills.<sup>36</sup> It must be recognized that the object of the new millowners was, of course, to produce yarn as cheaply as possible, and the new machines that enhanced productivity so enormously were designed to be used by the cheapest labor, the women and children who were least effectively used by the economy of the time.<sup>37</sup> In an era with the social morality of the eighteenth century, the large-scale recruitment of women and children was not a deviation from going social values but an appropriate expression of them. Even Wesley commended the manager of a mill who in 1787 was able to give employment to 250 children. Wherever it was possible to use women and children the eighteenth century mobilized them. The great complaint of the century was that there was not enough work for them.<sup>38</sup>

Much specific attention has been given to the recruitment of parish apprentices for the early mills, and their use has been cited as evidence of the generalized

1925), pp. 11-12, 21. However, the same evidence cited by the Hammonds also states that "very few weavers at that time left their employ to learn to spin, but as the weavers could put their children into mills at an earlier age than they could put them to looms, they threw them into mills as soon as possible...." *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 156-157. On the failure of handloom weavers to obtain mill employment, cf., Gaskell, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37.

<sup>33</sup> Redford, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

<sup>34</sup> Unwin, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-164.

<sup>35</sup> Fitton and Wadsworth, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

<sup>36</sup> Ashton, *op. cit.*, p. 117; Redford, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-22.

<sup>37</sup> J. Aiken, *A Description of the Country from Thirty to Forty Miles Round Manchester* (London: 1795), pp. 168, 219; Crabtree, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-39; the statement by W. Kelly regarding the invention of the selfacting mule in 1792, quoted in Edward Baines, *History of the Cotton Manufacture in Great Britain* (London, 1835), p. 206; James Ogden, *Manchester a Hundred Years Ago* (edited by W. E. A. Axon, London, 1887), p. 90.

<sup>38</sup> Wadsworth and Mann, *op. cit.*, pp. 405-508; Edgar S. Furniss, *The Position of the Laborer in a System of Nationalism* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1920). Wellman J. Warner, *The Wesleyan Movement in the Industrial Revolution*, pp. 150-151.

shortage of other labor for the cotton factories.<sup>39</sup> However, the use of parish apprentices as a cheap labor supply on a large scale much preceded the factory era and was always actively encouraged (and frequently subsidized) by responsible parish officers anxious to relieve the parish rates of these unwanted burdens.<sup>40</sup> Their employment in the mills did not, therefore, necessarily reflect an inability on the part of millowners to obtain other forms of labor, although it is true that parish apprentices could often be more easily recruited in large batches. The parish apprentices were used because they were a traditional source of labor and also because they seemed to avoid certain complex problems associated with the recruitment from other sources.

Some portions of the workforce recruited for country mills came from the families of immigrant construction workers hired when the mills were being erected. The women and children could be hired as operatives, but this created problems when construction was completed. What was to be done with the adult males in the families? A few were kept on as mechanics or as overseers but the bulk of them were not wanted in the mills.<sup>41</sup> Perhaps they were not as docile; most certainly their wages would have been higher. Some employers, Oldknow at Mellor and the Strutts at Belper are good cases, tried to find the adult men jobs in other enterprises they conducted, but most owners sought to find labor that would not burden them with the responsibilities of unwanted adults. With this in mind, parish apprentices were ideal employees for the owners of Arkwright's machinery in underpopulated rural areas.<sup>42</sup>

The evidence for the rural mills seems generally to suggest that the use of parish apprentices was not a function of the lack of other labor but arose out of a desire to employ the cheapest sort of labor. Not only were adults not employed when they were available, except at tasks for which children could not be used, but the apprentices were often discharged when they became adults. In fact, Farey in 1817 objected to the use of parish apprentices in cotton mills, not because they were ill-treated or because the work was particularly unhealthy

<sup>39</sup> "The early spinning machinery... needed water power for its working: hence the first mills were placed on streams, and the necessary labor was provided by the importation of cartloads of pauper children from the workhouses in the big towns." J. L. and B. Hammond, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

<sup>40</sup> Alfred [Samuel Kyd], *The History of the Factory Movement*, Vol. I (London, 1857), pp. 16-18; John Alfred Langford, *A Century of Birmingham Life*, Vol. II (Birmingham, 1871), pp. 57-58; Wadsworth and Mann, *op. cit.*, p. 349.

An example of the eagerness of parish officers to rid themselves of their poor can be found in Oldknow's experience. The overseer of a parish in Kent, having heard of Oldknow's negotiations with another parish, wrote offering apprentices: "and as they [the rate payers] will not be very willing to part with much money, wish you'd let me know your lowest terms and whether the children so put out will gain a settlement by such Apprenticeship." Oldknow responded that he would require two guineas, clothes and two shirts to take the boys. *Cf.*, Unwin, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-172.

<sup>41</sup> Fitton and Wadsworth, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-104; Unwin, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-167.

<sup>42</sup> For Oldknow's experience, *cf.*, Unwin, *op. cit.*, pp. 166ff. For the Strutt mill at Belper, *cf.*, Fitton and Wadsworth, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-104. *Cf.*, also, Chambers, *op. cit.*, p. 62.



but because their employment was a dead-end variety, "failing them almost entirely when they grew up and leaving them a calling to seek."<sup>43</sup>

Apart from all of this, the extent of the parish apprentice system seems to have been greatly exaggerated, a function of the humanitarian concerns which exercised the first half of the nineteenth century. Even at the peak of their use, about 1800, parish apprentices rarely constituted a third of the labor force in the rural mills and in most of the rural factories there was a much smaller proportion.<sup>44</sup> And in the towns and larger villages, where the supply of women and children existed independently of the exertions of the millowners, parish apprentices were very little used. In fact, the towns provided labor to the isolated mills in the rural districts.<sup>45</sup>

The New England experience differed from both the Bombay and the British. As in India, the factory system was imposed directly onto an economy characterized predominantly by household production, but unlike India the vast and growing opportunities for agricultural expansion meant that there was no enormous surplus labor force easily available for recruitment into industrial employment. Nevertheless, for technical and institutional reasons land was not a free good that could be taken up easily. In New England, at the beginning of the nineteenth century "The process of pioneering was finished, practically all of the land which was then considered available had been brought under cultivation; in the current phrase these states were 'fully settled'."<sup>46</sup> Agriculturists in the region typically cultivated relatively small farms and were often forced to eke out an existence with supplemental forms of employment. Faced by agricultural competition from areas better located and endowed, many New England families were available for non-agricultural employment. Moreover, in an era of large families the size of agricultural units tended to induce children to leave the family operation, many to move westward, some to become artisans or to seek whatever other forms of employment there were.<sup>47</sup> It was from these groups and from unmarried daughters who tended not to be

<sup>43</sup> Quoted by Chambers, *op. cit.*, p. 62. Cf., also, Gaskell, *op. cit.*, p. 136, and Fitton and Wadsworth, *op. cit.*, pp. 229-230. However, this treatment of children was not universal. The Greg mill at Styal seems to have kept a number of its apprentices when they became adults. F. Collier, *op. cit.* So did the Oldknow mill. Unwin, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

<sup>44</sup> Redford, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

<sup>45</sup> Redford, *op. cit.*, p. 23; Gaskell, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-138. There is no evidence that either Arkwright or Strutt took parish apprentices. Fitton and Wadsworth, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

<sup>46</sup> P.W. Bidwell, "Rural Economy in New England at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century", *Transactions, Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences*, Vol. 20, April 1916, p. 248. As Fuller has written, by 1820 "any considerable increase of population... in the future must be based on a change in the occupation of her inhabitants.... The result of all the household manufacture that was carried on was a huge fund of mechanical skill and aptitude ready and anxious to turn to any pursuit which would make it easier to earn a living." G. P. Fuller, "An Introduction to the History of Connecticut as a Manufacturing State", *Smith College Studies in History*, Vol. I, No. 1, October 1915, p. 27.

<sup>47</sup> Although the population of New England expanded between 1790 and 1820, its rate of growth was slow by contrast with other areas of the country, much of the natural increase being offset by emigration mainly to the West. Bidwell, *op. cit.*, Appendix B, pp. 383 ff.

extensively used in agricultural work that the cotton textile mills recruited the original labor force. And as a consequence of the growth of industry and commerce, of which cotton textile expansion was the most significant, the reversal of the pattern of population outflow and the accelerated rate of population growth was a most striking feature of the New England economy after 1820.<sup>48</sup> Bidwell's analysis of the demographic data indicates that most of the increase of population in the three southern New England states "is to be ascribed to the growth of 26 towns of the largest size.... It is safe to say that unless manufactures had developed there would have been a stationary condition if not a decrease in the population of most of the commercial towns." In fact, in those districts of the region where industry had not appeared and where dependence on agricultural activity persisted through the period 1810-1860, "population was either stationary or declining."<sup>49</sup>

The first cotton textile factory of modern type was the tiny spinning mill built by Samuel Slater in 1791 at Pawtucket, Rhode Island. This and subsequent Slater enterprises became the incubator for training artisans who, having familiarized themselves with the technical requirements, quickly spread out over the countryside to initiate enterprises on the Slater model. By the end of 1809 there were within thirty miles of Providence at least twenty-seven mills in operation and fourteen under construction.<sup>50</sup> At the end of 1813 an incomplete tabulation reported at least 113 mills in the New England area and by 1815 there were perhaps 165.<sup>51</sup> In 1832 there were over five hundred and by 1840 some 570. Between 1840 and the Civil War that number did not increase, growing output being achieved entirely by increasing size and efficiency of units.<sup>52</sup>

It has been widely held that recruitment of a labor force for this expanding industry was exceedingly difficult until the mid-nineteenth century but the evidence that is typically cited refers to the problem of finding skilled labor. Here, as in the British case, there has been a confusion between the qualitative problem and the need for large amounts of raw, unskilled labor.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>48</sup> Nathan Appleton, *Introduction of the Power Loom and Origin of Lowell* (Lowell: 1858), pp. 15-16; Vera Shlakman, "Economic History of a Factory Town", *Smith College Studies in History*, Vol. XX, Nos. 1-4, Oct. 1934, July 1935, pp. 12, 50. P. W. Bidwell, "Population Growth in Southern New England, 1810-1860", *Quarterly Publications, American Statistical Association*, Vol. XV, N. S. No. 120, Dec. 1917, pp. 813-815.

<sup>49</sup> Bidwell, "Population Growth", *op. cit.*, pp. 815-816, 833.

<sup>50</sup> Albert Gallatin, "Manufacture", *American State Papers*, Vol. IV (Finance), Report No. 325, 17 April 1810, p. 433.

<sup>51</sup> Tench Cox, "Digest of Manufactures", *American State Papers*, Vol. IV (Finance), Report No. 407, 5 January 1814, p. 690; Caroline F. Ware, *The Early New England Cotton Manufacture* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1931), p. 56.

<sup>52</sup> Ware, *op. cit.*, p. 38; M. T. Copeland, *The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United States* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1912), pp. 6-8.

<sup>53</sup> Scholars always speak of "the competition of western lands" as affecting the supply of labor available to American industry. Without involving myself in the controversy over Turner's "Frontier Thesis", let me point out that lurking behind much of this discussion seems

Another source of the judgment that labor was in short supply stems from the two different patterns of labor utilization that developed in the industry, the so-called family system in the Slater-type mills and the boarding-house system which found its greatest expression at Lowell after 1825. Most of the descriptions of labor supply derive from the Lowell experience for which documentation is far more extensive. The heavy dependence on young women, erroneously attributed to shortage of other sources of labor, was in fact a matter of deliberate policy with causes more or less independent of the availability of other kinds of labor. Moreover, in the analysis of the Lowell system there has been confusion between supply of labor and turnover of labor.

Among the distinguishing features of the Lowell-type enterprises was the fact that they were conceived for immediate large-scale operations and therefore required relatively large groups of labor from the outset. Typically established in very thinly populated areas, they could not afford to wait for established labor market devices to work. Consequently, their recruiting activities tended to be vigorous. Recruiting agents were sent out to scour wide areas of New England whenever new labor was required in large groups. The first of these companies went into operation at Waltham in 1815. The dramatic success of the venture led the company to erect a second mill in 1818 and a third in 1820. There is no record of any problems of recruiting labor for this rapidly expanding activity.<sup>54</sup>

The very success at Waltham forced the Boston entrepreneurs to shift to other areas, not because of difficulties with labor but because water power was inadequate.<sup>55</sup> The speed at which a labor force and an urban population could grow is evidenced by the career of Lowell, the next major center. The first unit went into production there at the end of 1823. Expansion was phenomenal and by 1833 there were nineteen mills at work.<sup>56</sup> When, in November 1821, the Boston financiers surveyed the site that later became the town of Lowell, they

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to be the unspoken assumption that the human animal has an inherent psychological lust for the land. However, it must be recognized that much of the migration to western land, certainly in New England before 1820, was a function of the absence of significant alternative opportunities. When the alternatives began to appear, one commentator bemoaned: "The effect of the high price of labor is to induce men and women to abandon their laudable occupations at home, to the detriment of their farms and households, and of that which is still more valuable, their morals.... The price which the manufacturer affords being so much greater than the farmer can possibly pay, that young men consider themselves destitute of enterprise if they are content to drive the ox or follow the plow". Statement of Henry Stark in Louis McLane, *Documents Relative to The Manufactures in the United States*, House Executive Documents, 22nd Congress, 1st Session, Doc. No. 308, Vol. I (Washington, 1833), pp. 684-685; *cf.*, also Shlakman, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

<sup>54</sup> In 1817 the company paid 12-1/2 per cent dividends and by 1822 had paid dividends totalling more than the entire capital invested. Ware, *op. cit.*, p. 66. It is no wonder that the Boston associates and their friends who financed the Waltham venture engaged in a veritable frenzy of company flotations, mill building and expansion in the years that followed. For a brief summary of the expansion of this group of enterprises, *cf.*, Shlakman, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-42.

<sup>55</sup> Appleton, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

<sup>56</sup> Ware, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81.

found it virtually unpopulated. By 1826, three years after production started, there were 2,500 people there. In 1837 the population had grown to 18,000, in 1840 to nearly 21,000 and in 1845 to more than 25,000.<sup>57</sup>

Unlike the Lowell-type enterprises, the Slater units typically started on a fairly small scale and grew on the basis of reinvested profits.<sup>58</sup> Because of the size at the beginning, the labor required was relatively limited and drawn mainly from the neighborhood. The slow growth in size meant that the demands on the supply of labor could typically be met by the normal functioning of the labor market.

Apart from the fact that the rapid growth of the Lowell-type units suggests that labor shortage did not inhibit expansion, the evidence indicates that unavailability of raw labor had only very limited and occasional influence on the operation of the industry in general. There seems to have been occasional tightness in the labor market during some periods during the war of 1812 when mills were springing up with great rapidity, but the evidence suggests that this was mainly a shortage of skilled artisans and trained artisans.<sup>59</sup>

One rare example of labor shortage is of the Lancaster company whose power looms were idle for a short period in 1821. However, the company had discharged many workers during the depressed years 1818 and after and the reappearance of good times apparently found the company unprepared.<sup>60</sup> Certainly in 1820 the Waltham enterprise had forty more operatives on the rolls than it could employ and the company's agent wrote that he was "more puzzled to get rid of hands than to get them."<sup>61</sup> There seem to have been brief shortages during 1831 and during the boom of 1846 and for at least one group of mills in Chicopee in 1859.<sup>62</sup>

It is true that during the periods when the industry was expanding rapidly the new labor force did not always automatically flow in as rapidly as was

<sup>57</sup> In 1826 there were a thousand millhands housed in tenements. In 1837 the operatives constituted 47.6 per cent of the population; in 1845 they were 36.7 per cent. M. T. Parker, *Lowell, A Study of Industrial Development* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1940), pp. 63-64, 67-69; and Bidwell, "Population Growth in Southern New England", *op. cit.*, p. 835.

The pace of mill expansion was rapid elsewhere too. At Chicopee the first mill was completed in 1825, work was started on the second the same year, and the third was erected in 1826, the fourth in 1831. Other mills followed at short intervals. Shlakman, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-28.

<sup>58</sup> On the difference in size of units between the Slater and Lowell systems, *cf.*, Ware, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28, 60, 123.

<sup>59</sup> Ware, *op. cit.*, 227, and Appendix B, p. 304.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 227. Moreover, this was the period when power looms were new and the company was attempting to recruit already skilled employees. *Ibid.*, p. 209.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 201.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 227-228; Edith Abbott, "Harriet Martineau and the Employment of Women in 1836", *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. XIV, December 1906, p. 626. Shlakman, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-149. However, even in the Chicopee case the problem seems to have been more a problem of turnover and discipline than of absolute scarcity. Actually, during 1857 and 1858 the Chicopee mills had laid off many workers and were operating at half time and much of the problem seems to have been a result of a series of strikes that stemmed from wage cuts. Norman Ware, *The Industrial Worker 1840-1860* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924), p. 118.

necessary to fill the mills with labor. In this sense, the situation was different than either the Bombay or the typical British case. The employer, during periods of rapid expansion, had to exert some effort to obtain large groups of new operatives. The Slater-type mills had recourse to advertisements in the press, but this is not evidence of generalized shortage but of the way the labor market in part functioned. Generally, however, advertisements were not necessary to obtain labor.<sup>63</sup>

The boarding-house mills did not use the newspapers at all, probably because of the very selective labor recruitment in which they engaged. Inasmuch as they were tapping an entirely new group for the labor market, their first efforts required the use of recruiting agents. Once the original labor force was mobilized from among the daughters of farmers, word-of-mouth information spread by the young women among friends brought in a steady stream of workers. However, during periods of great expansion, the mills occasionally reverted to the recruiting agents as a way of stimulating a more rapid flow than normal.<sup>64</sup>

Much has been made of the fact that the industry's area covered by the labor market widened significantly over time, as if this in itself is evidence of a shortage of labor. In economic terms the territorial scope of a labor market is irrelevant to the question of the adequacy of a labor force. What is significant is the fact that by spreading out in this fashion the mills were consistently successful in their efforts to maintain an adequate supply of labor. Certainly, the trend of wages is evidence of this.<sup>65</sup> It seems typical that when a mill began operations the tendency was to set wage rates somewhat higher than local going rates in order to get good labor. Once the labor force was recruited and the mill was functioning effectively, the rates (if not the earnings) began to slide downward.<sup>66</sup> At Waltham, statistics indicate that between 1820 and 1860 average earnings remained virtually constant, which meant that piece rates dropped substantially.<sup>67</sup> Professor Hammond summarizes the evidence when he tells us that "Wage levels had not made any considerable change down to 1860 over those paid in 1800".<sup>68</sup> The wage data are sparse and difficult to use, but generally

<sup>63</sup> C. Ware, *op. cit.*, pp. 211-213.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 213-220.

<sup>65</sup> Wage data are treacherous to work with, especially when one is concerned with trends over time. One is bedeviled with problems of wage rates and earnings, with changing job content and a host of other issues. However, all authorities are agreed on the pattern so that for the purpose of this essay it is not necessary to invoke a complex analysis. A brief summary will do.

<sup>66</sup> Shlakman, *op. cit.*, p. 140. This pattern existed also in Bombay and Great Britain.

<sup>67</sup> C. Ware, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

<sup>68</sup> M. B. Hammond, "Who Uses Business Manuscripts", *Bull., Business History Society*, Vol. V, No. 5, October 1931, p. 14. Not only did wage rates decline, but whereas the cotton textile industry had, at least for women and children, offered higher wages than any alternative opportunities at the beginning of the nineteenth century, by 1860 earnings had declined relative to those obtainable in other activities. C. Ware, *op. cit.*, p. 236 and all of Chapter IX.

they confirm the argument of this essay that there was no shortage of raw labor in the New England cotton textile industry.

While the supply of labor was sufficient in each of the three areas considered so that the supply of this factor did not inhibit the rate of growth of the industry, the wage levels required to mobilize the labor supply, the form in which labor was mobilized and the cost of other factors markedly affected the patterns of labor utilization inside the mills. Historically, it has been true that the Bombay mills used much more labor per unit of equipment than the British and the British mills tended to use more than the New England enterprises. This should not be interpreted as a measure of differential efficiency of labor or entrepreneurship but rather reflects the relatively efficient and rational allocation of resources given the ratio of unit-labor costs to unit costs of other factors including capital in each of the three areas. In fact, a survey of what evidence is available on technical and cost relations in the three areas suggests that the patterns of labor and equipment utilization in the mills of each region fit quite closely to what the reasoning of economic theory would suggest.<sup>69</sup>

### III

In each society the character of family organization profoundly affected the kind of labor that flowed in from the countryside. The traditional Indian extended family, joint in food, worship and property, expected of each member contributions towards its support and gave to each member a claim against the common resources.<sup>70</sup> When the plots of land became too small to provide adequate support for the extended family, individual members sought alternative employment by which the family enterprise was kept in existence. From the early nineteenth century, in the densely populated districts of Bombay Presidency individuals in large numbers sought additional sources of income for their joint families in the army, the police force and as recruits to the labor force required in Bombay city and the British colonies. With the opening of the textile factories another major source of employment appeared into which they poured. These migrants to Bombay city tended predominantly to be young, married adult men.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>69</sup> For a comparison of British and Bombay labor deployment patterns and costs, cf., "Report on Bombay Mills by Mr. John Robertson of Glasgow", Bombay Millowners Association, *Reports of the Bombay Millowners Association for the Years 1875 and 1875-76* (Bombay 1876), pp. 74-78. For similar comparisons of British and New England mills, cf., James Montgomery, *The Cotton Manufacture of the United States Contrasted and Compared with that of Great Britain* (Glasgow, 1840) and Samuel Batchelder, *Introduction and Early Progress of the Cotton Manufacture in the United States* (Boston, 1863), pp. 80 ff.

<sup>70</sup> On Indian social structure, cf., L.S.S. O'Mally (editor), *Modern India and the West* (London: Oxford University Press, 1941), and Edward Blunt (editor), *Social Service in India* (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1939).

<sup>71</sup> *The Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency*, Vols. I-XXXVI (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1877-1904) is a mine of information on this subject. Cf., especially, Vol. II, pp. 57-58; Vol. III, p. 40; Vol. V, pp. 102-103, 367-368; Vol. X, pp. 104-106, 122-123, 130, 143.



Because the traditional extended family is in effect a corporate body with property held in common unless the right of division is positively exercised, an individual male member has only general claims on the joint resources. As a result, there was no tendency for any specific member of the family to migrate to Bombay. It could be the father, it might be any of the sons, but the women typically remained behind to be taken care of by the corporate group. The joint family tended to restrict the migration of women; it would seem that typically women migrated only when whole families moved. The limited movement of women is suggested by the fact that unlike the British and New England textile towns, Bombay was a very heavily masculine center. At no time after 1864 has the proportion of women ever constituted as much as 40 per cent of the total population of Bombay.<sup>72</sup>

To the extent that the family retained its rural connection, individual members did not typically remain as permanent proletarians in the mills during the early period. Instead, once having established a foothold in the factory the position seems to have been retained by rotating various male members as periodic replacements. In this way, it was not the individual but the family, even though based in the countryside, that became the factory proletariat. Even when landless rural families were involved, jointness tended to inhibit somewhat the move of the entire group to the city. Influences derived from the village structure — the interdependence of castes, marriage and birth customs, the worship of village gods — tended to encourage the preservation of links with the countryside. Apart from these conservative influences, the desperate and persistent shortage of housing and the instability of mill and other employment made a complete severance of rural ties unwise if not impossible.<sup>73</sup>

Women constituted only 25 per cent and children only 5 per cent of the labor

<sup>72</sup> The data can be found in the various census reports for Bombay city. Kingsley Davis, *The Population of India and Pakistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 136, refers to the fact that Indian towns are generally heavily masculine and "probably have the most distorted sex ratios of any large group of cities in the world." On the other hand, E. G. Ravenstein, "The Laws of Migration", *Journal of the Statistical Society*, Vol. XLVIII, Part II, June 1885, pp. 196-197, bluntly stated that British data showed that "Woman is a greater migrant than man.... A migration of females has taken place into the towns in excess of that of males." Cf., also, A. W. Worthington, "On the Unequal Proportion between the Male and Female Population of some Manufacturing and other Towns", *Jnl., Stat. Soc.*, Vol. XXX, Part I, March 1867, pp. 68-79. For the evidence from New England textile towns, cf., United States, *Sixth Census, 1840: Compendium of the Enumeration of the Inhabitants and Statistics of the United States* (Washington, 1841).

<sup>73</sup> My own research suggests rather strongly that it is the factors associated with availability of housing and stable employment that account for the persistence of rural links among the Indian work force. In those situations where adequate housing and stable employment have been available, a completely urban workforce has been created. It should also be pointed out that the high degree of labor turnover in the Bombay textile industry seems to have been a phenomenon less the outcome of worker psychology than the result of employer policies. On these points, cf., Morris David Morris, "Commitment of the Industrial Labor Force in India: Some Characteristics and Consequences", which will be a chapter in a forthcoming publication of the Social Science Research Council on the problem of commitment of industrial labor in newly developing areas.

force in 1892 and 1893, the period of maximum utilization. While in the earliest period some women were employed both in spinning and weaving, they very quickly tended to be concentrated only in the unmechanized sections such as cotton picking, winding and reeling. There seem to have been at least two cultural elements which may have acted as an influence in setting the original pattern of a mill workforce predominantly male in character. First, there was the high masculinity ratio of the Bombay population, stemming from the joint family pattern that discouraged independent migration of women. Second, the early age of marriage and child-bearing may have made women less desirable employees. This conclusion is strengthened by the evidence that women were mainly employed in those occupations where they could be used on a casual and short-day basis. However, none of this explains the very limited use of children and no evidence is forthcoming on the subject.<sup>74</sup> The absence of a system of parish apprenticeship certainly seems inadequate to explain the infinitesimal use of child labor. The New England mills were able to use a good deal more child labor although it was not obtained through any system of apprenticeship. The only possibility is that Bombay mills were British designed, equipped and managed in the first stage. By the time the industry was started in Bombay the use of children in Britain was being significantly limited, and this may have affected the pattern transported to India.

The British and American family structure, more or less similar to one another, differed quite markedly from the Indian. Both societies were characterized by nuclear family patterns from which the siblings typically broke to establish independent households and livelihoods. In Britain, without the bolstering support of the extended family, the link with the countryside seems inevitably to have been severed and never restored once individuals or families moved into the mills. Although certain rural characteristics were preserved for a time in the country mills — for example, the tendency for some workers to keep their own cows — the effective economic link with rural life was smashed.<sup>75</sup> Moreover, unlike the Bombay industry, the early British mills typically gave employment to whole families but the pattern was characterized by a slight overall preponderance in the number of women employed and by an enormous dependence on children, both male and female.<sup>76</sup>

The New England mills developed two distinct patterns of labor recruitment and utilization. One paralleled British experience while the other, introduced subsequently by Francis Lowell, was largely an indigenous innovation. Slater, a former apprentice at a British mill, staffed his enterprises with neighborhood

<sup>74</sup> For a detailed discussion of the utilization of women and child labor in Bombay, *cf.*, Morris, "History of the Creation of a Disciplined Labor Force in the Cotton Textile Industry of Bombay City", pp. 126-133. In the United Kingdom in 1839 the same age-groups (all persons under fourteen) constituted slightly over 14 per cent of the total labor force in the industry. G. R. Porter, *The Progress of the Nation* (London, 1851), p. 193.

<sup>75</sup> Collier, *op. cit.*, p. 121; Unwin, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

<sup>76</sup> For some data collected in 1833, *cf.*, Baines, *op. cit.*, pp. 369-380.

children at first. The rapid increase of mills soon exhausted the local supply in many areas and in the absence of an effective system of parish apprentices Slater and those who organized mills along his lines often recruited families, providing housing for those who needed it. As in Great Britain, the employers attempted to recruit families with large numbers of children, preferring to select families where the adult males could be employed as mechanics and overseers. This system tended to create a relatively permanent family workforce dependent on mill work and created serious social problems when the market for yarn and cloth was slack and labor was laid off or worked only part time.<sup>77</sup>

Francis Lowell introduced the local innovation at the first Waltham mill, tapping the largely unutilized labor of young, unmarried farm girls whose families permitted them to work in the mills and who were housed in mill-controlled boarding houses. It seems quite clear that the development of the use of farm girls and the dormitory system did not stem from any attempt to overcome any problems of mobilizing labor, else one would have found the Slater-type mills following the example. The boarding-house system flowed in part from a hostility to the growth of cotton textile centers of the British variety with all the social disruption attendant thereto.<sup>78</sup> But the labor organization conceived by this Puritan ethic and the desire to avoid the evils of mill villages populated by entire families had certain pronounced economic advantages as well. It made possible the drafting of young women generally sufficiently well educated to achieve high levels of productivity despite the fact that they did not on the whole become permanent mill operatives. Not only did the dormitory system guarantee an absolute control over the workforce, but the use of unmarried women in these new company towns avoided two major problems evoked by the family system — the problem of finding employment for the adult male members of a family and the problem of social unrest during periods of depression among families utterly dependent on factory earnings.<sup>79</sup>

The Slater-type mills originally produced only yarn on the simple water-frame, a mechanism ideally suited to the employment of children. The Waltham mill was the first to introduce power-weaving, a process that required a somewhat older and more responsible labor force.<sup>80</sup> Having decided to recruit single

<sup>77</sup> "H. N. Slater's Reminiscences of Saml. Slater, his Father", in W. B. Weedon, *Economic and Social History of New England, 1620-1789*, Vol. II, (Boston, 1890), pp. 912-913; Batchelder, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-75; C. Ware, *op. cit.*, pp. 13, 29-30, Ch. VIII, pp. 254, 260-261; M. B. Hammond, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

<sup>78</sup> Charles L. Sanford, "The Intellectual Origins and New-Worldliness of American Industry", *Journal of Economic History*, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, March 1958, pp. 1-16, provides an excellent summary of the moral origins of the Lowell system.

<sup>79</sup> Appleton, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16; C. Ware, pp. 64-65 and Ch. VIII. One of the features of the industry's development that has been typically ignored but which significantly affects any estimate of the problems associated with labor recruitment and disciplining was the volatility of market demand for textiles and the frequency of periods of reduced employment.

<sup>80</sup> C. Ware, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

women for the weaving side and use dormitories to house them, the company found it desirable to exclude children altogether.

At Waltham, they... provided boarding-houses to accomodate all in their employ. This precluded the employment of children: as about half the usual wages of females would be required for the payment of board, the Company could not afford to pay board wages to those who were not capable of doing full work. The result was that only those of mature age could find employment; and such usually having a home to which they could return in case of any interruption in the business, they were not subject to be left dependent or exposed to suffering.<sup>81</sup>

Even after the introduction of power-weaving at the Slater-type mills, the proportion of adult males and children employed in them remained apparently much greater than in the Waltham-Lowell system.<sup>82</sup>

Although there were certain substantial technical differences which distinguished the two mill systems, these were largely irrelevant for the purposes of this essay. The one important distinction was that the Slater-type mills introduced the British mule for spinning, a machine that required the superior skill and strength of men.<sup>83</sup> This difference raises an interesting and unresolved problem, the degree to which the Slater system of family recruitment, which made adult males available, encouraged or was encouraged by the use of mule spinning. But whatever the problems of explanation are, it is clear that as a group the New England mills used a smaller proportion of children than the British mills although more than were employed in Bombay, and both British and New England factories employed a far larger proportion of females than the Indian plants.

#### IV

Other striking features of the mobilization pattern in Bombay that distinguished it from Britain and New England were the linguistic and social divisions. The early labor force in the New England mills was almost entirely native in origin and like the employers Yankee in background. It was not until the Irish appeared in great floods after 1846 that cultural and social differences appeared on a significant scale. Even then there were no linguistic problems. The British mills obtained a labor force somewhat more diverse in character. Nevertheless, the mills drew their labor mainly from surrounding counties. Irish migration into the Lancashire mills, bringing social, economic and religious cleavages, became most important only after 1815.<sup>84</sup>

<sup>81</sup> Batchelder, *op. cit.*, p. 75. Actually, children were employed as operatives. Two of the Lowell girls eventually wrote their autobiographies and one, Lucy Larcom, reports that she went into a mill at the age of eleven; another, Harriet Robinson, went to work at the age of ten and writes that there were others of the same age. Lucy Larcom, *A New England Girlhood* (Boston, 1890), p. 153; and Harriet H. Robinson, *Loom and Spindle*, pp. 17 and 30. However, in these two cases the young girls were permanent residents of Lowell.

<sup>82</sup> C. Ware, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-211.

<sup>83</sup> Batchelder, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

<sup>84</sup> C. Ware, *op. cit.*, pp. 228-230; Redford, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

India is a continent that is diverse regionally in terms of language and diverse socially in terms of caste structure. Prior to 1890 the Bombay mills drew mainly from areas where Marathi was the dominant language. Workers from other regions, introducing new linguistic elements, particularly Hindi and Telegu, entered later, and stage-wise can be compared with the introduction of French-Canadians and various European language groups into the New England mills after the Civil War. Nevertheless, in Bombay there was an immediate linguistic problem arising from the fact that owners, managers and the first skilled workers spoke either Gujarati or English but not Marathi and thus were rather effectively cut off from efficient communication with the workforce. (As late as 1943, nearly a century after the inception of the industry, the Bombay Millowners' Association felt the necessity of issuing a 27 page English-Marathi dictionary of textile mill terms to provide "some assistance to Officers and Supervisory Staff of Mills who do not understand Marathi....")<sup>85</sup>

The effect of this particular linguistic division was to affect the character of labor administration inside the mills. Although the Bombay mills developed long after the British and American mills had transferred virtually all main recruitment and labor administration responsibilities from the foreman to the management, the Indian jobbers (foremen) in the Bombay mills were immediately given and long retained virtually absolute control over both recruitment and administration of the millhands. While other factors also contributed to the phenomenon, the linguistic barriers between management and workforce are probably sufficient to explain the development of a pattern which ran counter to the trend of administrative development in Britain, the society which otherwise provided the model for Bombay mill organization.<sup>86</sup>

Apart from the linguistic cleavages, there were the social distinctions of caste and religion which also divided the workers not only from the employers but also from one another. While industry, even in India, tends generally to be a dissolvent of older social patterns, the growth of a single industry can play only a minor role, especially when it develops in an economic environment otherwise quite stagnant. In the absence of rapid economic growth in all sectors, there was great competition for the limited economic opportunities that did appear in the mills. Given jobber domination of labor recruitment and administration and a plethora of labor, the inevitable tendency was for traditional loyalties to persist. The jobber would select his own relations or caste brethren. As a consequence, while the original selection of the workforce was quite accidental, over time the workers recruited for various departments in the several Bombay mills tended to develop quite distinctive district, caste and religious concentrations.<sup>87</sup>

<sup>85</sup> Morris, "A History of the Creation of Disciplined Labor Force", *op.cit.*, pp. 55-57.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, Ch. VIII,

<sup>87</sup> R. G. Gokhale, *The Bombay Cotton Mill Worker* (Bombay: The Millowners' Association, 1957), Cf., also, M. D. Morris, "Caste and the Evolution of the Industrial Workforce in India", to be published shortly in *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*.

## V

While there has been a tendency to argue that the cotton mills in each of the three countries faced a general shortage of labor which inhibited growth in the early stage, a careful reading of the evidence shows that with some minor exceptions in rural mills in Britain and New England the supply of raw untrained labor was quite adequate. The problem was to obtain trained operatives and especially the highly skilled technical and administrative cadre. Shortages of this type were the inevitable consequence of economic growth marked by significant changes in technique.

In Britain, skill was developed primarily inside the mill and on the job. This was especially true of machine operatives. The more highly skilled technicians at first came from outside crafts and subsequently were developed by a process of mill apprenticeship.<sup>88</sup> In the United States, the primary skills were mainly imported from Britain and then spread over the countryside. Samuel Slater was merely an early and very striking example, a skilled mechanic who also functioned as a prime fount of trained men. Whether skill was originally imported or came from other American enterprises (e.g., the arsenals and shipyards), the important fact is that the skilled immigrants tended on the whole to remain permanently in the United States.<sup>89</sup>

In Bombay, as in New England, the industry had to depend upon imported skill but unlike the American case the Indian mills depended on skill that was essentially transient. The early Bombay entrepreneurs not only obtained equipment from Britain but their buildings and layout were also planned by the English machine manufacturers. As part of this package arrangement, the English suppliers also furnished skilled workers on a covenanted basis who were required, as their covenants typically read, to "impart all information, practical or theoretical, in all branches of his duties and to the best of his ability, to all native apprentices and jobbers, and to the work-people under his charge without any additional fee."<sup>90</sup> Typically, the Bombay employer had no effective voice in selecting his covenanted hands; often the same men who were sent out to direct the erection of the machinery stayed on as the skilled technical and administrative cadre. On the whole their quality was not high in the early stages, their turnover was substantial, and although these covenanted hands gradually did train a local cadre, the Bombay industry depended on the foreigners for a very long time. As late as 1895, four decades after the establishment of the first mill, 42 per cent of the superior personnel — managers, engineers and carding, spinning and weaving masters — were covenanted hands from England, and in 1925 they still made up 28 per cent of the top technical cadre. As I have already suggested, the language barrier which divided this group

<sup>88</sup> Fitton and Wadsworth, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-105; Collier, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

<sup>89</sup> C. Ware, *op. cit.*, pp. 203-209.

<sup>90</sup> Rutnagar, *op. cit.*, p. 291.



(as well as the entrepreneurs) from the operatives was an important factor in preserving the decentralization of labor administration in the Bombay mills.<sup>91</sup>

## VI

While space limits this paper to only a very few comparisons, one concluding comment ought to be made. Scholars have spent a good deal of effort describing the profound adjustments that were required by the shift of workers into factory employment and the violence of the reactions to that new discipline.<sup>92</sup> The striking feature of the Bombay pattern is that there was no violent reaction to factory work and, in fact, such employment was always eagerly sought for by far more workers than could be given jobs. Similarly, in New England, no violent antagonisms manifested themselves among those who worked in the mills during the early phase. It has been argued, of course, that in both Bombay and New England the labor force tended to be unstable, preserving for some period those links with the countryside that eased the transition to factory discipline. However, research suggests that in both the Indian and American cases the preservation of the rural nexus was more a matter of employer policy than of worker psychology. Where a permanent millhand cadre did appear in the early phase of each area, the phenomenon still was not accompanied by any violent anti-factory reactions.

The classic case of resistance to industrial discipline is derived, of course, from the Luddite movement in the English Midlands during the years 1811-1812. A detailed reading of the evidence shows that the Luddite pattern of machine-breaking reached back in Britain to the late 17th and early 18th centuries. During this period the incidents involved handicraftsmen protesting the pressure of more efficient competition and the undermining of their traditional control of the labor market. To the extent that these incidents at the end of the 18th century involved attacks on the most severe of all competitors, the new factories, the response came not from those inside but from those outside the mills. The most dramatic of the incidents, those of 1811-1812 in the Midlands, to the degree that they involved factory workers, were not directed against new machinery or factory discipline but were struggles for preservation of wage and working standards. They were, as always, the response of workers for whom collective negotiation with employers was difficult and for whom strike by riot was the effective alternative.<sup>93</sup>

Thus, in none of the three areas did the cotton textile mills find the recruitment of a raw labor supply a difficult task in the sense that the shortage of unskilled labor served to inhibit the pace at which the industry would otherwise

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 288-294; Mehta, *op. cit.*, Ch. VIII; Morris, "A History of the Creation of a Disciplined Labor Force", *op. cit.*, pp. 51-55.

<sup>92</sup> Wilbert E. Moore, *Industrialization and Labor* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951, Part I.

<sup>93</sup> E. J. Hobsbawm, "The Machine Breakers", *Past and Present*, Vol. I, No. 1, 1952

have expanded. Moreover, the shift to factory employment did not create in any of the three centers a violent Luddite reaction against the system. In this sense, a comparison among the three areas suggests that the recruitment of a labor force was equally easy, although the type of labor recruited and the reason for its availability differed. Not only did the proportion of men, women and children utilized vary, but the pattern of deployment, the degree of employer control over the labor force and the problem of generating skill all differed, partly because of economic and technical characteristics and partly because of social features which distinguished the three centers.

Here, I ought to suggest one general point. I believe that this analysis of the cotton textile industry is relevant to other industries as well. Generalizing for the process of industrialization, I think it is safe to say that the supply of raw unskilled labor was never an inhibiting factor in economic growth. Even in the United States it was the shortage of capital and limits on the extent of the market that were crucial. Skill, administrative and technical, was a more difficult problem but this feature has different consequences. Moreover, if my analysis of other British industries — coal mining, potteries and iron and steel — and other Indian industries are any evidence, the Luddite mentality has been grossly misinterpreted. Applying these suggestions to newly industrializing countries of our own time, the process of labor force mobilization and disciplining to industrial requirements will not serve as a critical limitation of their economic development.

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## THE LEGITIMATION OF PROTEST: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN LABOR HISTORY

The effectiveness of a protest movement, such as trade unionism, depends on its ability to overcome the widespread disapproval and opposition it engenders. The worker's demands and their methods of enforcing them must somehow become legitimate in the eyes of the employers, the government, the public, and the workers themselves.<sup>1</sup> The present article analyzes the British and German coal miners' struggles to overcome opposition to their endeavors to rise from traditional submission to the employer to some sort of partnership in industrial government. Its main emphasis is on the development of protest ideologies over a period of time, from the late 18th century to the first World War, which spans the industrial revolution in both countries. Although many of the aspects discussed apply to the countries as a whole, it is hoped that by focussing on a specific and rather distinct group with a long history, some of the contrasting elements will stand out more sharply. Britain will be discussed first, and then Germany, each case starting with employer-worker relations during the pre-industrial period and tracing the broad patterns of the protest movement through the period of viable unionism.

### *The British Miners*

By the end of the 17th century there was already an "almost complete divorce between capital and labor in British coal mining."<sup>2</sup> But not until the early 19th century were there definite signs of a protest movement, although the miners were known for sporadic outbursts of violence, especially in bad harvest years. They had a bad reputation and were generally considered "rough and ignorant."

Their socio-economic position explains this conduct. In Britain, as elsewhere, miners were initially recruited from the peasantry living near the pits. Though there were many local variations, living and working conditions were extremely harsh. British coal mining had none of the great medieval German traditions

<sup>1</sup> To some extent this problem is analogous to that faced by a rising entrepreneurial class during industrialization. For a comparative study of the legitimization of entrepreneurial authority see R. Bendix, *Work and Authority in Industry*, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1956). I am deeply indebted to Professor Bendix.

<sup>2</sup> J. U. Nef, *The Rise of the British Coal Industry*, (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1932), I, p. 439.

of the noble and free miner.<sup>3</sup> On the contrary, the collier's occupation had certain aspects of servility and was commonly associated with the punitive work of criminals. Wherever mines had developed beyond mere holes in the ground the protection of relatively high capital investments by continuous operation and maintenance made the securing of a steady and reliable work force a problem of the first order. The solution was to tie the worker by some means or other to his employer. The methods used to achieve this end varied from actual serfdom, made legal in Scotland in the early 17th century,<sup>4</sup> to the yearly bond prevalent on the northeast coast, to long-term contracts, which were more common in the less developed fields of the Midlands and Wales.<sup>5</sup> Even though the yearly bond was voluntary, for a long time it was not legally "a contract of service... but merely an acknowledgement by the men of a fictitious indebtedness."<sup>6</sup>

The lowly position of the workers must be contrasted with that of the coal operators. On the continent, the state generally appropriated the ownership rights of coal, but in Britain, first custom and then law, reserved these rights for the landowner. It is from this politically and socially powerful group that most coal operators were recruited. Even where mines were leased to capitalist entrepreneurs, the latter were commonly drawn from the landed classes.<sup>7</sup> The employer-worker relationship thus patterned itself after that between landlord and peasant, with emphasis on the social distance and power of the landlord and on absence of state interference. Or, rather, where the state did interfere it was often to strengthen the disciplinary hand of the employer, as in the case of the laws establishing collier serfdom in Scotland.<sup>8</sup> In spite of the workers' frequent life-long attachment to a mine, there is little evidence of a patriarchal relationship between coal master and collier.

The colliers, of course, were not without protection. On the one hand there was the weight of custom, which was a social form of protection against arbitrary treatment by the employers, and on the other, there was the workers' well-known "riotous disposition" which was a form of self-protection.<sup>9</sup> As

<sup>3</sup> See J. U. Nef, "Mining and Metallurgy in Medieval Civilization" in M. Postan and E. E. Rich (eds.), *Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, (Cambridge: University Press, 1952), vol. II, chap. viii.

<sup>4</sup> See "Slavery in Modern Scotland," *Edinburgh Review*, CLXXXIX (1899), pp. 119-148, and J. Barrowman, "Slavery in the Coal-Mines of Scotland," *Federated Institution of Mining Engineers, Transactions*, XIV (1898), pp. 267-279. The legal basis of this system was abolished in 1775.

<sup>5</sup> For a detailed discussion see T. S. Ashton and J. Sykes, *The Coal Industry in the Eighteenth Century*, (Manchester: University Press, 1929), chapters V and VII.

<sup>6</sup> S. Webb, *The Story of the Durham Miners*, (London: Labour Publishing Co., 1921), p. 9.

<sup>7</sup> Ashton and Sykes, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

<sup>8</sup> In the 18th century several laws were enacted which provided harsh penalties for what we would call industrial sabotage. See R. N. Boyd, *Coal Mines Inspection: Its History and Results*, (London: W. H. Allen, 1879), pp. 18-20.

<sup>9</sup> This self-protection is noted in J. L. and B. Hammond, *The Skilled Labourer*, (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1919), pp. 25-26.

long as the industry expanded gradually enough, local custom, which often provided for certain elementary forms of assistance in cases of accidents and in idle periods, was the guiding factor in employer-worker relations. Sudden changes in customs were likely to stir up discontent and distrust, especially if the workers suspected the motives of the change.<sup>10</sup> It is clear that in spite of their subordinate social position the miners possessed enough personal independence to engage in crude forms of self-defence. This was significant for the later emergence of a protest movement. The basis for their independence lay partly in the nature of their job<sup>11</sup> and partly in their social isolation, the scantiness of educational and religious institutions, the absence of employer concern with their private lives, the weakness of rural police enforcement, and the usefulness of the mines as hiding places in emergencies. It should be noted, however, that during the 18th century this relative independence did not mean that the workers were prepared to challenge the authority of their masters. Most of the outbreaks were directed not against employers but against outsiders, usually suppliers of food in bad harvest years.<sup>12</sup> Struggles with employers were not entirely lacking;<sup>13</sup> the point is that on the whole the miners remained loyal "servants".

These conflicts, even those with employers, differed radically from modern industrial disputes. The workers' weapon was recklessness and their strength desperation, not organization.<sup>14</sup> Typically, their aim was revenge for suffering rather than redress of grievances. Yet, even these instinctive and more or less spontaneous outbursts sometimes had ideological aspects: the rioters sought to aid their cause by spreading rumors that the food suppliers tried to starve them to death while they secretly shipped grain to the Spaniards.<sup>15</sup> Outbursts of anger and violence, however, were too crude a weapon to deal with the complex problems raised by the rapid expansion of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Customs and traditions were threatened by an increasingly dynamic economy, by new mining techniques which entailed more dangerous assignments, and

<sup>10</sup> In some instances the employers' reluctance to arouse the wrath of the workers made them hesitate to introduce even technological improvements; see R. L. Galloway, *Annals of Coal Mining and the Coal Trade*, (London: Colliery Guardian Co., 1904), I, p. 416.

<sup>11</sup> In the old days the miner had almost complete freedom in determining the pace and duration of work; some students find this to be the source of their "spirit of independence," see T. C. Barker and J. R. Harris, *A Merseyside Town in the Industrial Revolution, St. Helens 1750-1900* (Liverpool: University Press, 1954), p. 270.

<sup>12</sup> Ashton and Sykes, *op. cit.*, chapter viii and A. H. Dodd, *The Industrial Revolution in North Wales*, (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1933), p. 399.

<sup>13</sup> A. H. John puts more emphasis on this kind of conflict than Ashton and Sykes; see his *Industrial Development of South Wales*, (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1950), pp. 19-20.

<sup>14</sup> A keen observer like Adam Smith did not fail to observe this source of strength in the workers' position; see *The Wealth of Nations*, (Cannan edition; New York: Modern Library, 1937), p. 67.

<sup>15</sup> Ashton and Sykes, *op. cit.*, p. 120. The use of rumors as an unconscious justification for reckless conduct is a very widespread phenomenon in popular disturbances, the "Great Fear" of the French Revolution being a classic example.

by the influx of new employers and workers who had little feeling for the miners' traditional rights.

The problem was to develop methods to influence the employers' decisions in a more positive manner than was feasible through mere riotous behaviour. Unlike craftsmen with a guild tradition, the colliers were ill-prepared for this task. They were not among the first to unionize; they lacked, as the Webbs observed, the "degree of personal independence and strength of character" needed to form "independent associations to resist the will of the employers."<sup>16</sup> In other words, they were independent enough to have occasional outbursts, but their cultural level was too low for organized and disciplined action on their own. Moreover, they were strongly conservative; their notions of rights and duties were governed by long-standing customs. On the other hand, their conservatism furnished them with a justification for a certain type of protest: real or fancied violations of customs by the employers were felt to be strong provocation. In the old mining districts especially the miners fought most bitterly when innovations were involved,<sup>17</sup> although, in all likelihood, their resistance was often motivated by discontent arising from other sources.

This backward-oriented protest justification was naturally unsuitable for the organization of a protest movement. A protest movement could develop only in so far as the workers developed a new image of themselves and of their relationship with their employers. Although the changing character of the industry, and especially the changing attitudes of the mine operators,<sup>18</sup> hastened such a shift in outlook, they still had to have specific ideas to crystallize their fears and hopes and to nurture a spirit of resistance.

For the miners and other British workers, it was a fortunate historical coincidence that they could easily adopt such ideas from other widespread contemporary movements, mainly from the political reform and Methodist movements. Though none of these was designed to teach the workers how to resist the will of their masters, they nevertheless performed this educational function rather well. The spirit of reform and challenge of orthodoxy in the political and religious spheres could not be kept out of the industrial arena. The employers themselves set the example. The middle class political challenge of the entrenched aristocracy and the radical and anti-corn-law agitations became for the miners, as for many other workers, an important lesson in protest ideas and methods.<sup>19</sup> There can be no doubt that the successive waves of political agi-

<sup>16</sup> S. and B. Webb, *The History of Trade Unionism*, (new ed.; London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1920), p. 44.

<sup>17</sup> See, for instance, E. Welbourne, *The Miners' Unions of Northumberland and Durham*, (Cambridge: University Press, 1923), pp. 24, 63-65; and A. Aspinall, *The Early English Trade Unions*, (London: Batchworth Press, 1949), p. 343. In 1831, the northern miners even resisted the abolition of the yearly bond; Ashton and Sykes, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

<sup>18</sup> For some observations on this point by a contemporary writer, see J. Holland, *Fossil Fuel*, (1835), quoted in Welbourne, *op. cit.*, p. 26; see also John, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

<sup>19</sup> Welbourne states: "From the politicians the pitmen learned many a lesson in the art of enlisting the support of popular enthusiasm. They learned the value of meetings and processions,



tation from Peterloo to the Chartist uprisings were a strong factor in the ideological emancipation of the colliers, in spite of the fact that their interest in politics remained slight.<sup>20</sup> They sought increasingly to have a voice in the determination of their working conditions and became more and more critical of certain age-long "evils." To mention but a few illustrations: they began to organize unions, though none survived in the first half of the century;<sup>21</sup> they began to object to unilateral employer interpretations of the yearly bond, especially with respect to fines;<sup>22</sup> they demanded the right to measure without previous notification, the size of the corves by which their earnings were calculated;<sup>23</sup> they loudly complained about their "subjection to the caprice" of the mine foremen;<sup>24</sup> and by the 1840's, as one spokesman stated, "we resisted every individual act of oppression, even in cases we were sure of losing."<sup>25</sup>

The role of the Methodist movement in shaping the workers' attitude was perhaps even more important than that of political agitation. In a language which both employers and workers understood and appreciated, "the Bible furnished many an economic argument, many a warning to the rich, many a threat to the oppressor. The Sermon on the Mount is an education in social equality...."<sup>26</sup> Nowhere did this popular religious revival spread faster than among the mine workers, and many of those who were active in spreading the Gospel became the leaders of their fellow workers.<sup>27</sup> In England, but not in Wales,<sup>28</sup> they even became strike and union organizers. Methodism everywhere raised the miners' cultural level and self-respect, which was a prerequisite for disciplined, voluntary association. The lay preachers enjoyed the trust and confidence of their fellow laborers, and this, it must be noted, along with the prevailing liberal emphasis of political and economic movements, was an important factor in the rise of protest leaders from the workers' ranks at an early stage of the protest movement. For, in spite of the importance of outside

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of petitions and newspaper advertisements, of torches and bands and banners. They learned how to draft resolutions and to conduct with proper solemnity an orderly public meeting." *Op. cit.*, p. 53. See also J. Sykes, *Local Records*, (Newcastle: John Sykes, 1833), II, pp. 308-309.

<sup>20</sup> For a discussion of political agitation among the colliers see R. F. Wearmouth, *Some Working-Class Movements of the Nineteenth Century*, (London: Epworth Press, 1948), pp. 40ff, 156-157; and N. Edwards, *The Industrial Revolution in South Wales*, (London: Labour Publishing Co., 1934), pp. 74ff.

<sup>21</sup> Wearmouth, *op. cit.*, pp. 232-247.

<sup>22</sup> Hammond, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34.

<sup>24</sup> Sykes, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 293-294.

<sup>25</sup> S. and B. Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

<sup>26</sup> Welbourne, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

<sup>27</sup> For an evaluation of the labor leadership of the lay preachers on the northeast coast see S. Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24. See also R. F. Wearmouth, *Methodism and the Working-Class Movement of England 1800-1850*, (London: Epworth Press, 1937) pp. 221-238.

<sup>28</sup> D. Williams, *A History of Modern Wales*, (London: John Murray, 1950), p. 236.

ideological influences, the miners' movement was not captured by outside organizations; it was independent from the beginning.

The developments considered thus far concern primarily the miners' growing will to resist their masters and their struggle for the right to resist. With the appearance of viable unions in the 1860's<sup>29</sup> the problem of legitimizing protest took on a different character. Once certain basic protest rights, such as the right to organize and to strike, are recognized by society, and the workers have acquired power through unionization, the major question is one of establishing acceptable uses of the collective strength. The union leaders must take into account how much and what kind of exercises of union power a society will tolerate before taking repressive measures. This tolerance depends on how accustomed society has become to labor's new demands and on prevailing ideas about the worker's position, his rights and duties.

The third quarter of the 19th century in Britain was fairly permissive in this respect. The workers acquired political status just at the time when market conditions generally were favorable to unionization. In 1867 many miners obtained the right to vote, and in 1874 they sent two of their leaders to Parliament, the first working-class M.P.'s. The social esteem of the workingman in general had risen significantly since the early part of the century, and in the light of mid-Victorian optimism, his lot appeared more promising than in the gloom of the post-Napoleonic years. The age-old belief in the laborer's inescapable poverty, strengthened by the Malthusian vision of a continuous pressure against the margin of subsistence, had given way to hopes of economic abundance for all.

On the other hand, this period marked also the high point of free-trade, *laissez-faire*, and economic self-help. It was taken for granted by informed opinion that the full application of these ideas would lead to the greatest common good. Ideologically, these individualistic concepts could not easily be reconciled with unionism, especially since generations of economists had argued that unions have harmful effects on the economy and are incapable of improving the general level of welfare of the workers.<sup>30</sup> In the accepted liberal creed, in economics and in politics, there was no room for private coercive organizations. The freedom and equality to which the worker was entitled in the pursuit of his own and the greatest common interest allowed him to haggle with his employer, but only as an individual. But the union leaders had already become accustomed to use this acceptance of economic self-help and of individual freedom and equality as a justification for unionism, without any concern for the potential theoretical inconsistency involved. In their thinking

<sup>29</sup> Cf. R. P. Arnot, *The Miners*, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1929), p. 47, and G. D. H. Cole, *A Short History of the British Working Class Movement*, (revised edition; London: George Allen & Unwin, 1948), pp. 181-185.

<sup>30</sup> For a summary of the economists' position see S. and B. Webb, *Industrial Democracy*, (London: Longmans, Green & co., 1921), part iii, chapter i.

there could be neither self-help nor freedom and equality for the worker without unions. They won their case not by arguing against the liberal position, but by reinterpreting it to their advantage. Their success in doing so was highly significant, for it meant the transfer of important rights from the individual to the group.<sup>31</sup>

Although the union leaders were neither inclined nor forced to worry about the potential theoretical consistency of their position, there were practical limits to their "opportunism". In embracing the liberal argument to justify their position they had to accept at least its major practical implications, that is, the absence of legally favored groups and of governmental interference with the laws of the market. They had to rely on self-help through the market and could not seek to advance their interest through social legislation. There was, of course, no unanimous agreement among miners' leaders on this approach, but it was clearly the dominant trend,<sup>32</sup> especially on the northeast coast where the unions were strongest. Its general success, as the Webbs have pointed out, rested on the fact that the workingmen had "picked up the weapon of their opponents and left these without defense."<sup>33</sup> Its chief symbol was the sliding-scale,<sup>34</sup> which was widely adopted in the coal fields in the 1860's and 1870's. By tying the workers' welfare to the impersonal forces of the market the union leaders and the employers hoped to find a conciliatory solution to the troublesome wage question. For the miner's leaders emphasized conciliation, some of them even denounced strikes as "a barbarous relic" of times past.

In spite of the success of this strategy, it was found increasingly unacceptable during the depression of the late 1870's and early 1880's. The reasons for a shift in protest ideologies were not merely economic. Changes developed in the pattern of union demands and methods as part of a deep transformation of social values in Britain in the late 19th and early 20th centuries which culminated in the welfare state.<sup>35</sup>

The shift in the miners' orientation began to be felt in the middle 1880's. After a low point in activity, in the early years of that decade, came a powerful revival, with new ideas and methods, which radiated from the fields of central England to the other areas. The new protest ideology contained a radical reinterpretation of the worker's rights and of his position in the industrial

<sup>31</sup> T. H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class* (Cambridge: University Press, 1950), pp. 43-44.

<sup>32</sup> In addition to the works by the Webbs, Cole, and Arnot cited above, see N. Watson, *A Great Labour Leader*, (London: Brown, Langham & Co., 1908); J. A. Wilson, *A History of the Durham Miners*, (Durham: J. H. Veitch, 1907); and A. J. Youngson-Brown, "Trade-Union Policy in the Scots Coalfields, 1855-1885," *Economic History Review*, 2nd ser., VI (August 1953), pp. 35-50.

<sup>33</sup> *The History of Trade Unionism*, p. 295.

<sup>34</sup> An arrangement by which wages are adjusted automatically to changes in the price of coal.

<sup>35</sup> For a discussion of this transformation see W. H. B. Court, *A Concise Economic History of Britain*, (Cambridge: University Press, 1954), chapter xi.

society. His rights as an individual, in a more or less harmonious society, were no longer emphasized; on the contrary, the battle cry became class oppression and social inequality. To this change in outlook corresponded a change in methods of protest. As long as the collective rights of the workers were treated as an extension of the individual's right of contract, their welfare depended on the kind of contract possible in a given state of the market. But once these rights were treated as inherent in their class position, as social rather than civil rights, their welfare became the subject of social legislation, and their demands could legitimately transcend the laws of the unregulated market.

The first target of the new movement was the symbol of the old ideology, the sliding-scale. In its place arose a fitting new symbol, the living wage. The moving spirit of the drive, the Miners' Federation of Great Britain, formed in 1888, tested the workers' loyalty to the new principles in a gigantic lockout in 1893. It was able to maintain its position. Again in 1896, when the operators made a proposal resembling a sliding-scale, Ben Pickard, the president of the Federation, called upon the miners "to unite as one man to do battle for the living wage as this principle is the main point around which all minor points revolve."<sup>36</sup> Other major new demands were the legal eight-hour day, a legal minimum wage, and finally nationalization of the mines. Not all of these demands gained immediate worker support; the idea of nationalization failed to win widespread approval until after the turn of the century. Nevertheless, there was a new militancy in union conduct and an increasing reliance on nationwide collective action as opposed to the former emphasis on conciliation and local action.

The miners' new attitude was strongly influenced by the rising socialist movement. Although they rejected the doctrinaire approach of the Social Democratic Federation and the Socialist League during the 1880's,<sup>37</sup> they were receptive to the Labour Party's non-doctrinaire, ethical type of socialism. For this kind of socialism was able to capture the evangelistic and humanitarian elements which were once the strength of the Methodist movement among the miners.<sup>38</sup> This rise of socialism gave the miner a view of the world that was more congenial to his interests and class position than the liberal ideology, and a field of action that was more suited to his temperament than the narrow path prescribed by the laws of the market.

In closing this section on the British miners it may be worth noting that not until the late 19th century was their protest formulated on the basis of a strictly

<sup>36</sup> Quoted in Arnot, *op. cit.*, p. 308.

<sup>37</sup> H. Pelling, *The Origins of the Labour Party 1880-1900*, (London: MacMillan, 1954), p. 54; also Cole, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

<sup>38</sup> In some instances socialist fervor and religious revival actually went hand in hand; see for instance, C. R. Williams, "The Welsh Religious Revival, 1904-05," *British Journal of Sociology*, III (Sept. 1952), pp. 242-259. Incidentally, Labour Party socialism was initially most successful where religious Non-Conformism had been strongest; Pelling, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-192.

working class ideology. Until then they adjusted to dominant ideologies rather than attacked them. The fact that workingmen could develop a protest movement in an opportunistic fashion, and largely with the ideological arsenal of their opponents, is the outstanding feature of the British case. It should be noted also that the ideological break with the employers grew not while the workers were weak and disorganized but while they were strong and united. It was a sign of strength rather than of revolutionary alienation. British society was able to allow industrial protest to develop without sowing the seeds of social revolution. The workers were able to organize a protest movement to which the employers and the state could adjust without causing irreconcilable rifts in the body politic.

*The German Miners*<sup>39</sup>

The position of the German coal miners before 1850 contrasts sharply with that of the British during the corresponding stage of slow expansion. The British colliers led a "rough and ignorant" life, and outsiders looked upon them as "savages." In Germany, on the other hand, the miner's occupation had a tradition of honor and privilege. The collier's master was a wealthy landowner or capitalist lessee to whom the state left a free hand in the development of the industry, but the *Bergmann* worked either directly for the state, as was usually the case in the Saar after 1754,<sup>40</sup> or for a private individual who held a mining concession from the state and who was under the detailed control and direction of the *Bergamt* (Bureau of Mines).<sup>41</sup> Directly or indirectly the German miners were subjected to the disciplinary paternalism of highly status-conscious civil servants. This connection with the state was an important element in the social honor of their occupation.<sup>42</sup> They also enjoyed various material privileges. They were granted exemptions from certain taxes and feudal dues and sometimes from military service. Their working conditions, including hours, wages, seniority, hiring and firing were under state protection, and they and their families received special assistance in cases of accident, sickness and death. These benefits were provided partly by law,<sup>43</sup> partly by the regulations of the

<sup>39</sup> This discussion deals only with the Ruhr and Saar fields. These two areas were by far the most important; they employed about two thirds of all German miners. For detailed data see H. Imbusch, *Arbeitsverhaeltnis und Arbeiterorganisationen im deutschen Bergbau*, (Essen: Gewerkverein christlicher Bergarbeiter, 1908), pp. 2-3. For a general discussion of the development of the industry see M. Baumont, *La grosse industrie allemande et le charbon*, (Paris: Gaston Doin, 1928) and P. Benaerts, *Les origines de la grosse industrie allemande* (Paris: F. H. Turot, 1933).

<sup>40</sup> A. von Brandt, *Zur sozialen Entwicklung im Saargebiet* (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1904), pp. 3-4.

<sup>41</sup> However, until the early 19th century many miners were still self-employed peasants whose help consisted mainly of members of their family.

<sup>42</sup> E. Gothein, "Bergbau," *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik* (Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1914), VI, p. 332.

<sup>43</sup> In part by the *Preussische Allgemeine Landrecht* (1794), see R. Schwenger, *Die betriebliche Sozialpolitik im Ruhrkohlenbergbau*, (Muenchen: Duncker und Humblot, 1932), p. 15. For

industry and partly by the *Knappschaften* (state controlled guild-type organizations). These organizations, with their discipline, uniforms, marching bands, parades, special holy days and feasts were another manifestation of the miners' corporative spirit and evidence of their social status.

This contrast in status between German and British miners necessarily entailed an equally sharp contrast in expected and actual conduct. The British coal-master expected little from the collier beyond his labor, but the conduct of the German miners was subject to a host of regulations and official admonitions. For instance, the Saar *Règlement* of 1797 admonished them to behave in a praiseworthy manner, to be always "modest, calm, and peaceful, without grumbling, cursing, swearing, or being insolent....". It told them how late they could play cards in beer halls, when to be off the street, and when to wear their uniforms; furthermore, it ordered them to show "esteem, obedience, and respect for their superiors, and to greet them properly at all times...."<sup>44</sup> Similar regulations, with punishments for violation and machinery for enforcement, were passed in other areas. A Prussian ordinance of 1824 urged "to bring honor to the miners' estate and to seek the confidence of ...superiors through good moral conduct, orderliness, industriousness, and obedience."<sup>45</sup>

One of the major results of governmental tutelage was to forestall the development of independent collective action and to promote an attitude of submissiveness which lasted long after this tutelage was abolished.<sup>46</sup> The *Bergmann's* honor could not be reconciled with "mutiny." Unlike their British colleagues, who were feared for their riotous disposition, the German miners rarely disturbed the peace before 1850.<sup>47</sup> Even during the agitations of 1848 they stood aloof,<sup>48</sup> or were hostile to reform, as in one instance where they published a statement vigorously attacking those, including many coal operators, who were trying to "subvert" the existing regime.<sup>49</sup>

Significant changes in the workers' position and in their relationship with the employers began in the 1850's. Between 1850 and 1865 the state abandoned its control and supervision of the industry, except in the Saar where most mines

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other early regulations see H. Imbusch, *op. cit.*, and O. Hué, *Die Bergarbeiter*, (Stuttgart: H. H. W. Dietz, 1910), vol. I.

<sup>44</sup> Hué, *op. cit.*, I, p. 397.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 420.

<sup>46</sup> Worker submissiveness, of course, was not only in evidence in the coal industry. It was a manifestation of the workers' general attitude toward authority, which was strongly influenced by religious considerations. See W. Brepohl, *Industrievolk im Wandel von der agraren zur industriellen Daseinsform dargestellt am Ruhrgebiet*, (Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1957), pp. 70ff. During the distress of the 1840's many of the Westphalian workers "simply waited for government ordinances while others plunged into 'devout Pietism'." W. Schulte, *Volk und Staat*, (Muenster: Regensberg'sche Buchdruckerei, 1954), p. 128.

<sup>47</sup> A recent compilation of labor disturbances between 1798 and 1848 fails to list a single outbreak in mining; E. Todt and H. Radant, *Zur Fruehgeschichte der deutschen Gewerkschaftsbewegung*, (Berlin: Die freie Gewerkschaft, 1950), pp. 68-78.

<sup>48</sup> Schulte, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

<sup>49</sup> Hué, *op. cit.*, II, p. 30.



continued to be operated by the state. Output and employment in the industry went into a headlong expansion. The miners lost their legal protection of employment conditions but received freedom of movement and contract to pursue their economic interests as they saw fit. The *Knappschaften* remained in existence but generally came under the control of the mine management.

For organizing a protest movement the workers were psychologically, socially, and legally in a very difficult position. Their own legacies of dependence and subordination and prevailing social values emphasizing obedience and deference to the master were serious stumbling blocks. Physically, little had changed; the mine managers exercised the same authority as before, except that now they were free to pursue their interests without submitting to state control. As the disciplinary system became more impersonal, some writers argue, it also became harsher.<sup>50</sup> The employers remained "patriarchalisch kommandierende Feudalherren" while the government left the miner defenseless in the economic contest. Prevailing concepts of labor contract and strike rights definitely aimed at checking the "spirit of insubordination" of the worker.<sup>51</sup> The Kaiser's attitude, expressed in a circular issued in 1890, was that strikes were unacceptable and that the state would intervene to correct justified grievances.<sup>52</sup> Such interventions, usually by way of an investigating commission composed of *Bergamt* officials, who had close connections with the employers, were not much appreciated by the workers.<sup>53</sup> The employers united in a common front to resist labor's demands,<sup>54</sup> and by the eve of the first World War still considered the suggestion that unions "have a right to exist and could be trusted with a certain amount of authority" as "high treason" and regarded as proper only the "harshest attitude" toward unions.<sup>55</sup>

The mine workers found it difficult to overcome the legacy of dependence

<sup>50</sup> One contemporary writer maintains that the employers gave preference to former Prussian army sergeants in hiring foremen, and in general treated the workers in a *Kasernenhofstil*; K. Oldenberg, "Studien ueber die rheinisch-westfaelische Bergarbeiterbewegung," *Jahrbuch fuer Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung, und Volkswirtschaft*, XXIV (1890), pp. 665-666; for further examples of severe managerial discipline see Hué, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 74-76, 80, 154ff; Imbusch, *op. cit.*, p. 251; and P. Kiefer, *Die Organisationsbestrebungen der Saarbergleute* (Published Doctoral Dissertation, University of Strassburg, 1912), p. 121. Even today German coal mines are noted for their "ironhanded subordination" of the worker; see Institut fuer Sozialforschung, *Betriebsklima*, (Frankfurt a.M.: Johann-Wolfgang Goethe University, 1954), p. 93.

<sup>51</sup> T. Loewenfeld, "Kontraktbruch und Koalitionsrecht im Hinblick auf die Reform der deutschen Gewerbesetzgebung," *Archiv fuer soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik*, III (1890), p. 425ff.

<sup>52</sup> Hué, *op. cit.*, II, p. 434. For some differences between the Kaiser and Bismarck on the handling of strikes see P. Grebe, "Bismarcks Sturz und der Bergarbeiterstreik vom Mai 1889," *Historische Zeitschrift*, CLVII (1938), pp. 89-97.

<sup>53</sup> M. Quark, "Die preussische Bergarbeiterenquete vom Jahre 1889," *Archiv fuer soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik*, III (1890), pp. 162-172. The legislation which grew out of the investigation was a further disappointment to the workers; Hué, *op. cit.*, II, p. 435.

<sup>54</sup> L. Pieper, *Die Lage der Bergarbeiter im Ruhrrevier*, (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, 1903), pp. 33 ff.

<sup>55</sup> Gothein, *loc. cit.*, p. 333.

on the state. They stubbornly continued to expect governmental protection, even after the mining law of 1865 had definitively established the freedom of contract in the industry. In a rather pathetic petition addressed to the King in 1869 the Essen miners bitterly complained that they were being neglected by the *Bergamt*, who "left all decisions to the capitalists." They concluded that "since we have no other possibility of being soon relieved from our distress... we turn to Your Majesty with the prayer that the Royal Mining Offices be advised to tolerate no longer increases in the length of the work day."<sup>56</sup> They were not prepared to resist their masters. Imbusch notes that they "were so accustomed to the tutelage and wardship of the state that ...for years it would not even occur to them to look after themselves."<sup>57</sup> They appealed for the "rights of our fathers." When the Kaiser received miner delegates from the Ruhr during the big strike of 1889, they told him: "We want what we have inherited from our fathers.... if only Your Majesty would speak a word, everything would soon change and many a tear would be dried."<sup>58</sup>

In the German social and political climate the quoting of the Bible or opportunistic arguments about the rights of the individual, ideas which the British miners used so effectively, would not have been much of an ideological weapon, especially not in the service of a worker who may have been hard put to it to convince even his fellow workers. Workers with a legacy of dependence on their social superiors tend to be reluctant to shift their loyalty to a member of their own group. This shift can occur only once they have accepted the fact that they must look out for themselves. As a result, the start of the German miner's protest movement depended on the assistance of individuals of higher social status who could fashion a compelling protest ideology.<sup>59</sup>

It was impossible for the miners' protest to develop along the lines dictated by their immediate economic interests. Their dependence on outside help inevitably drew them into other movements which had broader social and political aims. This had a far reaching consequence: their repudiation of the legacy of dependence and their will to defend their interests became a function of their ideological indoctrination and of the politicization of their attitude. For political parties anxious to espouse their cause were already in existence and were ready to furnish their protest with the necessary ideological justification. The miners' protest became identified mainly with two major socio-political movements. One of these was the socialist movement, represented by the Social Democratic party, and the other, the Christian Social movement, which was connected with the Roman Catholic Church and the Center party.<sup>60</sup> This

<sup>56</sup> Imbusch, *op. cit.*, p. 688.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 164.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 287.

<sup>59</sup> More than any other group of German workers, the miners had to rely on leaders from the outside, which is exactly the reverse of the situation in most countries. Cf. N. Osterroth, *Otto Hué, Sein Leben und Wirken*, (Bochum: Vorstand des Verbandes der Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, 1922), p. 19.

<sup>60</sup> For the many Polish speaking miners in the Ruhr, the Catholic clergy established separate

party became the political arm of the Christian Social unions. The many Roman Catholics among the West German miners<sup>61</sup> and the political tension between the Church and the state gave the Church the position of a natural protest leader. The aim of the Christian Social movement was social reform on the basis of Christian morality. It attacked the evils of industrialization and denounced the godlessness of capitalism, liberalism and socialism. Its agitation among the miners was held responsible for the major outbreak before 1889, the so-called "Jesuit strike" of 1872<sup>62</sup> and from the ranks of those under its influence came "quite a few union leaders in later years."<sup>63</sup>

The intention of the Church, however, was neither forceful action nor the formation of labor unions. The hierarchy, according to a Catholic miners' leader, was opposed to "any kind of independence for the workers.... they were unable to divest themselves of the view that.... workers had to be guided and led by members of the other estates."<sup>64</sup>

The only labor organizations under direct clerical sponsorship were the miners' clubs, which aimed mainly at promoting good morals and good fellowship and only rarely supported strikes. Often the parish priest took the initiative in the formation of the club and played the leading role in its management. In 1886 a Catholic journalist, Johannes Fusangel, drew together some of these clubs to form the *Rechtsschutzverein*, an organization aiming at the vindication of the miner's traditional legal rights, especially with respect to the *Knappschaften*. *Bona fide* Christian Social miners' unions did not come into existence until the 1890's. They had workers as leaders but kept members of the clergy as advisers.

The socialists began to organize the miners in the 1860's but with little success. Like their Christian Social rivals, they waged a vigorous protest campaign on behalf of the mine workers, who, however, were slow to respond. Not until the 1890's did socialism gain a solid foothold among them. Socialistically oriented workers captured the union which grew out of the 1889 strike, but it nearly died out in the following years. Nevertheless, after 1895 it made rapid progress, expanded from the Ruhr to other areas and became by far the most powerful miners' organization in the country. On a few occasions the unions from the rival ideological camps cooperated, but usually there was strong tension between them.

There was tension also within the ideological camps regarding the role of the unions. The unions had become heirs to ideological orientations that envisaged not so much a day-to-day struggle with the employers as the remodeling of society along preconceived theoretical lines and the establishment of an in-

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organizations with strong Polish nationalist and anti-Prussian sentiments. Only very few miners joined Hirsch-Duncker trade unions.

<sup>61</sup> In 1910 74% of the Saar miners were Roman Catholics; F. Roy, *Le mineur sarrois*, (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1954), p. 42.

<sup>62</sup> Oldenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 917.

<sup>63</sup> Hué, *op. cit.*, II, p. 387.

<sup>64</sup> Imbusch, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

dustrial order which would make the daily struggle unnecessary. As the unions gained in power and prestige, they leaned more and more toward the pursuit of their immediate self-interest. Conflicts over "proper" union aims and methods were inevitable. On the one hand, there were many Church officials who felt that the Christian Social unions were becoming too independent and too materialistic,<sup>65</sup> and on the other, there were influential Social Democrats who poured bitter scorn over the union's "opportunism."<sup>66</sup> The workers had outgrown their dependence on a benevolent government, but to some extent they had exchanged one set of masters for another. They still could not act by themselves because they were still dependent, ideologically and politically, on outside allies.

### *Summary and Conclusion*

This study has traced, at the level of employer-worker relations, the interplay of social forces determining the character of labor protest. It showed that although the British miners were nearly social outcasts in the pre-industrial period, they had enough personal independence to develop crude habits of self-defense. As their horizons widened during industrialization, they were able to learn more effective methods of self-defense and to proceed independently and opportunistically, relying, so to speak, on their opponents' ideological arsenal while the employers, the state and public opinion became accustomed to their role as a force in the industrial society. By contrast, the German miners enjoyed a state-protected status and special economic advantages during the pre-industrial period but inherited legacies of submissiveness and of dependence on the state. During industrialization they were unable to challenge their masters by themselves; their will and ability to defend their interests became a function of ideological indoctrination and political alliances. The result was that industrial protest, spurred by rival ideologies, and social and political reform became inseparably entangled, contributing to a deepening of social tension not only between workers and employers, but between workers and the state and among workers themselves.

It may be permissible at this point to make somewhat speculative observations on the broader implications of this study. Where a collective labor protest movement is allowed to develop, its successful adaptation to the industrial society depends on radical changes in outlook and attitude among workers as well as among employers and government officials.<sup>67</sup> Instead of

<sup>65</sup> This conflict involved the unions, the hierarchy, and the Center party and was carried at least twice all the way to the Vatican. For a brief description see M. J. Koch, *Die Bergarbeiterbewegung im Ruhrgebiet zur Zeit Wilhelms II.* (Duesseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1954), pp. 129-134.

<sup>66</sup> For a specific illustration see K. Kautsky, "Die Lehren des Bergarbeiterstreiks," *Die Neue Zeit*, XXIII:i (1904-05), No. 24, pp. 772-782. The function of strikes was a key issue, see H. Herkner, *Die Arbeiterfrage*, (Berlin: Vereinigung wissenschaftlicher Verleger, 1921), II, pp. 387-394, 404-407. For a general discussion of the problem see P. Gay, *The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952).

<sup>67</sup> This implies some balance between industrial democracy and industrial conflict.

being more or less resigned to obey their masters and accept their lot as God-given, the workers, if they want to control their own protest movement, must develop a will to struggle for change and an insistence on rights they did not possess in the past. The more they are bound by traditional values, especially of the kind which considers loyalty to superiors and respect for authority equivalent to self-respect and proper conduct, the more difficult the transition is likely to be. To muster the zeal and perseverance needed for the support of a protest movement, the workers must repudiate this traditionalism; a genuine protest temper demands that they be convinced of the righteousness not only of their demands but also of the novel means proposed to enforce them; they must be willing to give their loyalty to new leaders and new organizations. Employers, who see their interests and authority threatened, and government officials, who find law and order menaced, must learn to accept the challenge from below. The workers, through their spokesmen, try to make the best case they can for their cause, but to a very large extent their strategy is dictated by the kind of opposition they meet. Their strategy depends mainly on the character of existing authority relationships, on whether managerial authority can be effectively attacked within the existing system or whether the system itself must be attacked. The present study suggests that these opposite alternatives tend to yield two major types of protest legitimization: the workers' spokesmen may insist that labor and management have basically identical ideals but management fails to live up to them, or they may argue that their aims are irreconcilable but only those of labor are justifiable, either on moral or historical grounds.

The emergence of labor protest during industrialization gives the workers, in Bendix's terms, "an opportunity for self-assertion at a time when their security and self-respect are threatened." The more serious this threat, and the more difficult a society makes the legitimization of protest, the more all-encompassing and revolutionary the aims of the protest movement are likely to become. The problem is, of course, that a society has only limited control over the forces shaping the protest movement. Historical legacies do not vanish overnight, and it takes time for the ruling groups in any society to become reconciled to the challenge of the labor movement. This reconciliation is much more difficult in a rigidly stratified society where the employers are allied with a centralized ruling bureaucracy, as was the case in Germany, than in a more fluid society where the employers at times seek the support of the workers to challenge the power of an entrenched aristocracy, as was the case in Britain. Therefore, in the crucial stages of early industrialization it may not be possible to direct protest into those channels which would be most desirable in the long run.

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## POPULAR IDEOLOGIES IN LATE MEDIAEVAL EUROPE: TABORITE CHILIASM AND ITS ANTECEDENTS

The basic Chiliastic character of the Taborite articles was recognized by scholars a long time ago. A. Hauck deals with the problem in his *Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands*,<sup>1</sup> in which he introduces the problem to the general public. His knowledge of the subject is based solely on the Latin sources, since he did not read Czech. When German and Czechoslovakian scholars dealt with the problem questions of sectarian influence, such as the Waldensian, and of nationalism tended to prevail. However after 1945 the young Marxian historiography of the CSR tried to discover the social roots of these ideas, focussing attention on certain social and economic questions which even the bourgeois historians had admitted to be relevant.

Starting with the perception of Marx and Engels that the existence of revolutionary ideas in a given epoch presupposes the existence of a revolutionary class<sup>2</sup> J. Macek came to the conclusion that urban and rural poverty were the driving forces of the Hussite revolution and that Chiliasm was the appropriate ideology for the movement.<sup>3</sup> He denied foreign sectarian influence, and explained Chiliastic Taborism solely by the Bohemian environment. "The revolutionary ideology of the popular heretic movement did not depend on a trans-fusion of ideas from one sect to another, or from one country to another but could arise indigenously out of the deep humiliation, oppression and exploitation of our people.... What was 'international' in Tabor was a class war against the common enemy, against the feudal lords and the church".<sup>4</sup> Likewise from this point of view, the Picards who were destroyed in 1421 by Žižka belong to the old Taboritic Chiliasm and were not a separate sect; they merely pushed its ideal of poverty to extremes.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A. Hauck, *Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands*, Vol. V (2) (Berlin, 1953, new edition), pp. 1080-1089.

<sup>2</sup> Marx-Engels, *Die deutsche Ideologie* (Berlin, 1953, new edition, Bücherei des Marxismus-Leninismus), Vol. 29, p. 45.

<sup>3</sup> J. Macek, *Tábor v husitském revolčním hnutí*, Vol. I (Prague, 1956, 2nd edition), Vol. II (Prague, 1955, Českoslov. Akad. Věd.), German edition: J. Macek, *Die hussitische revolutionäre Bewegung*, (Berlin, 1958).

<sup>4</sup> Macek, *Tábor*, Vol. I, 153, 159.

<sup>5</sup> Macek, *Tábor*, Vol. II, 103, 112.



Taborite Chiliasm was unquestionably an anti-feudal movement, supported by the lowest social strata of the towns and the countryside.<sup>6</sup>

Two phases of the Chiliastic movement are clearly distinguishable. Originally, the movement followed traditional aims which we shall discuss later. Its followers looked for the Second Coming when the Lord would annihilate evil without effort on their part. From February 14, 1420, this pacifist mood turned into frenzied fanaticism, the little town of Usti was destroyed and Tabor was founded. The time had come, it was proclaimed, to launch a militant struggle for the reorganization of the world.<sup>7</sup> All believers were summoned to leave the villages and towns and flee to the mountains, to escape the wrath of the Lord. Prague, like Babylon the great, was to perish in the flames.<sup>8</sup> During this time of wrath the Brothers of Tabor were "the representatives of God, his envoys, called to root out every offense and all evil from the kingdom of Christ"; they were "sent forth to lead the blessed out of Sodom". As avengers, they must move in with fire and sword against the enemies of God, and were to spare no one. This campaign of destruction was directed above all against churches, chapels, altars and against both the houses and the persons of the clergy.<sup>9</sup> Any territory they should enter was to belong to them. Payment of rent or labor service to the enemies of God was forbidden. Preachers went into the villages calling on the peasants to rise against their lords, and to seize the land.<sup>10</sup> "No longer is anything mine or yours; in the community everything is owned in common. So shall it ever be in the community, nobody may call anything his own, otherwise he commits a mortal sin".<sup>11</sup> In Tabor, Pisek and Vodňany newcomers were required to throw their money and jewelry into barrels provided for the purpose before they could be admitted to the community.<sup>12</sup> Thereby the earthly lord-serf relationship was dissolved; from that time forth there were to be only brothers and sisters.<sup>13</sup> The old man-made order of law was to fall:<sup>14</sup> debtors were released from their debts and marriage might be

<sup>6</sup> On the social structure of Tabor, *ibid.* pp. 343-349; on cities and villages from which inhabitants fled to Tabor, pp. 356-378; on the occupation of the citizens of Tabor in 1432-1450, and on the peasants leaving Tabor in 1422-24, Vol. II, 373-82.

<sup>7</sup> Compare F. M. Bartoš, "Do čtyř pražských artykulů. Z myšlenkových i ústavních zápasů let 1415-1420", *Sborník příspěvků k dějinám hlavního města Prahy*, Vol. V (2) (Prague, 1932), p. 567.

<sup>8</sup> Taken out of the Chiliastic articles of the old Czechoslovakian edition by J. Macek, *Ktož jsú boží bojovníci. Čtení o táboře v husitském revolučním hnutí*. (Prague, 1951), (article VII, VIII, X, XII) p. 58. A later version in Latin, shorter, used by I. von Döllinger, *Beiträge zur Sektengeschichte des Mittelalters*, vol. II (Munich, 1890), pp. 691-700. A general survey of the sources in Macek, *Tábor*, vol. I, pp. 379-386. J. Macek, "Táborské chiliastické články", *Historický sborník*, vol. I (Prague, 1953), pp. 63-64.

<sup>9</sup> Chapter XIV-XV, XX, XXI *op. cit.*, pp. 58, 59.

<sup>10</sup> Chapter XVII, XIX, p. 59 and Jan Příbram, *Život kněží tábořských*, *ibid.* p. 265.

<sup>11</sup> Chapter XXIII, p. 59.

<sup>12</sup> Jan Příbram, *op. cit.*, p. 264 ff.

<sup>13</sup> Article XXXIX, p. 61.

<sup>14</sup> Article XXV, p. 59, Příbram p. 271.

dissolved if it hindered anyone's flight to the mountains.<sup>15</sup> The era of written law was at an end; even the New Testament had lost its validity, since from now on "the divine law was written in the heart of every individual, and this was all the teaching (*učenie*) anyone needed."<sup>16</sup> Thus the time had come for Christ to descend to earth in the flesh so that all could see him, and so that he could set up his visible kingdom on the mountains. "Like a king he will move among the banqueters and he will cast out all who have not their nuptial garments, along with the wicked who have not come to the mountains, into outermost darkness."<sup>17</sup> Henceforth the dead "who have already died in Christ will rise", in the first rank being Master Huss, revered of all Taborites.<sup>18</sup> It is obvious that the lordship of Christ was to supersede that of earthly kings.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, it was proclaimed, the state of innocence "as with Adam, Enoch and Elias in Paradise will return; no one will hunger and thirst nor suffer pain in body or spirit, nor adversity". Procreation will be pure, and birth painless, therefore everyone is freed from marriage bonds.<sup>21</sup> Children born of virtuous parents need no baptism, since they received the Holy Spirit in the womb.<sup>21</sup>

This emphasis on the power of the Holy Spirit is typical of the Taborites. The most important preacher of the left wing, the so-called Picards, Martin Húška, saw the Holy Spirit even in Christ, of whom it is written in the Gospel: "He shall send you another comforter" (John 14:16). This Spirit-Christ will dwell with mankind until the end of the world.<sup>22</sup> The sources handed down to us from anti-Picard writers are filled with this theory of the Holy Spirit. At the end of January 1421 the Picards moved to Příběnice on the Luschnitz (south-west from Tabor), after the so called urban-knightly opposition in Tabor, made up of craftsmen, merchants and knights, had obtained the upper hand and were rejecting the far-reaching social and religious demand for the condition of poverty. This obliged the more conscientious to leave the City of Hope and found a new Tabor. The old Czech chronicles mention 300 people, Laurentius of Bržová 200 men, women and children, reaching for a new goal.<sup>23</sup> Unfortunately the group was deprived of leadership when Ultraquist lords on January 29, 1421 threw Martin Húška into prison. Macek emphasizes correctly that this was a heavy blow for the cause of poverty, since Húška had education and a political sense, both of which were lacking in the rank and file.<sup>24</sup> In a letter from prison dated February of the same year, Martin warns his followers:

<sup>15</sup> Article XXIV, p. 59.

<sup>16</sup> Article XXXVII, XXXVIII, p. 61, Příbram p. 275

<sup>17</sup> Article XXVII, p. 60.

<sup>18</sup> Article XXIX, p. 60.

<sup>19</sup> Article XXX, p. 50.

<sup>20</sup> Article XXXI-XXXIV, LXXVIII, p. 60 ff.

<sup>21</sup> Article XL, p. 61.

<sup>22</sup> Příbram p. 291.

<sup>23</sup> "Staré letopisy české", ed. Palacký-Charvát in Macek, op. cit., p. 117 Laurentius of Bržová, "Historia hussitica", *Fontes rerum Bohemicarum*, V (Prague, 1893), p. 475.

<sup>24</sup> Macek, Tabor, Vol. II, p. 303.

"Do not carry anything out hastily, as some have already done. Do not slander anything, that is beyond your understanding."<sup>25</sup> Of what kind of hasty actions was he speaking?

Doubtless he referred to the abolition of the mass and the reviling of the cross. The people were assuming that since God dwelt in them they could not sin. They said: "A time is coming when there will be such love among men that all things will be common, even women. The sons and daughters of God must be free, there shall be no marriage bonds."<sup>26</sup> The Lord's Prayer now ran, "Our Father, who art in us, enlighten us!" The creed they omitted, since they considered the faith of the Old Taborites and Ultraquists to be an error. They observed no holy days, regarding all days as alike except that they interpreted the seventh day as the Seventh Era. They called the heavens their roof and held that God did not dwell there nor the devil in hell, but that good and evil existed only in man. They saw Jesus as a brother, and did not believe in his death, for the Holy Spirit never dies, and the son of God must come forth from the Holy Spirit.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, they apparently indulged in libertine practices, and went about naked like Adam and Eve in Paradise, which had been recreated for them.

In short, these people manifested the most extreme chiliasm. For them, time had come to an end. The graves were to open. The Era of the seventh angel was at hand, as it is written in the revelation of St. John. Over the whole earth blood was to rise to the bridles of horses. They strove, to the best of their ability, to make these prophecies come true. One must remember that they were oppressed, for they were persecuted not only by the moderate Hussites, but also by the Taborites under Žižka. They spared no one, but killed all—men, women and children—and set fire to towns and villages in the night. To justify these actions they quoted Scripture: "At midnight there was a cry" (Matth. 25:6).<sup>28</sup> In October 1421, under their deified leader Rohan, a smith, they put up a desperate fight on the island of Hamr against the superior forces of the Taborites under Žižka. All of them were either killed or taken prisoner and burned as heretics.<sup>29</sup>

It would be an historical error to write off this Taboristic group as absurd and deluded, without significance in the Hussite revolutionary movement.<sup>30</sup> Its members were flesh of the Taborite's flesh, a product of rural and urban poverty, and the core of their ideology was the same Chiliasm which found a home in

<sup>25</sup> The letter is an appendix of the *Historia hussitica*, reprinted in a footnote, *op. cit.*, p. 495 g.

<sup>26</sup> "Staré letopisy české", ed. F. Šimek (Prague, 1937), p. 27 ff.

<sup>27</sup> Laurentius, *op. cit.*, p. 518. It deals with the report which Žižka gave to the magistrates of Prague after the suppression of the last Picards on the Isle of Hamr in the Nežarka River, Oct. 21, 1421.

<sup>28</sup> F. Šimek, p. 31; Laurentius, p. 518; Palacký-Charvát, p. 118.

<sup>29</sup> Laurentius, p. 519.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. G. Heymann, *John Žižka and the Hussite Revolution* (Princeton, N. J., 1955), pp. 261-264. The *Staré letopisy* saw in them people who had lost their mind since they insist that God had revealed his will to them; but in reality these things mirrored the devil; Palacký-Charvát, *op. cit.*, p. 117 ff.

Tabor and persisted there until the end of 1420. To have proved this is the great service Macek has rendered. At the same time this open Spiritualist tendency points to problems in intellectual history which cannot be explained solely by the influence of Huss and Wycliffe.

The hearts of the Picards were filled with the power of the Holy Spirit. This was why they believed God's law to be within, and that it need not be derived from Scripture. This sense of being filled with God produced a state of love, created a community of sons and daughters of God who could nevermore be divided. It was for this reason that the old form of marriage was abolished, for it was based on class divisions now transcended; in the Age of the Spirit, that is, of freedom, it was a contradiction. The reformulation of the Lord's Prayer is to be explained in the same way. In the same way the Holy Spirit, dwelling within, made Jesus one's brother, for the Spirit dwelt also in Jesus. It was for this reason that he could not die, for no one could kill the Spirit.

It may have been by the same reasoning that they reached the conclusion that their enemies would become blind if they opposed the bearers of the Spirit; and that these enemies could not prevail against them if they remained firm in the faith.<sup>31</sup> It follows further that because there was a Son of God whose position did not depend on an act of salvation and redemption, they were all sons of God by the fulness of the Holy Spirit which they possessed in common. What seemed to their opponents an unheard of blasphemy was for them a basic truth. Their leaders like Rohan, Moses and Adam justifiably called themselves God or Sons of God (Adam- *filium Dei se dixit*). The complete equality of rights of the sexes gave women a chance of leadership, as in the case of Rohan's comrade Maria.<sup>32</sup> Thus all members of the sect were through their possession of the Spirit godlike, and the formula "the Sons and Daughters of God" is to be understood literally, not symbolically.

The propaganda leaflet called *Puer Bohemus*, which was distributed as far afield as Northern France, comes out of the same constellation of religious ideas. It holds that not only are the Scriptures permeated by the Holy Spirit, but also everything which is true, irrespective of who writes it down or speaks it; for as everything which comes from God is good, so is everything which comes from Him true. Whoever proclaims the truth speaks by the Holy Spirit.<sup>33</sup> Bartoš believed that he had found the trail which connected the Bohemian Picards with those in Northern France which Eneas already

<sup>31</sup> F. Šimek, p. 30.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Macek, on the position of women among the Taborites and Chiliasts, *Tábor*, Vol. II, pp. 83-86, also A. Kolářová-Cišařová, *Žena v hnutí husitském* (Prague, 1915).

<sup>33</sup> F. M. Bartoš, "Puer Bohemus. Dva projevy husitské propagandy", *Věstník Kral. České společnosti nauk*, 1922/23, pp. 8-52, especially p. 44 ff.: "Primum ergo non negamus, quemadmodum negare nos perhibetis, scripturam adeo esse inspiratam, unde ymno dicimus, sicut dicit Petrus quod 'scriptus sancto inspirante locuti sunt sancti dei homines' scripturam autem non tantum evangelicam, apostolicam et propheticam, sed omne verbum, a quocumque est scriptum vel editum, quia sicut omne bonum a deo est, ita et omne verum."

alluded to, when he wrote: "Piccardus — ex Gallia Belgica — in Bohemian penetravit"<sup>34</sup> and Laurentius von Březová reported the entrance of these people into Prague in 1418.<sup>35</sup> For these reasons Bartoš compared them with the *homines intelligentiae* who belonged to the sect of the Free Spirit, and were condemned in 1411 in Brussels.<sup>36</sup> R. Holinka,<sup>37</sup> and lately H. Kaminsky,<sup>38</sup> have also established the influence of this widespread heresy, both on purely phenomenological bases. In this connection there is a source long overlooked in a manuscript of the former Cistercian monastery of Hohenfurt (Vyšší Brod). It is a Taborite tract in the early new High German language against the German "Heretics" of the year 1421, beginning with the characteristic sentence: "We, the *Society of the Free Spirit* (italicizing mine, E. W.) *Brotherhood of Christ*, pity all our famous Bohemians who divide themselves in two, turning toward our destroyers and the subverters of our righteous faith." The end of this tract, unfortunately only a fragment, breathes the very breath of Chiliasm: "And whoever will be a Christian, stand by us. Everyone gird up his loins, brother spare not brother, father spare not son, son spare not father, neighbor spare not neighbor, so that the German heretics collect themselves and be eliminated from this world, like the usurers and the avaricious priesthood. Then we shall fulfill the seventh commandment of God, according to the words of St. Paul: covetousness is idolatry, and the idol and the worshippers of idolatry shall be killed, so that our hands may be sanctified by the cursed; Moses in his books gives us a like example, for what was written there should serve us as a sign..."

Here the manuscript breaks off.<sup>39</sup> It seems to form a link in the historical chain of phenomenological evidence, and justifies us in speaking about the heresy of the Free Spirit Sect as one source of Bohemian Chiliasm. Some researchers presume Joachim of Fiore to be a second source. M. M. Smirin sees the influence of the Calabrian abbot in the Taborite method of Scriptural interpretation: "It is not hard to recognize that we have here Joachim of Fiore's idea, in his *Comparison of the Old and New Testament*, of establishing the true spiritual meaning of the Scriptures."<sup>40</sup>

R. Kestenberg-Gladstein deals more specifically with this relationship. She shows that the Hussite movement furnished an ideal soil for the ideas of Joachim of Fiore, even though there is no mention in the sources either of

<sup>34</sup> Aenea Sylvius, *Historia de Bohemorum...*, (Frankfurt-Speyer, 1677), p. 72.

<sup>35</sup> Laurentius, p. 431

<sup>36</sup> F. M. Bartoš, "Pikardi a Pikarti", *Časopis národního musea*, 101, 1927, pp. 225-250.

<sup>37</sup> R. Holinka, "Sektářství v Čechách před revolucí husitskou", *Sborník Filos. Fak. Univ. Komenského v Bratislavě* VI, 52 (1929) pp. 168-173.

<sup>38</sup> H. Kaminsky, "Chiliasm and the Hussite Revolution", *Church History*, vol. 26 (1957), pp. 43-71.

<sup>39</sup> MS. 123, folio 278-279 v., see W. Schlierbach, *Xenia Bernardina*, II (Vienna, 1891), p. 283, Edited by E. Werner in Büttner-Werner, *Circumcellionen und Adamiten* (Berlin, 1959), pp. 135-140.

<sup>40</sup> M.M. Smirin, *Die Volksreformation des Thomas Münzer und der Grosse Bauernkrieg* (Berlin, 1952), p. 258.

Joachim nor of his *tertius status*. She draws for comparison on the concept *regnum reporatum* which the Taborites used for the end of the era, and which is derived from Joachim. The reappearance of Christ, the painless birth of children in the new kingdom, and the designation of the Prague of the Utraquists as Babylon — all this is Joachite heresy. The term *tertius status* may have been avoided not from ignorance but deliberately. The Taborites' hopes were so confident that they had no need of the term.<sup>41</sup>

Macek, however, rejects such derivations as unhistorical. In his visions of the third era, Joachim refers to a monastic order and the cowl. He makes no attack on the Church or the Pope. He speaks of the third era as lasting a thousand years; the Taborites on the contrary gave the kingdom of Christ no time limit. They never divided the life of Christianity into three periods. According to them the Holy City of Jerusalem was not to descend from heaven, but was to be wrought by force of arms. The main task rested not with the clergy, but with simple believers.<sup>42</sup> However in regard to the time limit on the kingdom of Christ, Jan Přebíram did report that Christ would rule the world visibly and tangibly for a thousand years.<sup>43</sup> Obviously there can be no question of a literal taking over of Joachim's scheme, since the class structure in fifteenth century Bohemia was quite different from that in twelfth century South Italy. The revolutionary Bohemian populace seized only on those ideas that corresponded to their needs and they stripped these ideas of all qualifications. The dominion of the Spirit in the third era meant freedom. "But the Lord is the Spirit; where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom. We, however, when we look upon the glory of the Lord with unveiled countenance, shall be changed into the same image, from clarity to clarity, as by the Spirit of the Lord."<sup>44</sup> Thus begins the ascent to the divine person within the contemplative order. The Pneuma appears as man in whom the fulness of the Spirit is present, in whom God himself has made his home. Spiritualization is deification. In this notion that what is to come is already secretly at work E. Benz sees the revolutionary impulse of the Joachite view of history. Inexorably it drove the prophets to take an active hand in overthrowing the present age and in establishing the promised age that is to come.<sup>45</sup> Joachim himself did not follow his ideas

<sup>41</sup> R. Kestenberg-Gladstein, "The 'Third Reich'. A fifteenth-century polemic against Joachimism and its background", *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institut*, 18, (1955) pp. 245-295, especially pp. 254 ff., 256.

<sup>42</sup> Macek, *Tábor*, Vol. II, p. 130.

<sup>43</sup> Macek, *Křesťanský bojovník*, p. 265: "Item že ti voleni boží budú s panem Kristen vidomé a citelně za tisíc let na světe kralovati."

<sup>44</sup> "Tractatus super quatuor Evangelia", ed. E. Buonaiuti in *Fonti per la storia d'Italia, scrittori sec. XII* (Rome, 1930), p. 222.

<sup>45</sup> E. Benz, "Creator Spiritus. Die Geistlehre des Joachim von Fiore", *Erasmus Jahrbuch*, 25 (1956), pp. 285-355; H. Grundmann, *Neue Forschungen über Joachim von Fiore* (Marburg, 1950), pp. 81-83; M. W. Bloomfield, "Joachim of Flora. A critical survey of his Canon, Teachings, Sources, Biography and Influence", *Traditio*, XIII (1957), pp. 249-309.



through in this way; he refrained from any attack on the existing Church or on the Papacy.

Petrus Johannis Olivi (died 1298) had however been concerned with the appearance of the mystical anti-Christ, the great Apocalyptic figure, either as a scion of the house of Hohenstaufen or as an anti-pope. Although he did not yet dare to identify the devilish, carnal church with the established Roman Church, Rome was for him nevertheless the symbol of that church which opposed the Church of the Spirit and persecuted it. He inveighed against the reigning Pope, Boniface VIII, for disregard of the ideal of evangelical perfection. This, to Olivi, was the one supreme value by which the Church, theology, and the papacy should be governed. It stood above the papal power because by the law of Christ the Holy Spirit entered into the faithful directly. The Church was thus deprived of sovereign power. Evangelical perfection was the aim of moral and religious life, an imperative from which there was no dispensation. At the end of the fifth era Babylon would pitch her tents in Rome and the "carnal" clergy would form the seat of the Beast of the Apocalypse. The sixth era, the period of transition to the age of the Spirit, was to start with a cruel battle against the carnal church and its adherents.<sup>46</sup> These prophecies too, like Joachim's, were developed on the level of purely passive contemplation. They avoided any challenge to action for any specific group and they kept the monastic orders always in a front rank, attributing to them a desire for reform.

Of those who had taken hold of the spirit of Olivi, the southern French Beguines were already more concrete and aggressive; they had gathered around the Franciscan spiritualists as Tertiarians.<sup>47</sup> R. Manselli has shown that after the burning of four Spirituals in Marseilles in March of 1318 and the execution of three Beguines in Narbonne in 1319 through the Inquisition, a change came over the outlook of these groups. Whereas before 1318 the ideas associated with poverty had dominated their religious thinking, from that time on escha-

<sup>46</sup> Compare F. Ehrle, "Petrus Johannis Olivi, sein Leben und seine Schriften", *Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters*, III (1887), pp. 409-552. R. Manselli, *La 'Lectura super Apocalipsim' di Pietro di Giovanni Olivi* (Rome, 1955), Ist. stor. ital. per il medioevo, *Studi Storici*, fasc. 19-21, pp. 224, 225, 219, 222, 226, 229. L. Hödl, *Die Lehre des Petrus Olivi O. F. M. von der Universalgewalt des Papstes. Eine dogmengeschichtliche Abhandlung auf Grund von edierten und unedierten Texten*, (München, 1958), (Mitteilungen des Grabmann-Institutes der Universität München, Heft 1), pp. 20, 25 ff.

<sup>47</sup> On the position of the southern French Beguines in regard to the Fraticelli and the Spirituals see F. Ehrle, "Die Spiritualen, ihr Verhältnis zum Franziskanerorden und zu den Fraticellen", *Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters*, IV (1888), pp. 1-190, esp. p. 153. A. Mens, "Les béguines et les bégards dans le cadre de la culture médiévale", *Le Moyen Age*, 64, (Paris, 1958), pp. 305-15, emphasizes the independent character of the heretic Beguines in southern France compared with those of northwestern Europe. E. Pásztor, "Le polemiche sulla 'Lectura super Apocalipsim' di Pietro di Giovanni Olivi fino alla sua condanna", *Bullettino dell'Ist. stor. ital. per il medioevo*, 70 (Rome, 1958), p. 409, stresses the significance of the attack on the Church in Olivi's prophecies: "che dalle visioni escatologiche del loro maestro si costruivano armi potenti, per rivolgerle contro la stessa Chiesa, proclamandola priva di ogni potere e autorità...."

tological expectation took first place. It was not by chance that the term for *courier* now passed into their speech.<sup>48</sup>

During his activity in Toulouse the inquisitor Bernard Gui dealt with these heretics especially, and through him we get a good insight into their teachings. For them John XXII was the greatest enemy of Christendom, doing more damage to the Church than all the heretics together, for he transformed the *ecclesia Dei* into a *synagoga dyboli*.<sup>49</sup> No wonder the end of the world was approaching. A great war would break out in which many of the defenders of the *ecclesia carnalis* would fall. The Saracens would press forward and occupy Christendom, coming through Narbonne. They would mistreat Christian women and lead them into slavery. Peter John Olivi prophesied all this in Narbonne, speaking as for God.<sup>50</sup> God had further revealed to him that in the course of the Apocalyptic events the carnal Christians would fall into despair, abandon the faith and die. The *virī spirituales* would however be unharmed, for God would hide them from anti-Christ. Out of them would be formed a new *ecclesia primitiva*, which would receive an even greater outpouring of the Holy Spirit than the original Church.<sup>51</sup> The Beguines already shared in this fullness of the Spirit, which had taken up its abode not only in their souls but also in their bodies.<sup>52</sup> The victory of the *virī spirituales* is also a victory of the Spirit throughout the whole world. The world will then be *bonus et benignus*; there will be no evil and except for carnal desire in some men, no sin. Just as among the Bohemian Chiliasts, private ownership and all its attendant evil was to disappear: "omnia erunt communia quoad usum et non erit aliquis que offendant alium vel sollicit ad peccatum, quia maximus amor erit inter eos et erit tunc unum ovile et unus pastor."<sup>53</sup> They limited these conditions to one hundred years. During this time love would diminish in the world and evil grow again; therefore Christ himself would have to descend to earth and call a general judgement.<sup>54</sup>

Who were the bearers of these teachings, the people who were persecuted, who were condemned and burned at the stake in 1318 in the province of Narbonne, in 1322 and 1323 in Toulouse and Pamiers?

There is very little evidence in the sources about these events. Inquisitor

<sup>48</sup> R. Manselli, *Spirituali e Beghini in Provenza* (Istituto storico italiano per il medio evo, studi storici), fasc. 31-34 (Rome, 1959), pp. 183, 167 seq., 190 seq.

<sup>49</sup> Bernard Gui, *Manuel de l'inquisiteur*, Vol. I, ed. G. Mollat. (Paris, 1926, Les classiques de l'histoire de France au Moyen Age, 8/9), p. 152.

<sup>50</sup> To the Beguines this man was "ille angelus de quo scribitur in Apocalipsi quod facies eius erat sicut sol et habebat librum apertum in manu sua et quod ei clarius fuerat revelatum tempus futurum et illa que debent contingere pro tempore futuro quam alicui alio doctori". Cited by R. Manselli, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

<sup>51</sup> Bernard Gui, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-150.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.* p. 148 "...sed etiam Spiritum Sanctum in suo corpore sentient habitare".

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 150, 152.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 152.

Bernard Gui differentiated among the heretics according to their grades of consecration. Those with less theoretical knowledge of their teachings stood below those who had full knowledge. Most of them may have had no real understanding of doctrine, merely living as beggars in expectation of a better time.<sup>55</sup> It seems that some among them regarded begging as superior to work.<sup>56</sup> This indicates that the heretics, who in the developed feudal States were quite numerous, came from varying social strata. The large-scale transition to the paying of money rent had resulted in an increase of the non-bond population, working in the country as day-laborers and in the towns as craftsmen or as wage-workers.<sup>57</sup> Separated from production, people formerly industrious gave way to laziness and eccentric dreams. Typical of this is the confession given by the heretic Prous Boneta to the Inquisition in 1325 in Carcassonne. Belief in the work of the Holy Spirit, whose era Peter John Olivi had inaugurated, was enough for her. She saw this faith as uniting Christians, Jews and Saracens, since "qui crediderint in Spiritus Sancti opere salvabuntur".<sup>58</sup> Christ would descend in the form of a poor virgin, so that he would not be recognized and persecuted. The Word, however, would come from Prous, who was to be elevated as the new Eve, of whom it was said: "Tu eris initium et causa salvationis totius humanae naturae seu humani generis per illa verba quae factione de dicere, si credantur."<sup>59</sup> Visions of this kind might appeal to emotional circles of women, but could not bring broad groups together in a movement.<sup>60</sup> The heritage of Joachim trickled away, so to speak, in such circles. It roused expectation and a sense of mission and it sharpened the rejection of the Roman church; yet it inspired no action, nor any practical program. The more radical

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 114, 116. Some of the Beguines renounced their trades; a woman named Amada, from Limoux, testified before the heresy tribunal in 1325 that she lay on Olivi's grave and lived by alms, "credens tunc melius facere querendo sic victum suum et vestitum". Cited by Manselli, *op. cit.*, p. 180 (3).

<sup>56</sup> Bernard Gui, *op. cit.*, p. 166. D. L. Douie, *The Nature and the Effect of the Heresy of the Fraticelli* (Manchester, 1932), p. 253, decided that, "the bulk of the Beguines were drawn from the lower classes...".

<sup>57</sup> See F. Graus, "Die erste Krise des Feudalismus", *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, III (Berlin, 1955), pp. 552-592.

<sup>58</sup> W. H. May, "The Confession of Prous Boneta, heretic and heresiarch, *Essays in Medieval Life and Thought, presented in Honor of A. P. Evans* (New York, 1955), pp. 3-30, pp. 27-29.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>60</sup> The material from the Doat mss. made available by R. Manselli (*op. cit.* in n. 50, above, pp. 81, 189, 192, 261-2, 309, 311-13, 324, 362) shows that at Narbonne, Montpellier, Lodève and Béziers there were some craftsmen among the members. Tailors, weavers, clothiers and candlemakers are named, along with a butcher, a smith, a parchment-maker, a sawyer and a merchant. There is no mention of peasants, the movement was purely urban. Manselli (*op. cit.*, p. 258), because there were clergy in it, thinks the movement had no distinct social profile. This was not so. The records of the Inquisition show that the clergy who participated came from the same kind of urban families as their lay associates. The clergy were bound to the urban environment by a thousand ties, above all when they were active as mendicants. These craftsmen's adoption of Spiritual Franciscan doctrines on poverty clearly reflects the desire of the medieval bourgeoisie for an "accessible" church, without any thinking out of the consequences and without a trace of revolutionary ideas.

turning of the Southern French Beguines against the established status was theoretical; it looked for deliverance to come from without.

In this they resemble the Northern French-German Sects of the Free Spirit of the Amalrican persuasion, which had probably no direct association with their southern relatives.

The Amalricans, who were condemned by the Paris Synod of 1210, combined the principles of pantheism, Joachite Chiliasm and libertinism in their system. Their central idea was the omnipresence of God. Therefore evil was also divine, and the devil was not repudiated. Moreover all men are of divine essence, and whoever realizes that God controls his life cannot sin. Even harlotry does not fall under the concept of sin since it cannot be attributed to the human beings but to God, who determines all actions. Whoever possessed the Spirit was Christ, yes even the Holy Spirit, and his deeds were divine deeds. The Spiritual, that is, whoever possessed this truth, had no need for sacraments, not even the Lord's Supper, for they were only signs like the ceremonies in the Old Testament; as the latter were given up with the appearance of Christ, so the sacraments can be abandoned on the arrival of the Holy Spirit. The incarnation of the Holy Spirit in a sect member not only produced a state of exaltation but gave the eschatological assurance that is expressed in the following prophecies. In five years all men will be Spiritual, and anyone will be able to say: "I am the Holy Spirit", and "Before Abraham was, I was," in the same way as Christ could say, "I am the son of God, and before Abraham was, I was."<sup>61</sup>

H. Grundmann has brought out an interesting point in Joachite thought,<sup>62</sup> one dealing primarily with its speculative theory regarding the Trinity. The Trinity incarnates itself throughout time. The Father became flesh in Abraham and in the rest of the Old Testament patriarchs, the Son in Christ and the Christians, the Holy Spirit in those who call themselves the Spirituals.<sup>63</sup> William of Breton expresses it thus: The power of the Father was in force as long as Mosaic Law prevailed. But when Christ appeared all sacraments of the Old Testament were abandoned and the new law prevailed up to the time when the sacraments of the New Testament were terminated and the Era of the Spirit began.<sup>64</sup> H. Ley believed that he could deduce from this the Amalrican political program. "They defended the interest of the ruling classes of feudal society in their separatist period and tried to destroy the opponents of particular powers" he writes; "the language of Joachim of Fiore lost... its mystifying content. His thoughts gained a new frame of reference in relation to problems set by the

<sup>61</sup> C. Baeumker, "Ein Traktat gegen die Amalricaner aus dem Anfang des XIII. Jahrhunderts", *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie*, XII, (1893), I, pp. 365, 370; II, pp. 375, 372; XII, pp. 409, 412.

<sup>62</sup> H. Grundmann, *Studien über Joachim von Floris* (Leipzig, 1927), p. 95.

<sup>63</sup> C. Baeumker, *op. cit.*, p. 391.

<sup>64</sup> Guilelmus Brito, "De gestis Philippi II", ed. E. Delaborde, found in: *Oeuvres de Rigard et de Guillaume le Breton* (Paris, 1882), pp. 230 ff.

conditions of his time."<sup>65</sup> This seems to me a very bold interpretation, but it finds support in a story of the Abbot of Heisterbach in which William, a pupil of Amalrich, is supposed to have called the Pope anti-Christ and Rome the new Babel. The King of France was to subjugate all other kingdoms, and his son, who would rule in the Era of the Spirit, would be given the wisdom of the Scriptures, and power (*potestas*).<sup>66</sup>

If one ignores the harsh antipapal bias, this story does not go beyond the prophecies of Joachim. Joachim's interpretation of Scripture was colored by his concern over the political tension between the Hohenstaufen Emperors and the Papacy.<sup>67</sup> But our sources contain no appeal from him for political action. One was simply to wait for the third age; there are stray prophecies as to when it would arrive, but these are narrowly sectarian in tone. Smirin rightly pointed out that many people thought of the third age not as an event in world history, but as the attainment of personal perfection through joining the sect.<sup>68</sup>

The Spirituals had marked missionary success in the dioceses of Paris, Sens, Troyes and Langres, especially among the secular clergy and among women.<sup>69</sup> Ley assumes that they turned primarily to artisans, peasants, and in general, to the poor,<sup>70</sup> and the Spirituals' conviction that they had a message may have appealed to the lowly. Their chiliastic hopes continued to be linked with emphasis on becoming godlike and in many Free Spiritual groups with libertinism. Moreover, they democratized Heaven. In their view simple men, by the mere fact of their human nature, had abilities as great as any we can conceive. This turning of man into a God was one medieval way of expressing the doctrine of equality according to natural law.<sup>71</sup>

In his pamphlet *De planctu Ecclesiae* (1330-32), Alvarus Pelagius remarked that the apostles of the Free Spirit sect were welcomed among the lower social classes, especially among peasants, charcoal burners, smiths and swineherds. They attracted these people by promising a life of ease, readily persuading them to abandon their toil and join the sect as wandering beggars. In preaching to the wealthy, on the other hand, the apostles donned the cloak of religion, acting as father confessors to rich burghers and widows and enjoying their hospitality. They sought also to convert laywomen who were under religious vows by discoursing to them in terms of naive piety.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>65</sup> H. Ley, *Studie zur Geschichte des Materialismus im Mittelalter* (Berlin, 1957), pp. 218, 220.

<sup>66</sup> Caesarius von Heisterbach, "Dialogus miraculorum", ed. J. Strange (Köln-Bonn-Brüssel, 1851), p. 293

<sup>67</sup> See E. Buonaiuti, *Gioacchino da Fiore. I tempi, la vite, il messaggio* (Rome, 1931), pp. 123-186.

<sup>68</sup> Smirin, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

<sup>69</sup> H. Grundmann, "Religiöse Bewegungen im Mittelalter", *Hist. Stud. Ebering*, 267 (Berlin, 1935), pp. 356 ff.

<sup>70</sup> Ley, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 382, 412.

<sup>72</sup> Alvarus Pelagius, *De planctu Ecclesiae*, Lyon 1517, p. 172a.

It was A. Jundt's conclusion that the Brothers and Sisters of the Free Spirit probably fascinated the lower classes by holding up to them the idea of a renovation of society. They condemned both marriage and property as imperfect institutions incompatible with godlike union. In this way they condoned theft.<sup>73</sup> The majority of the members of the Free Spirit sect were so much religious driftwood become radical. They wanted to have assurance of individual salvation and to engage in individualistic opposition to the prevailing order of society, religion and morality. They expected to find true freedom in idleness and contemplation. Certain elements of the town populace, such as coopers, carters and porters fell eagerly on the heretics' idea of begging (under the slogan *Brot durch Gott*), and on their notions of unlimited freedom. Uprooted peasants who had suffered the whole gamut of misery, they looked for no more than bare existence. Like the others mentioned above, they fell a ready prey to heretic doctrines.<sup>74</sup> Salimbene tells of vagabonds, robbers, swindlers, seducers, and fornicators joining the Apostolic Brothers under Gerhard Segarelli (1260?-1300), often after a time relapsing into their former life.<sup>75</sup> Once they felt they had achieved salvation, the discipline of an ascetic life lost its attraction.

The *Homines Intelligentiae*, discovered in Brussels in 1410-11, are typical. There were two sectarian circles among them, one following the "Theorist" William von Hildernissen, the other following the "Pragmatists" Aegidius and Seraphim. William stood for the spiritualization of man, teaching that no one can understand the Scriptures correctly unless the Holy Spirit is in him. The time is drawing near when its laws will be fulfilled and spiritual freedom will become manifest. Already now the body, the outer man, is powerless to stain the inner man, the soul, for this will not be damned. Such knowledge fills William with joy and confidence. Among his illiterate adherents these doctrines took on a more earthy tone. They spoke openly of the sex act as the joy of paradise. Virginity counted for nothing.

Aegidius, a layman of sixty, said repeatedly to his followers, "I am the Savior of mankind. Through me you will know Christ, as through Christ you know the Father." Along with these doctrines of adoration and salvation went the Joachite theories of time. The period of the Old Testament was the age of the Father, that of the New Testament the age of the Son, and the present was the age of the Holy Spirit. This was connected with Elias, from whom they expected the reconciliation of the Scriptures,<sup>76</sup> that is to say, the Joachite Concordia,

<sup>73</sup> A. Jundt, *Histoire du panthéisme populaire au moyen âge et au seizième siècle*, (Paris, 1875), p. 101. Also K. Müller in *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 8 (1883), column 204.

<sup>74</sup> H. Martrod, "Les bégards. Essai de synthèse historique", *Etudes franciscaines* 37 (1925), p. 148.

<sup>75</sup> Salimbene de Adam, "Chronica", ed. O. Holder-Egger, *Monumenta Germaniae Historica Scriptores*, 32, p. 287.

<sup>76</sup> P. Fredericq, *Corpus documentorum inquisitionis haereticae pravitatis Neerlandicae*, I (Ghent, 1889), pp. 271-274.



harmonizing the two Testaments with the rule of the Holy Spirit. The *homines intelligentiae* thereby stressed the role that Elias was to play in the apocalypse, a figure whom both Bonaventura and Henoch saw symbolically, in Francis of Assisi.<sup>77</sup>

The Brussels heretics therefore repudiated ancient truth and with it Catholic dogma. In the age of the Holy Spirit truth is new, and to preach poverty, chastity, and obedience would run against it.<sup>78</sup> William and the pragmatists were in agreement on this, except that Aegidius and his people spoke their minds more freely. William, however, at his trial rejected libertinism and the idea of the embodiment of the Savior in a member of the Sect, as well as the Joachite theory of time. Yet his tenth theorem, in which he spoke of the beginning of the age of the Spirit, when the true understanding of the Scripture would prevail and the old law be eliminated, shows that he was moving in the same direction as Aegidius. As with the Amalricans the pillars supporting heresy are Pantheism, Chiliasm, and Libertinism, and as with the Amalricans there is a total lack of revolutionary *élan* and large-scale preparation for ushering in the new age. These people were content to found conventicles, large or small, which met together from time to time to demonstrate how filled with God and spiritual strength their members were. They expressed no expectations of change in society. There was indeed no social crisis at the time which could have served as a focus to radicalize their thoughts.

Yet a hundred years earlier in Italy there had been a kind of anticipation of the Bohemian revolution, the insurrection of Fra Dolcino. The Soviet historian S. D. Skazkin has written a short sketch of economic and social conditions in the territory which served as Dolcino's base of operations, that is, Trento, the South Tyrol, and the dioceses of Bologna and Modena, Brescia and Bergamo. Skazkin sees the extension of trade in the countryside as the key to the depression of the peasantry at the end of the 13th century and in the 14th century. The victorious cities, displacing the feudal nobility as landlords, sought to increase feudal rent as much as possible. This is evident in short leases and in forced manumission, that is, in the dissolution of the peasants' personal relationship of dependence. The sum required was as a rule so high that only a few could pay it all at once. Most fell into debt and were forced by their creditors to make them a yearly payment in addition to their rent for the land they worked. In short, the sale of freedom was only a subtle way of raising feudal rent.

It is therefore understandable that it aroused indignation among the peasants, who rightly identified it as a new form of pressure by the lords. The latter were seeking to absorb the profits that accrued to the independent peasant economy through the

<sup>77</sup> Bonaventura, "Legenda maior", *Analecta franciscana*, X, chap. 15, p. 626.

<sup>78</sup> Fredericq, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

growing ties with the city market. In the 14th century uprisings began in almost all Europe in opposition to attempts to raise feudal rents and in defence of traditional custom.<sup>79</sup>

In addition to this, during the city communes' struggle for emancipation from the feudal nobility the peasants succeeded in building their own organization of rural communes. These were the peasants' own administrative bodies serving to protect their interests. The successful cities which were building their *Contado* at the end of the 13th century threw their whole energy into the subjugation of these rural communes. It was a question not only of establishing the right of lordship, but above all, of the subjugation of rural interests to those of the city. This affected the peasants' production and marketing interests. Everywhere the cities interfered with the rural economy, and exploited it to their profit, for instance, in the price of food. This aroused discontent and opposition among the peasants especially in the territories where the rural communes were most strongly developed, in Northern Italy.<sup>80</sup> The communal lands were confiscated by cities like Cremona and Vicenza as security for the peasants' debts, and in every way they curbed drastically the rural communes' powers. For the use of their land they introduced special taxes to be paid to the cities. Above all they interfered with the established system of land tenure. Forests, meadows and pastures were let to villagers temporarily for payment. Thus a group of well-to-do peasants developed who paid for the lease and then sublet the land to poorer members of the village.

With the extension of the power of the cities over the countryside, middle-class landowners replaced the "village aristocracy", putting the system under their own management, accelerating and aggravating the process of differentiation.<sup>81</sup> It was in this atmosphere of ferment that Dolcino, a pupil of Segarello's, developed his Chiliarist doctrine. Although he leaned strongly toward Joachite spiritual views he thought along thoroughly practical lines. He saw the historical process not in terms of abstract periods, but in actual possibilities of existence. He placed the emphasis on the apostolic way of living; therefore he introduced four realms.<sup>82</sup> The fourth era would bring a complete renovation of life. The clergy and the monastic order would be eliminated because they no longer met the needs of society, especially not in the simplicity and freedom of the apostolic age. Frederick of Sicily, son of Peter of Aragon, would act as

<sup>79</sup> S.D. Skazkin, "Istoričeskie uslovia vostanija Dol'čino", *Desjatiť meždunarodnij kongress istorikov v Rime. Doclady sovjetskoj delegacii* (Moscow, 1956), pp. 389-408, 395.

<sup>80</sup> R. Caggese, *Classi e comuni rurali nel medio evo italiani*, Vol. II (Florence, 1909), pp. 12 ff.

<sup>81</sup> L. M. Bragina, "Obščinoe zemlevladienie v Severo Vostočnoj Italii XIII-XIV vv.", *Sbornik srednie veka*, XII (Moscow, 1958), pp. 31-50. A. Labriola likewise sees town economic policy towards the country as the reason for the rise of a rural proletariat. See his *Discorrendo di socialismo e di filosofia*, VI, ed. a cura di B. Croce (Bari, 1953), p. 140ff.

<sup>82</sup> "Historia Dulcini", ed. Muratori, RIS, IX, 1726, column 458; Kestenberg-Gladstein, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

emperor of the last age, and he would kill all priests, monks, and prelates, beginning with Boniface VIII. This event would occur in 1305. The fourth era had already started with Gerhard Segarelli. Dolcino was commissioned by God to explain the prophecy. Therefore he issued proclamations<sup>83</sup> designed to turn the Christians to him so that they could reintroduce the apostolic life during the time of change, a life of freedom and common ownership. This return to the *vita apostolica* was the basic motivation of his sect, the essential heritage of Segarelli.<sup>84</sup> Out of this he derived his authority and that of his followers, since it also embodied for him the *ecclesia spiritualis*.

Dolcino rallied 4000 followers to fight against the old age in the belief that they possessed divine right, founded on property and freedom.<sup>85</sup> The struggle against the bishop and the communes of Novara and Vercelli, which lasted several years, demanded organizational measures, above all material resources, which Dolcino wanted to procure through church tithes; although tithing as such in the apostolic Utopia was a contradiction.<sup>86</sup> E. Dupré-Theseider has however argued that while the heretic preacher was in the mountains there were no such social needs. There is no sign of any militant push, it is as though he had simply fled with his followers. When he appeared in Gattinara he was unarmed but after his retreat over the Pietra Calva he warned his people to prepare for the defence of the true faith. He himself had as yet no social program but was merely building up the eschatological expectations of the faithful.<sup>87</sup>

No doubt Dolcino was influenced by the fact of enemy encirclement. It is however impermissible to argue that his policy was the fortuitous result of being joined by peace-loving enthusiasts of the type of the Provençal Beguines. Dupré-Theseider forgets the social milieu, without which the movement remains unintelligible. His lack of detail notwithstanding, it is Skazkin's merit that he has made the social environment clear. What is new in the behavior of the Apostolic Brothers is the turning of eschatological expectation and prophecy toward revolutionary action. The fact that Dupré-Theseider finds no articulate social program in the sources does not prove that the sect had no ideas on the subject. The ideal of the primitive church and the hope that the year 1305 would transform the entire scene constitute a Utopia. Behind this were specific ends such as economic equality and the abolition of class divisions.

The Church knew what it was doing when it launched a Crusade against these "fanatics". Dolcino's shrewd and cunning tactics show that he and his

<sup>83</sup> Bernard Gui, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-93.

<sup>84</sup> F. Tocco, "Gli Apostolici e Fra Dolcino", *Archivio storico italiano*, 19 (1897), pp. 241-275, 273.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. G. Dunken, "Der Aufstand des Fra Dolcino zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts", *Wissenschaftliche Annalen*, VI (Berlin, 1957), pp. 494-501, 497.

<sup>86</sup> Bernard Gui, Vol. I, pp. 90-92.

<sup>87</sup> E. Dupré-Theseider, Fra Dolcino, "Storia e mito", *Bollettino della società di Studi Valdesi*, 77 (Torre Pellice, 1958), pp. 5-25.

followers were realists and did not lean entirely on hope and expectation. In speaking of the revolutionary phase, Dupré-Theseider adduces the acts of the Inquisition in Bologna, which show the participation not of proletarians and serfs but, almost exclusively, of the middling bourgeoisie (*medio ceto*), namely, petty merchants, craftsmen, and small property-owners.<sup>88</sup> To derive the whole social character of the rising from individuals who were dispersed after its suppression is methodologically wrong. It is however significant that dissident members of the bourgeoisie should have adhered to Dolcino. This shows that he became a rallying-point for all forms of discontent, that he was threatening to expand his purely rural base of operations into the little towns of Northern Italy and was obviously a menace to the ruling classes. But one cannot overlook the fact that he attracted a mass following among the peasants of the Alpine region. Why would the feudal lords of that region have been so anxious to suppress him if he was attracting only the middling bourgeoisie?<sup>89</sup> The fact remains that in the Apostolic Brethren we have a heresy determined essentially by peasant conditions, a heresy looking not to reform, but to militant combat with State and Church. Radicalization proceeded from this core, not from the peripheral strength among craftsmen and traders; these latter were satisfied with reforms aiming at an "accessible" Church.

As the military situation worsened, libertinism and an exalted Spiritualism came to be intensified, as occurred among the Bohemian chiliasts when their hopes were frustrated. The strict asceticism that Dunken calls "the revolutionary discipline of the masses"<sup>90</sup> and which had marked the Old Taborites as well as the Apostolic Brothers in the first phase of their operation, came to be abandoned. The sect members, under the sense of achieving perfection, linked community of property with free love. In my opinion the charge of libertinism cannot be put down to mere clerical slander. Such an interpretation disregards the extreme consequences of a sect community which relates chiliastic fulfillment with death or destruction, and seeks to accomplish the latter by sloughing off all that is old. Traditional morality becomes totally inadequate. The sense of community within the sect comes to rest on the needs of defence and on hatred of the enemy.<sup>91</sup> In the ultimate phase the heretics' diminished consciousness of self will often incline them to practices and theories which at first played no role or only a subordinate one.

Both Apostolic Brethren and the Bohemian Chiliasts connected Joachite phantasies with social reality and created for themselves a unique ideology adapted to the class demands of the peasantry and the lower strata of the

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22.

<sup>89</sup> J. A. Kosminski and S. D. Skaskin, *Geschichte des Mittelalters*, I (Berlin, 1958), p. 384.

<sup>90</sup> Dunken, *loc. cit.*

<sup>91</sup> Cf. G. Volpe, *Movimenti religiosi e sette ereticali nella società medievale italiana*, sec. XI-XIV (Florence, 2nd ed., 1926), p. 122.

towns.<sup>92</sup> There is no question here of confused reception of philosophical-theological theorems as in pseudo-Joachism and Spiritualism. Rather, we see the medieval populace of town and country at a certain stage of development, building a new ideology out of traditions which as a rule had not dealt with them or with their interests at all. Dolcino himself represents only a vague beginning. The Chiliastic Taborites, on the other hand, produced a well-thought out program which sharply reflects the fifteenth century people's self-consciousness.

Does this mean that wherever the poor appear as an independent faction their aims and wishes will be grounded in Chiliasm?

By no means. When the Ciompi revolted in Florence in 1378, temporarily overthrowing the *Popolo Grasso*, we hear nothing of Chiliastic expectations; indeed, the insurrection had no religious ideology.<sup>93</sup> And yet prophecies were current in Florence foretelling the destruction of tyrants and traitors by the *popolo minuto*. An anonymous writer who wrote a day-to-day chronicle of the insurrection says that a Minorite had circulated these prophecies ten years before, predicting their fulfilment in 1377-8. The serpents of the earth, it was said, would devour the lions, the leopards and the wolves as well as all birds of prey, and simultaneously the people would put all tyrants and traitors to death. A great epidemic and famine would follow, with many fatalities. The church would lose its temporalities and the people would be swayed by false deceivers. In the end the clergy and people would unite, cast out the wicked and live happily with enough to meet their needs.<sup>94</sup> Ideas of this kind did not suffice for the Ciompi, who set up guilds and took measures to raise their standard of living. It was the same with the insurrection of the workers in Siena in 1371. They formulated their demands thus: "Pay according to the orders of the Commune of Siena and not of the guilds." At the same time they put their own men in the government.<sup>95</sup> Religious ideals played no role. The same was true of the Community of Zealots in Thessalonica in 1342-49, which from 1345 was supported almost exclusively by the urban and rural populace. It was swayed by political ideas which left no room for heretic (bogomil) doctrines, nor showed any trace of Chiliastic tendencies.<sup>96</sup>

<sup>92</sup> G. Miccoli treats Fra Dolcino's rebellion as an isolated episode in the history of medieval heresy. The facts do not support this interpretation, for the militant chiliastic push occurs not only among the Taborites but also among the Paulicians, whose armed advance was not determined by eschatological ideas. See his "Note sulla fortuna di Fra Dolcino", *Annali della Scuola normale Superiore di Pisa*, series II, 25 (Pisa, 1956), pp. 3-17.

<sup>93</sup> N. Rodolico, *I Ciompi. Una pagina di storia del proletariato operaio* (Florence, 1945), p. 58.

<sup>94</sup> "Diario d'Anonimo fiorentino dall'anno 1358 al 1389", ed. Gherardi in *Cronache dei secoli XIII e XIV* (Florence, 1876), pp. 389 ff.

<sup>95</sup> V. I. Rutenburg, "Vostanie obezdolennich v Siene v 1371 g. i predšestvujušie jemu narodnich vosstanija v 50 ch-60 ch godach XIV veka", *Sbornik srednie veka*, IV (Moscow, 1953), pp. 152-180, 170, 172.

<sup>96</sup> A detailed analysis of the "Komune" will appear soon in: *Vizantyskij vremennik*, Nr.

The great Peasants' Revolt in England in 1381 was strongly influenced by Wycliffe's ideas, but John Ball was concerned only with the social elements in these, that is, with the doctrine of common ownership.<sup>97</sup> The dispossession of mortal sinners among the lords was to be carried out by the people. There were no Chiliastic tendencies. The peasants were sufficiently well-organized to put forward economic and social demands without any religious husk, and made use of Wycliffite heresy only to strengthen their will to fight. There are other examples at hand as in the 14th century (the Jacquerie, 1358, and Etienne Marcel, 1356-8).

It is thus clear that chiliasm represents only one ideology of the late medieval populace, and was not the only one. This was no accident. The people did not form a solid class. In the towns they hardly formed a party. Until the great German Peasants' Revolt they were dependent on the support of peasants. They were outside bourgeois and feudal groups. The town populace had neither privileges nor property; they had no small holdings of land as the peasants and the petty bourgeois had. In every relation they were possessionless and rightless. As Engels wrote, they were a living symptom of the dissolution of feudal and guild society, and, at the same time, the forerunners of modern bourgeois society.<sup>98</sup> This position explains their radical point of view, their Utopian speculation about a classless society, and their uncompromising practicality. It was understandable that the first attempt to realize their fantastic dreams of the future were doomed, under the conditions of feudal society, to subside into the absurdities of their prophecies. Therefore we see their aspirations in pure form only where the rural and urban proletariat went its own way, where the middle townspeople either split off or played no part, where the land-owning peasants disassociated themselves from the rural poor or where an unsuccessful insurrection collapsed in despair. The organized craft workers in Siena and Florence, the strongly-united sailors in Thessalonica, were too occupied with the immediate struggle for better living conditions, higher wages, and political equality to be concerned with Chiliastic dreams like those of the Apostolic Brothers or the left-wing Taborites. In Bohemia, where in founding their own party alongside the bourgeois and knightly opposition, the people were in process of becoming conscious of their position, Chiliasm doubtless had some influence over them. But the first step was not followed by a second, indeed could not be, for the time was not yet ripe for the classless society. Any further step would have to lead into pure Utopia, into illusion, and end in a complete fiasco. Žižka destroyed the Chiliastic community in order to save the

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XVII, under the title: "Volkstümliche Häretiker oder sozial-politische Reformen? Probleme der revolutionären Volksbewegung in Thessalonike 1342-1349".

<sup>97</sup> M. Brandt, *Wyclifova hereza i socijalni pokreti u Splitu krajem XIV st.* (Zagreb, 1955), pp. 130, 166, 174.

<sup>98</sup> F. Engels, *Der deutsche Bauernkrieg* (Berlin, 1951), pp. 61 ff.



revolution. The poor allied themselves with the bourgeois opposition, bowed again to its leadership.

As Thomas Müntzer developed into the ideologist of poverty in the German Peasants' War, he dropped the career of a prophet, after a little hesitation, and founded a political party, or *Bund*. But the poor were not yet strong enough to win. A new residue of Chiliastic expectations remained, as expressed in Müntzer's speech before the Battle of Frankenhausen. The solution to the problem — the political party — could only be realized after the overthrow of feudal society.

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## REVIEWS AND NOTES

*Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin*. No. X. *L'Etranger*. 2 vols, pp. 405 and 592 ff. Brussels, 1958, Edition de la Librairie Encyclopédique.

Comparative studies in history and social thought have been carried on since 1935 by the Société Jean Bodin, a loosely organized group of legal historians, political scientists, specialists in various fields of history, and, in recent years, also in sociology and anthropology. The center of the association has been in Brussels, the home of its initiator, count Jacques Pirenne, and its secretaries-general, Alexander Eck and, since 1951, John Gilissen.

The society has operated through meetings, each of which has been devoted to a special theme to be treated by representatives of the various fields of learning. The papers presented and delivered at these meetings are subsequently published in the *Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin*. The list of titles of these stately volumes reveals a consistent plan of attention to those great problems of social history the clarification of which requires comparative treatment in the twofold sense of penetration by specialists in various fields of learning as well as in various regional domains.

The topics of the first eight meetings were determined by the founders' interest in the history of medieval Europe, a field in which Belgian, French and Dutch scholars have been leading in recent decades. Volume I of the *Recueils* (1936) is devoted to the central theme of feudalism, *Les liens de vassalité et les Immunités*. It is characteristic of the Société Jean Bodin that of these eight papers of the volume only two dealt with feudalism in France and Spain. The others are concerned with feudalism in ancient Egypt and China, in the Islamic countries and in medieval Russia. The theme is continued in the volumes of 1937, devoted to *La servage* and of 1938 on *La Tenure*. After the interruption of the Second World War the theme was resumed in 1949 in a volume on *Le Domaine*, that of 1953 on *La Foire*, and a sequence of three successive volumes on *La Ville* (1954, 1955, 1957). For its 1957 meeting, the Society for the first time chose as its topic a phenomenon of general social significance rather than an aspect of one particular system of social organization, viz., that of alienage. The meeting had grown to such length that for the collection of its papers two volumes have become necessary. Even three volumes will be needed for the papers of the meeting of 1957, which was concerned with the very general topic

of *La femme*. In 1959 the Society discussed the timely theme of *la Paris*. The subject-matter of this year's meeting, *La Preuve*, is, however, of a more technically legal character. In the course of the post-war years the Society has not only widened its field of activity; it has also attracted participants from England, the United States, Germany, Poland, the Orient, and English, Spanish and German have appeared as languages of presentation and discussion.

Contributors to the meetings and to the volumes of the *Recueils* have been leading specialists of their respective fields. Among the contributors to the earlier volumes one finds such scholars as Henri Maspero, Paul Collinnet, F. Joüon de Longrais, Raphaël Taubenschlag, Pietro Silverio Leicht, Charles Verlinden, Jean Gaudemet, Robert Feenstra, and Pierre-Clement Timbal. The standard of highest competency has also been maintained in the papers on *L'Etranger*.

In the rendition of the title of the two volumes which constitute the subject-matter of our present review, the French word has been used even though it may sound awkward in an English text. But it would be difficult to find an English term that would indicate the totality of the phenomena to which these volumes are devoted. The closest equivalent would be "The Outsider." It seems, indeed, to have been the intention of the organizers of the 1957 meeting to approach the various kinds of human society by investigating the various ways in which they treat outsiders. However, the variety of human groupments is infinite and an attempt at universal treatment of the phenomenon of the outsider would have gone beyond all possibilities. The scope of the investigation had to be limited, and the field was thus determined as the treatment of the outsider to the political community, i.e., the alien. In this connection modern man thinks of course of the alien as the non-citizen of the state. However if the investigation had to be comparative in the sense of contrasting modern Western society to other kinds of social organizations, it had to include forms of political organization other than the state in its modern sense, such as the polis of antiquity or the seignory of the Middle Ages. But even if political community is understood in this broader sense, an investigation limited to it would have excluded those forms of social organization which either did not know at all, or ascribed comparatively little significance to, the "political" organization. If so-called primitive society was to serve as a foil for the better understanding of "higher" types one thus had to deal not only with primitive forms of kingdom, but, above all, with those societies in which the kinship group is the basic unit; and in the discussion of medieval France, not to speak of modern Andorra, one had to deal with the outsider not only to the seignory, the town, or the kingdom, but also with the outsider to the village or the valley. One could also not fail to include societies in which the significance of "strangeness" to the political group is overshadowed by that to the religious community, such as those of Islam, or of Hinduism and its castes, and, in some respects, of Christendom or of the Catholic Church or its sub-divisions.

The happy idea of approaching society from the point of view of outsideness thus proves itself a suitable instrument of ascertaining what kind of strangeness, i.e., strangeness to what kind of group, has been essential in any given civilization. Although, by the directives of the meeting, the authors were induced to concentrate their attention upon strangeness to the political unit, insofar as it can be found in a given civilization at all, their papers indicate time and over again that strangeness to a social class, a neighborhood group, a guild, a unit of worship, or some other groupment may have been more important for the status position of the outsider and that, therefore, such groupment constituted the most significant one of the civilizations in question. The volumes are full of suggestions of this kind. They ought, one would hope, to induce the Société Jean Bodin one day to devote a meeting to the problem of "Les Critères Essentiels du groupement social."

The emphasis upon alienage in the sense of strangeness to the political unit has, of necessity, resulted in great attention to legal definitions of alienage and to its legal incidents. The majority of the papers are, indeed, of a predominantly legal character. This observation holds particularly true for the papers devoted to the status of aliens under the modern laws of the Netherlands (Robert Feenstra and Henk Klomp maker), England (Robert Kirkpatrick), the United States (Carl B. Swisher and S. Thomas), and France (Jean Portemer, Gabriel Lepointe and Jean Hémard). Predominantly concerned with legal incidents of alienage are also the articles on the Greek cities (André Aymard), the Hellenistic world (Claire Préaux), the Frankish monarchy (Francois-Louis Ganshof), Medieval Canon Law (Willem Onclon), France of the Middle Ages and the *ancien régime* (Marguerite Boulet-Sautel, Paul Ourliac, Pierre-Clément Timbal and Robert Villers), on Spanish developments (Rafael Gilbert), or Germany (Hans Thieme), Switzerland (Louis Carlen), Belgium from the 13th to the 20th century (John Gilissen), on Russia of the Norgorod-Kiev period (Marc Szeftel) and on Hungary (Charles d'Eszlary).

In view of the scarcity of materials attention to sources of any kind, legal and others, had to be paid in the articles on ancient Egypt (Count Jacques Pireme), and ancient Mesopotamia (Guillaume Cardascia). The nature of both the sources and the factual situations also required a less strictly juristic approach to the civilization of India (J. Duncan, M. Derrett and Sourindranath Roy), Siam of the 17th Century (Robert Lingat), China (M. H. van der Valk), Japan (André Gouthier), Indonesia before the 19th century (Jan Prins), and classical Islam (Armand Abel), not to speak of primitive society in general (Annie Dorsinfang-Smets) and in contemporary Cameroon (Jacques Binet).

The parade of these monographic presentations is introduced by a paper of John Gilissen's, the organizer of the meeting and editor of the *Recueils* in which he states the plan which the contributors had to follow and in which he also sketches a set of comparative conclusions.

It cannot be the task of a reviewer critically to evaluate the scholarly merits

of the thirty-four articles of the two volumes of this ninth meeting of the Société Jean Bodin. That must be done for each paper by the competent expert. As a lawyer I only wish to state that I have found in the articles on European laws a good deal of new, or newly arranged, material on the history of the law of conflict of laws, of civil procedure, and of constitutional law. Contradictions concerning certain problems of the history of the law of conflict of law may either be more apparent than real, or, more probably, indicate that such monographic studies of specific regions or periods as those of the present volumes will render untenable a good many oversimplifications which have so far been current.

Of the papers in general one might say that the richness of information stands in inverse relation to the extent of the field the paper has to cover. The narrower it has been circumscribed, the more detailed is its content and thus the more suggestive is its significance for comparative history and social science. Attention to detail is required because of the immense variety of the ways of the treatment of the stranger. We have observed already the great differences in the definition of the stranger. Who is regarded as a stranger is only the reverse of the question of who is an insider, and the answer to that question depends upon the exact nature of the group in question and, thus, of the civilization of which it is a constituent. Consequently, each civilization has known strangers to various kinds of groupments and, as also indicated already, strangeness to the political group, if that exists at all, may not be the most important kind, especially from the point of view of the individual concerned. A man may be a non-stranger to the political group and yet an outsider to its ruling group or groups. Professor Gilissen in his summary thus distinguishes between "étrangers de l'extérieur" and "étrangers de l'intérieur." Of the latter kind were the peregrines of the Roman Empire or the *Dhimmi*, the infidel subject, in the Islamic world, or the Jews in the Christian Middle Ages.

There may be a hierarchy of political groupments, for instance, in a modern federal nation such as the United States, or in the 14th century where a man might be a burgher of a city, and the subject of both some Duke and the Emperor of the Holy Roman-Germanic Empire.

How the outsider is treated depends, however, not only on the nature of the group to which he is an outsider, but also on the nature of his particular outsiderness. Obviously, the legal and social position of the resident alien is not the same as that of the transient, and as to the latter it makes a difference whether he comes as a merchant, a pilgrim, a vagabond, or a traveling potentate. Consequently, one finds almost universally that certain aliens are accorded special privileges, while others are treated with peculiar harshness or hostility. Among the privileged, the pilgrim and the merchant appear with frequency.

While it may generally be said that the position of the stranger is precarious, it seems to go too far to assume that he was universally regarded as an enemy. De Visscher properly observes that Mommsen's once generally accepted ident-

fication of stranger (*hospes*) and enemy (*hostis*) is no longer regarded as tenable. Attitudes vary between indifference, xenophobia and hospitality. The fact that the stranger has no rights in the sense of claims enforceable in a court does not necessarily mean that he is helpless and devoid of protection. Even among primitive people travelers are treated with kindness if they observe traditional forms of politeness and thus indicate that they have no hostile intentions. Where travel has come to be a necessity one finds almost universally some form of patronage. The stranger attaches himself to an influential citizen, who, while he assumes responsibility for him, takes him under his protective wing so that an attack upon the guest's person or goods becomes an attack upon his patron. In a society in which, like that of many an ancient polis, only the heads of households had standing in court, a stranger who could find a patron was thus no worse off than any insider who was not a house chief. The finding of a patron was often guaranteed, especially in ancient Greece, by mutuality systems of the kind of the Greek *proxenia* or its counterparts in the Orient or among primitive people. Patronage could also be found on the part of kings, especially when the stranger was willing to pay, or belonged to a group in which the king was interested for reasons of personal advantage or public policy, and in this respect it made little difference whether the king was that of an Hellenistic kingdom, the Frankish Empire, a European kingdom, or an oriental country like Siam. Rulers were also widely inclined, often in combination with the grant of their protection, to regard the stranger as an easy object of exploitation, either in the form of special fees and taxes, or of rights of aubaine or mortmain. The papers bear impressive witness to the inventiveness of the human mind when it has to solve a given problem, viz., here that of rendering possible travel and temporary residence in a world of closed communities; the papers also show, however, that the devices available for the purpose are limited in number and tend to recur under widely differing circumstances. One of these constantly recurring devices is the, more or less extensive, extraterritoriality of fixed settlements of foreign merchants, which can be found in the Hellenistic world as well as in medieval Europe and in the Orient of the 19th century.

The content of the volumes is too rich to be even approximately listed in this review. By arranging the meeting and making its papers generally accessible in these attractive volumes the Société Jean Bodin, its President, Count Pirenne, and, quite particularly, its Secretary-General, Professor John Gilissen, by whom the meeting was carefully prepared and by whom the almost one thousand pages of papers were edited, have rendered a great service to comparative history and social thought.

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## THE EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN IN ITALY 1881-1951

1. The six censuses that have been taken in Italy between 1881 and 1951 give unusually full information on the employment of women. For each region they show both the percentage of the female population that has been employed and the percentage of women in the employed population in each of the various branches of economic activity.<sup>1</sup>

These figures are given in Tables II and III below. They do not take account of such factors as age, marital status, number of children, etc., which might affect the employment of women. The incidence of such factors does not however vary significantly between one region and another. We may therefore legitimately use indexes derived from the census material for the purposes of comparison between regions.

2. Table II shows that in every region the percentage of the female population that has been employed has decreased markedly between 1881 and 1951. The largest drops have occurred in Sicily, Abruzzi, Campania and Liguria. Further, as Table III indicates, the percentage of women in the total employed population has tended to fall. These impressions may be in part due to an improvement in the technique of census-taking. It is not improbable that in earlier censuses many housewives living in rural areas were reported as employed in agriculture who would not have been so reported by the technique of recent censuses. Yet the very great decrease in women's employment in agriculture—a decrease greater than in any other branch of activity—cannot be explained away by changes in census technique. We must conclude that there was a genuine decrease.

Our data show that the percentage of the female population that has been employed has also fallen in manufacturing and in services involving manual labor. The facts thus run counter to the popular belief that the employment of women is on the increase, a belief that merely generalizes the situation of the middle class. It is true that more women from the middle class are entering employment, as may be seen in our figures from public administration. This category includes teachers.

The fall in the percentage of the female population to be employed in manufacturing is largely due to the technical progress that Italy has made. There has been a steady advance in the use of machines calling for specialized labor, with the result that women formerly employed as unskilled labor are no longer needed. Again, traditional manufactures, such as those using straw, along with hand-weaving and other trades carried on in the home, are gradually disappearing. In the 19th century the labor employed in weaving and in the textile industries in general was almost exclusively female. This situation is altogether changed.

<sup>1</sup> The territorial districts given refer to regional boundaries as defined in 1901. The classification of economic activities into five main branches of employment is taken from the census of 1951. The data of the earlier censuses have been rearranged accordingly.

Finally, social legislation has also contributed to reduce the employment of women.

The activities that have attracted more women are tertiary activities, for example, in addition to the public administration sector, the transport sector. The absorption of women in transport is particularly striking in Sicily, Sardinia and Campania, regions in which strong social and religious traditions in the past prevented women from seeking any employment at all.

3. If we divide the time span of our survey into two periods, 1881 to 1921 and 1921 to 1951, we see that the fall in the percentage of the female population entering employment was in general more marked in the first period than in the second. The aggregate fall in the first period was 33.5% and in the second period 24.3%. The range of the percentage variations in the two periods, in the various regions, runs as in Table I.

Table I shows that in regions in which in the first period there was a major fall in the percentage of women in employment, this fall in the second period tended to level off, whereas in regions in which there was only a slight fall in the first period, this later became much more accentuated.

From Table III, which gives the percentages of women in the total employed population in the various branches of economic activity, we see that in industry these percentages fell most markedly in the first period, before 1921. In agriculture, commerce and services, on the contrary, these percentages fell most markedly in the second period, between 1921 and 1951.

The percentage of women among employees in transport and in public administration has increased in almost all regions, but it may be seen that this increase was higher in the first period than in the second.

4. This topic deserves a more extensive and detailed analysis. The purpose of this note was simply to present some statistics that would enable one to see the changes in the participation of women in the Italian labor force in relation to the problems of economic development.

The changes we have traced resulted directly and indirectly from the process of industrialization and the accompanying rise in the status of agricultural work. In Italy this process was slower than in other Western European countries, there being very great differences, economic, social, and cultural, among its various regions. For these reasons we believe that our data will be a useful basis for further comparative regional study.

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TABLE I

*Change in percentage of female population entering employment*

<i>From 1881 to 1921</i>		<i>From 1921 to 1951</i>	
1. Sicily . . . . .	- 73.9	1. Calabria . . . . .	- 43.7
2. Puglie . . . . .	- 54.7	2. Abruzzi . . . . .	- 33.5
3. Calabria . . . . .	- 39.5	3. Piemonte . . . . .	- 33.4
4. Liguria . . . . .	- 37.4	4. Umbria . . . . .	- 31.9
5. Campania . . . . .	- 37.0	5. Campania . . . . .	- 29.8
6. Abruzzi . . . . .	- 34.7	6. Liguria . . . . .	- 29.1
7. Sardinia . . . . .	- 34.5	7. Marche . . . . .	- 26.5
8. Lazio . . . . .	- 31.4	8. Lombardy . . . . .	- 24.7
9. Basilicata . . . . .	- 30.9	9. Tuscany . . . . .	- 23.4
10. Lombardy . . . . .	- 30.7	10. Lazio . . . . .	- 20.0
11. Tuscany . . . . .	- 28.0	11. Veneto . . . . .	- 19.6
12. Veneto . . . . .	- 19.6	12. Emilia . . . . .	- 18.1
13. Umbria . . . . .	- 18.4	13. Sicily . . . . .	- 17.2
14. Marche . . . . .	- 17.7	14. Basilicata . . . . .	- 15.7
15. Piemonte . . . . .	- 13.8	15. Sardinia . . . . .	- 6.2
16. Emilia . . . . .	- 10.5	16. Puglie . . . . .	+ 22.3

TABLE II

*Employment of women 1881-1951*

Regions	Percentages of female population employed					
	1881	1901	1911	1921	1931	1951
1. Piemonte	47.9	45.2	42.6	41.3	28.5	27.5
2. Lombardy	47.9	40.0	35.6	33.2	26.6	25.0
3. Veneto	32.3	31.8	29.5	26.0	20.9	20.9
4. Liguria	39.0	32.2	28.3	24.4	18.7	17.3
5. Emilia	34.5	33.1	29.7	30.9	22.4	25.3
6. Tuscany	33.2	29.0	28.6	23.9	17.6	18.3
7. Umbria	33.1	27.4	24.7	27.0	16.1	18.4
8. Marche	45.4	39.4	33.7	37.3	26.0	27.4
9. Lazio	33.6	27.3	24.3	23.1	16.4	18.5
10. Abruzzi	47.0	38.1	32.4	30.7	16.4	20.4
11. Campania	41.6	33.0	29.5	26.2	15.8	18.4
12. Puglia	38.6	22.5	20.5	17.5	9.5	21.4
13. Basilicata	47.9	40.0	34.0	33.1	15.7	27.9
14. Calabria	57.8	45.9	37.3	35.0	16.3	19.7
15. Sicily	33.3	13.8	11.0	8.7	4.7	7.2
16. Sardinia	14.8	10.1	9.7	9.7	8.5	9.1
Total	40.1	32.3	29.0	26.7	18.5	20.2

TABLE III. *Percentages of women in employed population*

Year	Piemonte bardy	Lom-	Veneto	Liguria	Emilia	Tos cany	Umbria
<i>A. Agriculture and Fisheries</i>							
1881	46.3	40.6	36.0	42.1	32.5	30.3	31.9
1901	43.3	34.6	35.7	38.9	32.7	28.9	27.7
1911	42.4	34.4	35.9	31.7	31.7	25.9	25.5
1921	38.9	27.8	31.3	35.2	33.4	26.9	28.8
1931	22.3	13.3	23.4	20.2	24.5	18.6	17.5
1951	23.6	11.6	24.1	22.7	28.9	21.7	20.0
<i>B. Industry</i>							
1881	32.4	44.4	24.8	34.7	37.8	39.3	24.5
1901	35.5	41.5	25.2	25.4	31.9	31.8	20.2
1911	36.3	38.7	29.1	24.6	29.1	39.1	27.0
1921	35.4	38.9	22.7	18.4	27.2	25.4	21.2
1931	31.2	35.4	26.7	26.7	22.5	20.0	14.9
1951	30.0	31.7	22.3	1.52	21.8	19.1	17.8
<i>C. Transport and Communication</i>							
1881	1.8	1.0	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.7	2.5
1901	3.9	3.2	1.8	1.3	2.1	1.9	3.9
1911	5.3	3.9	2.7	1.5	3.4	3.0	6.0
1921	5.4	4.2	2.6	2.1	3.3	2.9	4.3
1931	5.8	5.1	4.2	2.4	4.0	3.2	5.2
1951	12.2	10.0	7.8	5.5	7.5	6.2	8.0
<i>D. Commerce, Credit and Services</i>							
1881	48.8	40.6	39.5	46.7	39.7	40.5	50.0
1901	48.8	40.2	38.1	43.0	39.8	37.1	42.3
1911	46.7	38.7	39.2	40.9	38.5	35.7	45.0
1921	44.0	37.9	35.8	37.9	36.7	34.0	37.7
1931	41.8	37.8	38.6	39.5	36.3	33.5	37.3
1951	40.5	37.9	37.3	39.5	35.3	32.2	35.4
<i>E. Public Administration</i>							
1881	18.0	21.6	15.5	19.1	13.9	16.4	16.9
1901	21.6	28.0	20.2	17.3	18.6	20.9	21.8
1911	21.8	28.9	18.9	18.0	19.4	20.8	24.8
1921	28.8	36.4	26.6	22.4	26.7	25.3	33.5
1931	36.4	41.3	34.8	30.4	32.8	30.2	38.0
1951	39.2	43.3	36.2	31.2	35.2	32.2	36.0
<i>F. Totals for each district</i>							
1881	42.0	40.6	40.6	37.6	33.2	32.6	31.2
1901	40.3	36.7	32.4	31.9	32.0	29.3	26.8
1911	39.1	35.5	33.1	29.3	30.3	30.0	26.3
1921	36.9	32.9	28.5	25.9	31.0	25.9	27.6
1931	28.6	28.7	26.1	21.3	25.1	20.9	19.2
1951	29.4	28.8	25.5	22.2	27.6	22.4	21.6

*Continuation of TABLE III - (Percentages of women in Employed Population)*

Year	Marche	Lazio	Abruzzi	Campa- nia	Puglia	Basili- cata	Calabria
<b>A. Agriculture and Fisheries</b>							
1881	39.8	33.0	39.3	40.2	26.5	41.4	30.1
1901	38.8	28.4	38.9	40.0	23.5	43.0	39.0
1911	36.7	29.4	39.7	41.6	25.0	41.6	41.8
1921	39.3	29.2	35.6	37.8	22.5	36.9	39.3
1931	31.0	17.8	24.3	25.8	8.6	23.6	25.1
1951	33.6	25.7	29.3	34.3	30.9	36.9	33.2
<b>B. Industry</b>							
1881	44.9	21.6	57.9	46.7	59.8	59.0	73.5
1901	35.0	22.0	37.9	31.3	30.8	29.9	63.0
1911	35.4	25.2	25.0	26.7	24.3	17.3	45.1
1921	31.6	18.0	20.7	19.9	19.9	19.2	33.1
1931	24.8	13.2	11.0	16.2	22.1	7.9	14.6
1951	17.7	13.0	8.7	15.0	26.2	6.6	6.4
<b>C. Transport and Communication</b>							
1881	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.6	0.2	0.1	0.3
1901	1.5	1.6	1.7	0.9	0.7	1.0	1.4
1911	3.0	2.5	3.2	1.4	0.9	2.1	2.3
1921	3.5	3.5	3.5	1.8	1.1	1.7	1.9
1931	2.9	2.9	4.4	2.0	1.5	1.6	1.7
1951	7.5	7.2	8.5	3.9	3.5	4.2	4.7
<b>D. Commerce, Credit and Services</b>							
1881	51.1	44.4	48.3	34.8	41.1	47.0	46.0
1901	45.7	37.6	43.5	33.7	32.8	45.1	43.8
1911	43.2	34.7	38.8	28.0	31.9	38.9	39.5
1921	55.9	35.9	31.0	25.0	22.6	32.2	33.7
1931	39.0	37.3	33.0	25.9	20.9	31.0	36.0
1951	38.4	37.6	31.9	22.2	22.2	29.9	32.9
<b>E. Public Administration</b>							
1881	15.6	13.6	12.7	13.5	14.1	13.5	9.8
1901	19.1	17.6	16.1	15.7	14.6	14.1	12.8
1911	20.7	17.1	16.9	15.9	14.8	16.7	12.9
1921	30.9	18.4	27.3	18.8	18.5	19.6	19.9
1931	33.5	25.1	25.3	24.0	20.6	20.9	22.9
1951	34.4	28.2	29.4	27.7	21.9	24.2	25.4
<b>F. Totals for each district</b>							
1881	40.4	29.8	43.3	39.6	36.9	44.7	48.0
1901	37.1	26.6	37.9	34.7	24.8	39.9	44.2
1911	35.2	26.4	36.4	33.2	24.0	36.8	40.4
1921	37.3	25.1	32.7	29.3	20.8	33.3	36.4
1931	29.8	20.2	22.5	21.8	13.5	20.9	23.1
1951	29.8	24.1	24.9	25.7	27.5	30.8	26.4

Continuation of TABLE III - (Percentages of women in Employed Population)

Year	Sardinia	Sicilia	Total for all districts	Year	Sicily	Sardinia	Total for all districts
<i>A. Agriculture and Fisheries</i>				<i>D. Commerce, Credit and Services</i>			
1881	23.1	9.1	35.9	1881	46.0	55.9	42.8
1901	11.0	4.8	33.1	1901	39.7	56.4	40.1
1911	10.0	3.4	32.7	1911	35.4	57.7	37.9
1921	9.2	4.6	30.2	1921	25.6	56.4	35.2
1931	2.4	3.6	19.0	1931	24.1	53.1	35.3
1951	8.6	5.6	24.7	1951	25.6	48.9	34.7
<i>B. Industry</i>				<i>E. Public Administration</i>			
1881	52.2	31.8	45.1	1881	13.6	10.2	15.6
1901	19.8	11.2	33.3	1901	15.3	8.9	19.0
1911	15.8	16.4	31.5	1911	15.0	11.4	19.3
1921	11.3	12.3	27.2	1921	20.2	17.7	25.0
1931	5.6	8.8	24.2	1931	24.2	20.9	30.4
1951	4.2	6.2	22.0	1951	26.3	27.8	32.4
<i>C. Transport and Communication</i>				<i>F. Totals</i>			
1881	1.1	0.9	0.8	1881	34.4	17.4	37.6
1901	0.6	1.8	1.8	1901	16.8	21.1	32.4
1911	0.7	3.3	2.6	1911	14.4	12.5	31.2
1921	1.0	3.4	2.8	1921	11.4	12.7	28.6
1931	1.1	3.4	3.3	1931	7.0	11.5	22.6
1951	3.7	7.0	6.8	1951	11.1	13.3	25.1

## IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC HISTORY OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES FOR PRESENT-DAY UNDERDEVELOPED NATIONS

In a recent issue, John T. Krause has raised the specter that improved nutrition and health in the underdeveloped countries "will increase birth rates fantastically."<sup>1</sup> Coupled with the present and prospective declines in mortality in these countries this would pose a formidable prospect indeed for solution of "the population problem," and the argument therefore calls for careful evaluation. The available historical evidence provides one basis for such appraisal, and the purpose of the present note is to point to one case in which the evidence conflicts with Krause's hypothesis.

Krause's argument itself rests on the use of historical data. His analysis

<sup>1</sup> John T. Krause, "Some Implications of Recent Research in Demographic History," *CSSH*, Volume I, Number 2 (January 1959), p. 187.



cannot be fully summarized here, but the principal burden of the argument — and the part with which the present note is concerned — involves a comparison of the pre-industrial situation of more developed Western areas with the current situation in underdeveloped nations. This is perhaps a rather generous description of the procedure, since a number of the examples, such as the 20th century Hutterites, Iceland, mid-nineteenth century Ireland, and the French Canadians, are rather suspect from the point of view of "typicality." Indeed, if, after eliminating such problematical evidence, one traces the argument through from table to table in Krause's paper (that is, from Tables III through VI, which comprise the heart of his analysis), one concludes that it rests virtually on a comparison of pre-industrial Sweden with present-day India.

The essential steps in the argument are as follows:

(1) In present day underdeveloped countries there are proportionately more persons married than in the pre-industrial stage of the more developed nations. Moreover, of particular importance for fertility, the age at marriage is much lower.

(2) At a given age, the fertility of marriage in present day underdeveloped countries is considerably less than in the pre-industrial stage of more developed nations. This is presumably due to poor health and nutrition rather than the operation of conscious controls over fertility, which, it is argued, were already in operation in the pre-industrial stage of the developed nations.

(3) Hence the improvement of health and nutrition in the underdeveloped areas is likely to precipitate a rise in marital fertility, and given the greater extent and earlier age at marriage, birth rates may increase fantastically.

Since a central feature of the analysis is the distinctive marriage pattern in present-day underdeveloped countries, one is naturally led, in attempting to evaluate the argument, to search for examples of more developed countries where pre-industrial marriage patterns were closer to those of current underdeveloped nations. One area where such cases can be found is Eastern and Southeastern Europe.

TABLE I

*Married Women as a Percentage of Women in Specified Age Group*

	15 and over	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49
Sweden, 1750	50	4	27	56	71	79	79	75
Bulgaria, 1934	71	17	65	88	92	93	90	84
India, 1931	71	84	90	87	83	70	62	47

Sources: Sweden and India — Krause, *op. cit.*, p. 178 (figures have been rounded Bulgaria — United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook*, 1954, p. 51 (Southern Dobruja is excluded).

TABLE II

*Average Annual Age Specific Marital Fertility Rates per 1,000 Women*

	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	40-44	45-49
Sweden, 1775-1800	522	467	382	323	121	29
Bulgaria, 1906-10 (est. range)	24-141	302-465	356-405	303-329	129-143	58-69
Bengali areas (rural), 1945-46	118	323	288	282	100	33

Sources: Sweden and India — Krause, *op. cit.*, p. 181. Bulgaria — for each age group the estimate was made by dividing the 1906-10 figure for births per 1,000 women by the estimated percentage of the group married. The latter was not known for 1906-10, and had to be estimated. On the assumption that in 1906-10 the percentage of women married in each age group was higher than in 1934, two calculations were made, one on the basis of the actual 1934 age specific figures for percentage of women married, the other, assuming the percentage married was 100 per cent in each age group. The results yield a range within which the 1906-10 marital fertility rates would fall if the assumption is correct that the percentage of women married in each age group was higher in 1906-10 than in 1934. If one reasoned that the 1906 figures for percentage of women married were perhaps not much different than in 1934, the true 1906-10 marital fertility rates would lie near the upper limit of the range. But account should be taken of the fact that the present calculation assigns illegitimate as well as legitimate births to married women, and this tends to bias upwards the estimated marital fertility rates. The basic data are from L'Institut National d'Études Démographiques, *Le Mouvement Naturel de la Population dans le Monde de 1906 à 1936* (1954), p. 82 and United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook 1954*, p. 51.

Tables I and II present the relevant figures for Bulgaria, a nation for which data were readily accessible, for comparison with Krause's figures for Sweden and India. It will be noted that in Bulgaria in 1934, 71 per cent of the women over 15 years of age were married, a figure identical with that for India, and much higher than that of Sweden in 1750. With regard to age at marriage, the percentage of women married at an early age in Bulgaria was considerably higher than in Sweden. It is true, though, that the percentage married in Bulgaria was less than in India for the important age groups 15-19 and 20-24, though not, it should be noted, for the later age groups. However, examination of the data for the countries covered in the United Nations *Demographic Yearbook*, the source for the figures, shows India to be at one extreme of a frequency distribution of countries by percentage of women married at given ages, rather than representative of the underdeveloped countries. For example, for the age group 15-19, there are only two other areas, Korea and Mozambique, for which the proportion of women married exceeds even 40 per cent. By comparison with the more typical pattern for the underdeveloped nations covered in the Yearbook, the Bulgarian figures for percentages of women married at these early ages are not out of line at all. Finally, while exact figures for age-specific marital

fertility in Bulgaria at a pre-industrial date are not available, the rough approximations that can be made of the pre-World War I situation, suggest levels at the early ages falling somewhere between those given for India and pre-industrial Sweden (Table II).

On the whole, then, the evidence suggests a pattern for Bulgaria approximating more closely that for India than does the pre-industrial situation of Sweden. Much of what has been said to characterize the situation of present-day underdeveloped nations might have been said of Bulgaria prior to World War I — more frequent and earlier age at marriage coupled with lower fertility of marriage, presumably due to poor health and nutrition. What then, was the course of fertility in Bulgaria from World War I on, a period during which Bulgaria may be considered to have entered, however haltingly, into the process of modern development? Did the birth rate rise "fantastically"?

Table III tells the story. The birth rate did not rise, but fell. In 1906-10, the crude birth rate was 42.1, one of the highest in Europe and quite comparable to the levels in underdeveloped areas today. By 1935-39 it had dropped to 24.2, and by 1955-56 to 19.8. Moreover, the decline was exceedingly sharp in comparison with the experience of some of the older developed nations. Thus the United Nations figures show a decline from around 39.6 in the early twenties to 24.2 in the late thirties, an average drop in the rate of about a point per year.

This one example does not of course constitute conclusive refutation of Krause's hypothesis. There is need for bringing more countries into the comparison and for more intensive examination of the underlying factors in the various situations. It is worth noting, however, that the patterns for other countries in this area, such as Russia and Yugoslavia, would probably prove to

TABLE III  
*Annual Average Crude Birth Rate per 1,000, Bulgaria, 1906-10 to 1955-56*

Period	Birth Rate	Period	Birth rate
1906-10	42.1	1920-24	39.6
1911-15	38.8	1925-29	34.2
1916-20	26.5	1930-34	30.3
1921-25	39.0	1935-39	24.2
		1940-44	22.1
		1945-49	24.6
		1950-54	21.6
		1955-56	19.8

Sources: 1906-10 through 1921-25 — L'Institut National d'Études Démographiques, *op cit.*, p. 72. 1920-24 through 1955-56, United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook, 1954*, pp. 258-259, and *Demographic Yearbook, 1958*, p. 213. Before 1941, Southern Dobruja is excluded.

be much like that of Bulgaria. Indeed, in searching for insights into prospective demographic trends in underdeveloped areas, one wonders at the relative neglect of countries such as these, where precipitous declines in fertility are known to have occurred. Certainly they would seem to call for thorough study along with the experience of older developed nations.

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